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1| Coalitional Representation in the House of Representatives 
 
There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that 
in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested 
in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in 
the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on 
to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public 
function, local or general. 
–John Stuart Mill (1991, 64) 
 
Oppression consists in systematic institutional processes which prevent some 
people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially 
recognized settings, or institutionalized social processes which inhibit people’s 
ability to play and communicate with others or to express their feelings and 
perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen. 
–Iris Marion Young (1990, 38) 
 Writing in in 1861, John Stuart Mill attempted to articulate a reason for why a 
representative form of government was, in fact, the ideal form of government for any 
society to have. One of Mill’s most important arguments for this form of government 
derived from the belief that the community, or the governed population, provides the 
basis for all governmental power and authority. Consequently, it only makes sense that 
every citizen ought to be able to participate in the exercise of this “ultimate sovereignty” 
in some way. Because Mill perceives true democracy, wherein all people are able to 
speak and participate directly in political decision making processes, as a logistical 
impossibility, he settles on representative government as the ideal, assuming that elected 
representatives will take actions that promote the general good of the community rather 
than their own selfish interests. 
 In practice, though, representative government in the U.S. does not approach the 
ideal form articulated by Mill. Various social groups, often defined on the basis of racial 
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identity are systematically excluded from political institutions to varying degrees and are 
unable to participate in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty held by the people. 
According to political theorist Iris Marion Young, this kind of oppression is especially 
problematic as it precludes racial groups from voicing their concerns or needs in the 
legislative forum where such issues may be addressed, especially in the U.S. Congress. 
Even if people are able to speak out in public about what issues face their group or larger 
community, such proclamations do not achieve much if they are not heard in the political 
institutions that are ostensibly designed to carry the words of the people to the ears of 
politicians and into legislation. Such oppression is especially troubling when considered 
alongside the original function of Congress as intended by the framers of the Constitution 
and articulated in Article I. The framers thought of Congress, specifically the House of 
Representatives, as the branch of government closest to the people and thus the most 
responsive to their desires and interests. Such a relationship is fostered, they argued, 
because of the frequency of elections for members of the House and the fact that 
Representatives are tied to smaller constituencies than Senators or the President. This 
relationship is also crucial to the framers’ goal of preserving liberty for all citizens of the 
United States. As Madison articulates in Federalist Paper No. 52, because it is vital for 
liberty that government has a common interest with the people “so it is particularly 
essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, 
and an intimate sympathy with, the people” (323; see also Federalist Paper No. 57). Thus 
where Mill sees representative government as offering the perfect opportunity for people 
to participate in government and influence the deliberations of those in power—
essentially fulfilling the mission of the House of Representatives as visualized by 
 3 
Madison and the other framers—Young points out the sobering reality that some groups 
do not have the same opportunity to engage in this form of deliberative democracy, 
raising questions about the responsiveness of representative government to the needs of 
all citizens. 
 The critical question to ask, then, is to what extent does our current iteration of 
representative government work for the interests of all people, especially those who 
belong to racial minority groups? Many scholars have attempted to answer this question, 
though there is not yet a concrete answer. What does come through in these studies, 
though, is evidence of the relative unresponsiveness of government to the interests and 
concerns of racial minority groups. In part, this lack of responsiveness has been tied 
directly to how many members of racial minority groups actually get the opportunity to 
serve as representatives within Congress. Because the number of racial minority 
representatives does not correspond to these groups’ share of the American population, it 
is difficult for these legislators to take effective action to realize the interests of the 
groups through legislation. 
We might further clarify the question above, then, to ask: To what extent does 
having legislators of racial minority groups in Congress bolster the representation of 
those groups’ interests in the legislative process? That is, does an increase in the 
descriptive representation of a given racial group translate into the substantive 
representation of that group’s interests in Congress? These are the questions that I 
attempt to answer in this dissertation, focusing on the political representation of Latinxs 
in the United States. However, the focus of my study differs from previous analyses of 
Latinx representation in Congress in a critical way. Where previous studies of the link 
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between descriptive and substantive representation have focused on the dyadic 
relationship between a representative and their constituency—whether defined as a 
congressional district or a state—I focus on Latinx representation as a coalitional 
endeavor. That is, I focus on Latinx representation as a relationship not just between 
constituents and individual members of Congress; rather, I focus on Latinx representation 
as a relationship between Latinx constituents and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
(CHC), a coalition comprised of Latinx members of Congress who work to represent all 
Latinxs as a national constituency that transcends the boundaries of congressional 
districts. Scholarly accounts that focus on individual members of Congress have not 
found strong evidence either for or against the argument that descriptive representation 
translates to meaningful substantive representation, owing in part to the strong effects of 
partisanship and ideology on individual legislators at any given point in time. Focusing 
on representation in Congress as a coalitional practice, I argue, shifts our focus away 
from how each legislator represents their constituents—within their district or 
otherwise—and to an analysis of how members of Congress who are members of the 
same racial group work collaboratively to identify and realize the interests of that group. 
Such a shift is necessary because of the significant diversity that exists within the Latinx 
community, and assessing the extent to which this diversity is represented in Congress 
requires a discussion of how Latinx legislators themselves grapple with this diversity as 
they work together on the basis of their shared racial identity. Coalitional representation 
also calls for an expansion of how we measure representation in Congress—rather than 
focusing only on the passage of legislation, we must treat representation as multifaceted 
and comprised of a wide range of activities that this coalition of Latinx legislators in the 
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CHC undertake in order to boost the voice of the Latinx community within American 
political institutions. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I develop in greater detail my theory of coalitional 
representation, its relationship to scholarship on political representation, and its potential 
benefits for the representation of the Latinx community. I then discuss my methods for 
evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) as 
the coalitional representative for the Latinx community in the U.S. Congress. I conclude 
with a brief roadmap of the ensuing chapters, which detail my exploration of how the 
CHC engages in coalitional representation for the Latinx community. While the CHC and 
coalitional representation appear to have limited success according to standard measures 
of legislative effectiveness, i.e. passing legislation, I demonstrate the unique benefits 
conferred upon the Latinx community by the CHC. These include a deep awareness of 
the diversity of the Latinx community and the incorporation of this awareness into 
legislative agendas and behaviors, as well as several other actions undertaken by the CHC 
that constitute representation insofar as they help make present the voice of the Latinx 
community within political institutions without needing to fight the rising tide of partisan 
polarization in Congress. 
 
Coalitional Representation and the CHC 
Early debates on the nature of political representation are animated by a 
disagreement on the nature of the relationship between representatives and their 
constituents. Edmund Burke articulated two distinct relationships—the trustee 
relationship and the delegate relationship. In the former, constituents elect their 
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representatives, but the representatives do not have to adhere to the specific desires of 
these constituents when making decisions about policy and governance. Representatives 
are entrusted with the power to govern, and to make decisions that the representatives 
deem to be in the interests of their constituents and the nation. In the delegate 
relationship, representatives are more accountable for their actions to the constituents 
who elected them to office in the first place, and representatives ought not make 
decisions that contradict the desires of their constituents or the general population. 
This latter position gained in prominence with John Stuart Mill’s defense of 
representative government as the most ideal form of government. For Mill, one of the 
defining characteristics of a representative form of government is that “the whole people, 
or some numerous portion of them, exercise, through deputies periodically elected by 
themselves, the ultimate controlling power…They must be masters, whenever they 
please, of all the operations of government” (1991, 97). That is, the elected 
representatives who serve in government are not to be treated as trustees, acting in 
whatever way they deem to be in the interest of the general public. Rather, it is most 
important that the general public be able to hold representatives accountable through 
regular elections, given that any legitimate form of government must derive its ultimate 
sovereignty from the people who are governed. Thus, representatives serve at the will of 
the represented, and take actions that promote the “general good of the community” 
(131). 
 If we were to continue to follow Mill’s view, then we would be left to assume that 
members of Congress, in order to be described as good representatives, must be 
constantly attentive to the interests and desires of their constituents and realizing those 
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preferences through legislative action, lest they get removed from office in the next 
election. However, members of Congress are faced with another dilemma given their 
status as national lawmakers: ought they prioritize the interests of their own constituents 
or the interests of the nation? We know that the answer to this question is extremely 
complicated, as incumbent reelection rates remain extremely high even though members 
of Congress often prioritize personal ambition or national interests at the expense of the 
interests of their constituents. Such a question only gains in importance and impact when 
considered in the specific context of racial minority groups in the United States, who are 
perennially under-represented in Congress relative to their share of the national 
population. If members of Congress are considered good representatives by virtue of 
advocating for the general good of the community, then how can any representative or 
group of representatives be considered normatively good when they often ignore the 
preferences of various minority groups that comprise the community? 
 Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) evaluation of the concept of representation, both in general 
and in the political context, helps answer this question to some extent. In the general 
sense, Pitkin defines representation as “the making present in some sense of something 
which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (8). To represent a person in 
government, then, is simply to introduce them to government and its institutions in some 
way. This does not necessarily have to be physical—representation for Pitkin can occur 
simply by making a person’s viewpoint present in government. This leads into Pitkin’s 
conceptualization of political representation, which is different from her general 
treatment of representation in that political representation necessitates a specific kind of 
“acting for” constituents on behalf of the representative. Representatives not only make 
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the views of the represented known in government, they also act for those views and 
attempt to see them realized through governmental action or policy. Going further, Pitkin 
argues that a key element of the relationship between the representative and the 
represented is a sense of accountability, according to which the represented can hold the 
representative to account when the latter takes actions counter to the views of the former. 
Thus, Pitkin’s conceptualization of political representation comes across as very similar 
to that offered by Mill. Both argue that representation requires representatives be 
accountable to the represented, and that the role of representatives is to be a delegate 
rather than a trustee—they are expected to work for the interests of the people regardless 
of constituents’ identities, racial or otherwise. 
 Pitkin goes further than Mill, though, in her identification of different types of 
representation. Foremost among these are descriptive and substantive representation. 
Descriptive representation, for Pitkin, is “the making present of something absent by 
resemblance or reflection, as in a mirror or art” (11). As it applies to congressional 
representation, this is often taken to mean that a descriptive representative closely 
resembles or looks like the people they are representing. Thus, a descriptive 
representative of a woman would also be a woman, and a descriptive representative of 
someone from the middle class would also be someone from the middle class. More often 
than not, descriptive representation is discussed in terms of racial or ethnic identity, 
forming the basis of the argument that in order for racial minority groups to be 
adequately represented in Congress, their level of descriptive representation must match 
their proportion of the general population. That is, the number of people of a given racial 
group serving in Congress should roughly approximate the percentage they comprise of 
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the general population of the U.S. This does not, however, guarantee that the substantive 
interests of the group will be accurately represented in Congress. According to Pitkin, 
descriptive representation is problematic in that it does not engender the “acting for” that 
she considers to be central to the practice of political representation; as she puts it, “in the 
political realm it has no room for the creative activities of a representative legislature, the 
forging of consensus, the formulating of policy, the activity we roughly designate by 
‘governing’” (90). Descriptive representation, then, is not so indistinguishable from 
symbolic representation insofar as in both cases there is no acting for the represented, as 
the core motivation for both of these forms of representation “is in no sense a matter of 
agency” (111). 
 Substantive representation—wherein representatives act for the interests of 
constituents regardless of descriptive characteristics and perceived similarities between 
the representative and their constituents—is thus a preferable form of representation for 
Pitkin. To represent someone on a substantive level is not only to make their views 
present in the institution of Congress, it is also primarily a matter of agency and acting 
for those interests. It is not merely assumed that the representative holds the same views 
as the constituent based on a shared identity or experience—the representative actively 
pursues the realization of these views through legislation. Substantive representation is 
thus much closer to Pitkin’s ideal form of political representation, and ought to be 
preferred to representation that is only descriptive, and thus merely symbolic, in nature. 
 Operating under such theories of representation, we would expect that members 
of Congress are able to represent the views of their constituents simply by virtue of 
sharing ideological predilections or party identification with their constituents. Party 
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identification and ideological leanings, one could argue, are clear indicators of 
constituents’ substantive preferences and thus provide clear cues to legislators as to 
which bills to support or oppose. As such, we focus on the relationship between an 
individual member of Congress and their direct relationship to their constituents. 
Logically, then, we would expect that if a member of the House of Representatives wins 
the election in their district, then they have been judged the representative most beneficial 
to the substantive representation of the interests of a majority of people in that district. 
This is not always the case though – we are often confronted with members of 
Congress who only represent some of the constituents in their district or state, rather than 
all of them. In some cases this is affected by how often individuals contact the offices of 
the legislator, or in other cases by how often individuals donate money to legislators 
(Miler 2010). In other instances, this representational disparity can be explained by the 
lack of members of Congress who share life experiences with their constituents that make 
the legislator more aware of the unique perspectives of members of various 
subconstituencies living in their district or state. For some, this is referred to as a sense of 
linked fate across all members of a particular group, wherein members view their own 
prospects as inextricably linked to the prospects of the group (Dawson 1994). Others 
characterize this as a sense of shared group consciousness, where group members have a 
shared sense of what matters and what ought to be done to benefit the group (Conover 
1984). In either instance, the notion that members of a particular social group—whether 
defined by race or some other characteristic—share political experiences and desire the 
same things from a representative government speak to the benefits of descriptive 
representation, despite Pitkin’s argument to the contrary. The benefit of descriptive 
 11 
representation is derived from having more members of a certain group in government, in 
large part because group members are more likely to share and understand the 
experiences that shape the collective preferences of the group (Mansbridge 1999). A non-
member does not have the same experiences that are associated with being a member of 
the group, and so is not capable of fully representing the interests of the group. Thus, 
descriptive representation has more than a symbolic effect on representation—because of 
the sense of linked fate or shared group consciousness, descriptive representation directly 
translates to the “acting for” that Pitkin considers as central to political representation. 
Descriptive representation for Mansbridge, then, better fulfills what she describes 
as the deliberative function of representative democracy. In terms of deliberation, 
representative democracy ought to include representatives who can speak for groups 
when that group’s perspective is relevant to the issue at hand. This is contrasted to the 
aggregative function of representative democracy, which in times of political conflict 
aims to “represent the interests of every group whose interests conflict with those of 
others, in proportion to the numbers of that group in the population” (Mansbridge 1999, 
634). That is, when there is a conflict over an issue the groups that are in conflict are 
represented proportionally, though not necessarily by a descriptive representative as 
“normative democratic theory demands only that power be exercised on behalf of 
particular interest bearers…not that this power be exercised by any particular 
mechanism” (635, emphasis added). Descriptive representation, Mansbridge concludes, is 
more focused on realizing the deliberative function of representative democracy—the 
goal is to ensure that underrepresented groups have a voice in conversations and 
decisions that are likely to affect their lives. What is important to note is that this is not 
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necessarily achieved when an underrepresented group has one representative elected to 
Congress—these groups themselves are internally diverse and have heterogeneous 
preferences and ideals. Thus, it is not enough to simply have one minority representative; 
rather, “a variety of representatives is usually needed to represent the heterogeneous, 
varied inflections and internal oppositions that together constitute the complex and 
internally contested perspectives, opinions, and interests characteristic of any group” 
(Mansbridge 1999, 636; see also Dovi 2002). 
This, in turn, gives way to Mansbridge’s later theorization of surrogate 
representation (2003), a type of representation characterized by political representatives 
acting for members of the same social group even when they have no formal electoral 
relationship, i.e. the constituents live in another state or congressional district. Surrogate 
representation certainly helps with regard to realizing the deliberative function of 
representative democracy; however, Mansbridge argues that surrogacy is easily corrupted 
and turned away from both the deliberative and the aggregative when surrogacy is 
anchored by monetary contributions by constituents outside the district to a member of 
Congress. The idea of surrogate representation has subsequently received much attention 
through scholarly works that attempt to determine the extent to which increased 
descriptive, surrogate representation of racial minority groups translates to the 
substantive representation of those groups’ interests, especially when considered 
alongside concerns about the role of money in politics, and the possibility that district 
constituents have less influence on representatives than external, money-contributing 
individuals or groups. 
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However, as with the early theories of representation, studies of this nature are 
still lacking in a key regard—determining the efficacy of descriptive or surrogate 
representation is done at the individual level of each member of Congress, rather than at 
the group level. Analyses focus on whether being a member of a given racial group 
makes a legislator more or less likely to engage in some kind of legislative behavior, 
ranging from roll call votes (Hero and Tolbert 1995) to committee oversight activity 
(Minta 2011) to staff hiring practices (Wilson 2017). What is not discussed much is the 
extent to which collective action taken by all legislators who belong to that racial 
minority group might also boost the link between this descriptive form of representation 
and the substantive representation of the racial minority group’s interests. 
In response to this lack of discussion of representation as a group exercise, I offer 
up a theory of what I call coalitional representation. Coalitional representation refers to 
the collaborative efforts of a group of legislators to uncover, expose, and realize through 
the legislative process the interests of their constituency. This constituency is not 
necessarily defined by geographic boundaries as is the case with congressional districts—
the members of the coalition set the terms for what it means to be represented by the 
coalition, resulting in constituencies that are widely dispersed throughout the United 
States and might be better thought of as national constituencies. Membership in the 
coalition is often based on some shared identity, with the main purpose of the coalition 
being to represent all constituents who also share that identity. 
What I describe as coalitional representation, though, must be considered distinct 
from surrogate representation (Mansbridge 2003). According to Mansbridge, surrogate 
representation describes the relationship between representatives of a particular group 
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and constituents who are not represented by those legislators in a formal electoral sense, 
but who nevertheless benefit from the efforts of that legislator. That is, a Latinx member 
of Congress might be a surrogate representative for Latinxs living outside their own 
congressional district or state by virtue of that legislator focusing on issues that affect the 
Latinx population as a whole. Attempts to measure the effectiveness of surrogate 
representation for Latinxs, though, limit surrogate representation to the dyadic 
relationship between constituents and individual members. There is also evidence that the 
level of acculturation, sense of linked fate, and experiences of individual discrimination 
among Latinxs affect their view of how desirable surrogate representation is (Schildkraut 
2016; Wallace 2014a). What distinguishes my account from these is my treatment of 
coalitional representation as primarily a dyadic relationship between Latinx constituents 
and the coalitional representative—i.e. the Congressional Hispanic Caucus—as a group. 
Founded in 1976, the CHC has provided a way for Latinx representatives to work 
together on issues that are of primary concern to the Latinx population, even when those 
issues may not matter as much to the individual congressional districts represented by 
each of the Caucus members. Given that the Caucus’s membership is comprised entirely 
of Latinx members of Congress from a variety of backgrounds, national origins, and 
experiences, the Caucus provides the best way to test this theorization of representation 
as a coalitional practice. My theorization of coalitional representation expects that while 
individual members may not always act in line with Latinx interests, especially on highly 
partisan or publicly salient roll call votes, members are much more likely to prioritize 
Latinx interests when acting explicitly as members of the Hispanic Caucus. What is 
more, the Hispanic Caucus provides an environment in which Latinx legislators can work 
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closely together and across party lines in order to craft legislative options that best serve 
Latinx interests across the U.S. 
The question here is thus not about how desirable Latinx constituents judge being 
represented by other individual Latinxs (Schildkraut 2016).1 Rather, I focus on the 
question of how the Hispanic Caucus defines the terms of the coalition—who can be a 
member of the CHC, who is part of the Latinx community the group represents, what 
issues matter to that community—in the face of significant diversity within the Latinx 
community, and how effective the CHC then is at advocating for the community through 
the legislative process. Even if more acculturated Latinxs or Latinxs with a lower sense 
of linked fate might look unfavorably upon surrogate representation, such evaluations do 
not preclude the possibility of good coalitional representation taking place via the CHC. 
While measuring the effectiveness of a coalitional entity in representation 
certainly requires looking at the actions of individual members of Congress, focusing on 
individual members and individual-level characteristics does not tell us how members of 
Congress work together with other members, or how legislators who belong to the same 
racial group perceive their position and responsibilities vis-à-vis members of the same 
racial group in the general population. That is, the relationship between representative 
and represented in coalitional representation ought to be measured at the elite level in 
order to truly gauge the effectiveness of coalitional representation. Where constituents 
may see surrogate representation as tied to a specific Latinx representative, 
                                               
1 Schildkraut measures the desirability of surrogate representation among Latinxs by asking Latinx 
constituents how they feel about having individual Latinxs serving in Congress. Schildkraut’s 
conceptualization of surrogate representation and the relationship it entails between representative and 
represented thus operates at a different level than coalitional representation. 
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representatives may see themselves as acting as part of a larger collective that works for 
the Latinx constituency regardless of Latinx constituent attitudes about representation. In 
this sense, coalitional representation pushes back against the possibility of corruption 
raised by Mansbridge and helps fulfill the deliberative function of democracy, as 
members of the representative coalition focus on the needs and wants of the coalition’s 
constituents as a whole and provide an active voice for them within political institutions. 
Much research on Latinx representation in Congress focuses on whether 
individual Latinx members of Congress are good substantive representatives of Latinx 
interests when compared to other, non-Latinx members of Congress. The evidence on this 
score, though, is inconclusive. In some cases, it appears that Latinx representatives are 
not any better than other members of Congress who share the partisan or ideological 
preferences of the Latinx population, especially when looking at roll call votes (Hero and 
Tolbert 1995; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014b). Other evidence supports the idea that having 
Latinxs in Congress substantially adds to the substantive representation of Latinx 
interests, largely relying on other forms of legislative behavior that are both less public 
and less likely to be controlled by party loyalty than roll call votes, such as bill 
sponsorship, committee oversight activity, and other committee activities (Minta 2011; 
Rouse 2013). 
Missing from these studies though is a consideration of the coalitional efforts 
undertaken by the CHC as it attempts to act in the interests of all Latinxs living in the 
U.S. The CHC also complicates Mansbridge’s treatment of surrogate representation—
nearly every CHC member represents a majority-Latinx districts and consequently the 
group represents a significant proportion of Latinx community simply through its 
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members representing their districts. While the CHC’s members act as surrogates for 
Latinxs living in districts represented by non-Latinxs, it is hard to say that CHC members 
are distracted from the needs of their constituents when they are focusing acting as part of 
the CHC—to do so is also to focus on a majority of CHC members’ own district-based 
constituencies. 
Shifting the discussion of Latinx representation away from the traditional dyadic 
relationship of representative-constituent also affects how we think about Latinx 
members of Congress vis-à-vis existing theories about the organization and function of 
Congress as a whole. The presence of a coalitional Latinx representative such as the CHC 
that is ostensibly bipartisan and prioritizes Latinx interests above all else raises the 
important question of how Latinx representatives respond to the increasing partisan 
polarization and party competition in Congress (Lee 2009). As political parties in 
Congress act as cartels with positive and negative agenda power (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Cox and McCubbins 2007) and party leaders’ power has increased since the CHC’s 
founding (Rohde 1991; Pearson 2015), do Latinx representatives give in to pressure from 
party leadership when doing so would jeopardize Latinx interests? Similarly, does the 
CHC fall victim to informational control utilized by party leadership to control the voting 
behavior of rank and file members (Curry 2015)? If the CHC provides its members with 
information about how legislation affects the Latinx population, then they are able to 
make more informed decisions about legislation than party leaders would prefer, raising 
the possibility of Latinx representatives acting as a minority faction within Congress. 
 Thinking of representation as a coalitional practice, though, is not without its own 
problems. One of the largest issues this raises concerns the nature of Latinx identity. To 
 18 
treat representation as a coalitional endeavor undertaken by Latinxs in Congress assumes 
that all Latinxs in the US have the same interests and preferences, in large part defined by 
their shared Latinx identity. However, Latinx identity is not homogeneous—differences 
exist based on national origin and generational status, among other factors. How, then, 
does a coalitional entity such as the CHC navigate the potential tensions that might arise 
from different subgroups of Latinxs holding different viewpoints on certain issues, e.g. 
Cubans differing from Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans on Cuba-specific issues, or 
Puerto Ricans differing from others on questions of Puerto Rico’s status as a territory of 
the United States? Is it possible for the Caucus to adequately represent all Latinxs if it 
relies on the assumption that Latinx identity is panethnic in nature? This question, I 
argue, is just as important as the question of whether Latinx members are better 
representatives of Latinx interests than non-Latinx legislators, as the very idea of “Latinx 
interests” is potentially problematic if derived from a panethnic approach that effaces the 
nuances of Latinx identity. Consequently, it is also necessary to identify the process 
through which the Hispanic Caucus recognizes or constructs Latinx interests, and how 
those choices reflect upon the representativeness of the Caucus. 
How do Latinx members of Congress engage in coalitional action in order to 
represent the substantive interests of the Latinx population? Are Latinx representatives 
effective when they engage in collective efforts on behalf of Latinx interests? Do 
collective efforts at Latinx representation insulate Latinx representatives from the 
perpetual party pressures present in Congress? These questions have not been asked, and 
the answers can provide important insight into the discussion of whether having more 
Latinxs in Congress is beneficial for the substantive realization of Latinx interests in 
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Congress. Perhaps more importantly, the answers to these questions offer an answer to a 
question that has been asked for decades: is the underrepresentation of racial minorities, 
in this case Latinxs, a significant problem for Congress and representative democracy? 
What is being asked here is not simply if congressional representation is truly 
democratic. It is also a question of “how to make genuinely inclusive a concept whose 
binding force is itself premised on various forms of exclusion” (Balfour 2011, 98). 
American representative democracy, according to some critics, is formed on the basis of 
exclusion and the extension of democratic rights to a select few, most typically white 
males. While this in and of itself is a democratic injustice, it is not resolved by simply 
affording rights to members of minority social groups. Even when minority social groups 
are given the right to vote, taken by many to be the hallmark of American democracy, the 
provision of this right does not address the exclusionary and discriminatory nature of 
American politics and society. Insofar as the right to vote confers upon people the 
standing of citizens, such a notion of citizenship is still “derived primarily from its denial 
to slaves, to some white men, and to all women” (Shklar 1991, 16). Even when racial 
minorities are given the right to vote and to be represented in political institutions such as 
Congress, this standing does not insulate them from the exclusion and discrimination that 
are inherent to this particular notion of being a good citizen. Thus, while racial minorities 
can vote, this does not guarantee that their voices are represented equally within 
American politics. 
Such a democratic injustice is exacerbated when minority social groups 
experience the kind of oppression in American political institutions described by Iris 
Marion Young at the beginning of this chapter. That is, it is a democratic injustice that 
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minority social groups do not receive the same amount of representation in representative 
political institutions even when they ostensibly have the same rights as other members of 
society. Latinxs, and other racial minority groups, experience a specific kind of 
oppression within Congress when they do not have the same institutional voice or 
presence as other groups. The question of whether descriptive representation is desirable 
or not thus takes on a different valence—the question is not simply one of how best to 
achieve the substantive representation of Latinx interests, but also a question about how 
best to redress a systemic form of oppression that disadvantages Latinxs within a political 
institution and form of government created on the theoretical foundations of equal 
deliberation and participation for all citizens. Even when Latinxs are present in Congress 
in larger numbers, their voices are not necessarily heard because of the racing and 
gendering of the institution (Hawkesworth 2003) or because legislators only choose to 
see those constituents who donate money or call legislators’ offices constantly (Miler 
2010). 
 This exploration of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus does not provide a perfect 
solution to this democratic injustice. However, if it is demonstrable that the Hispanic 
Caucus effectively engages in the coalitional representation of Latinx interests, then it 
might be possible to claim that at least some kind of equality is being realized in our 
deliberative democracy insofar as the Hispanic Caucus provides a collective voice for the 
broader Latinx population, as  
Equality refers not primarily to the distribution of social goods, though 
distributions are certainly entailed by social equality. It refers primarily to the full 
participation and inclusion of everyone in a society’s major institutions, and the 
socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their 
capacities and realize their choices. (Young 1990, 173) 
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Achieving justice and equality when a group is underrepresented in Congress 
necessitates a remedy that not only increases the number of Latinxs in Congress, but that 
also ensures that they will not simply be present as tokens devoid of real power. If 
members of the Hispanic Caucus are able to and do use their position to actively work for 
Latinx interests, then perhaps the situation is not so bleak. 
 
Why the CHC? 
 Focusing on the role of congressional caucuses in the House offers a unique 
opening to investigate the representation of minority racial groups, especially in the 
context of collective representation. Congressional caucuses are “voluntary associations 
of members of Congress, without recognition or line item appropriations, which seek to 
have a role in the policy process” (Hammond et al. 1985, 583). While the legal status of 
caucuses in Congress changed in the mid-1990s, at their core they remain the same—they 
are legislative service organizations which members of Congress join in order to signal 
their concern for a particular issue or constituency. There is a variety of caucus types in 
Congress, though Hammond (1998) simplifies the list to six primary types: party 
caucuses, personal-interest caucuses, national constituency caucuses, regional caucuses, 
state/district caucuses, and industry caucuses. Membership in these different types of 
caucuses can be sought for different reasons, but each of these reasons is tied to the 
demonstrated benefits of caucus membership. Traditionally, the benefits of caucus 
membership are viewed in terms of how such membership can complement other aspects 
of the congressional context. Caucuses are a critical source of information-gathering for 
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members of Congress, especially as caucuses provide information in a way that 
“augment[s] the institutional structure of Congress” by “acting as informational 
counterparts to committees” (Ainsworth and Akins 1997, 408; see also Stevens, Jr., et al. 
1981). While committees provide members with information and allow specialization 
among members of Congress, caucuses can provide their members with more specific 
information about how certain constituencies feel about certain issues, rather than 
focusing on policy minutiae. 
 Caucuses provide signaling benefits to their members. Caucuses allow members 
to send a signal to their constituents that they care about the issue or group represented by 
the caucus in question. This is especially true in districts where constituent interests are 
more heterogeneous and a representative is forced to signal to a wider variety of groups 
that s/he is paying attention (Miler 2011). Caucus membership, then, seems to facilitate 
legislators’ attempts to at the very least be good symbolic representatives for a variety of 
constituents. By joining any one of the different types of caucuses, members can position 
themselves as symbolic representatives for partisans, a particular region of the country, 
certain national constituencies, or members of a specific industry. Caucus membership is 
not limited to only this symbolic effect though—caucuses also aid the efforts of 
representatives through substantive activism. Aside from providing information that 
complements the committee system, caucuses can also provide leadership opportunities 
for members who do not enjoy such chances in the broader Congress, or who are 
disadvantaged in this regard by the seniority system. As such, members are able to use 
caucuses as “new platforms for advocacy and responsiveness beyond the controls of their 
party or committees” (Caldwell 1989, 638). 
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 Out of all the different types of caucuses that exist in Congress, national 
constituency caucuses most often provide all of these different benefits of caucuses. At 
their core, national constituency caucuses are defined as such by the desire of members to 
signal a commitment to “representing national, regional, or local constituency interests” 
(Hammond et al. 1985, 587). Elsewhere, national constituency caucuses are defined by 
the fact that members “perceive themselves as representing groups nationwide, outside as 
well as within their congressional districts or states” (Hammond 1991, 279), especially 
when it comes to racial groups. Thus, members of national constituency caucuses signal 
their commitment to members of that national constituency beyond the boundaries of 
their congressional districts, obtain information on all issues that are of concern to the 
national constituency, and provide a space for members to work together on realizing the 
interests of the national constituency through congressional activities. It is important to 
note that in previous studies of caucuses there is no stipulation that membership in a 
national constituency caucus requires that a representative also be a member of that 
national constituency. In practice, though, typically only members of the national 
constituency are allowed to be full members of a national constituency caucus who can 
participate in meetings and agenda-setting for the group, evidenced by the Congressional 
Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. The Latinx identity requirement 
for full membership was even written into the CHC’s bylaws,2 though no such 
requirement was imposed on those legislators wishing to be associate members. 
                                               
2 Bylaws of the CHC as amended October 9, 1984. Records of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 
Meeting Minutes with Attachments 1984-1994, Box 2, Folder 5. National Archives Building, Washington, 
D.C. 
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Multiple studies demonstrate that members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 
perhaps the most notable of the national constituency caucuses, exhibit a high degree of 
vote cohesion, especially in areas that seem to align closely with black public opinion 
(Gile and Jones 1995; Pinney and Serra 2002; King, Jr. 2011), demonstrating the effect of 
caucus membership on the substantive representation of black interests. Because the 
Black Caucus is a national constituency caucus, its members think about policies in terms 
of their effects on the entire black population living in the U.S. rather than the effect 
policies would have on each member’s own district. The Black Caucus does not, 
however, totally overcome some of the other factors that often affect the individual power 
of members of Congress, including seniority (Levy and Stoudinger 1976) and whether 
the presidency is controlled by the Democratic Party (Pinney and Serra 1999). Thus, in 
the case of the Black Caucus, there is some evidence for the power of collective 
representation, albeit an attenuated power that is subject to the ever-present influence of 
partisanship. 
 The CHC fulfills a similar role for Latinxs in Congress as the CBC does for 
African Americans. That is, the Hispanic Caucus attempts to focus on issues that are 
relevant to Latinxs throughout the United States and to provide resources for Latinx 
legislators to utilize in order to realize these Latinx interests through their own legislative 
actions. The Hispanic Caucus does receive mention in some of the works focused on the 
Black Caucus, though, it does not receive its own analysis—at least in some cases, it is 
assumed that the two caucuses are similar enough because they are both national 
constituency caucuses for minority racial groups that both tend to be liberal and 
Democratic. 
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An important difference between the CBC and the CHC is that Latinxs occupy a 
unique position within American society and its racial hierarchy. Latinxs as a group have 
been at times included in the racial majority but at other times excluded, providing an 
experience for Latinxs of different generations that is not always defined by 
discrimination and oppression. While African Americans have a shared history of 
oppression through slavery, Jim Crow, and continued anti-black violence, Latinxs have 
sometimes enjoyed—and in fact fought for—the right to be considered part of the white 
majority (Hattam 2007). This desire to assimilate has even caused tensions between 
Latinxs born in the US and Latinx immigrants, as the former view the latter as 
threatening to their chances to become accepted as white and thus as Americans 
(Gutiérrez 1995). Such a dynamic is only further entrenched through racial systems and 
structures designed to pit racial minorities against each other, playing off each group’s 
belief that it is competing with other racial minority groups for valuable resources that are 
only available to those closer to the top of the racial hierarchy (Hero 1992; Kim 2000). 
While older Latinxs might continue to buy into the assimilationist ideal and the belief that 
Latinxs are white and have only experienced discrimination because they did not 
assimilate quickly enough, younger Latinxs tend to view their political and social 
standing as similar to that of Black people and other racial minorities. The experiences 
among Latinxs are thus more heterogeneous and not as easily represented by a collective 
entity such as the CHC—where the CBC is able to draw on the common experience of 
discrimination and oppression, as well as the history of the Civil Rights era, the CHC has 
no such unifying moment to draw on in order to coalesce all Latinxs and their interests. 
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The discussion of coalitional representation for Latinxs, especially in the context 
of the Hispanic Caucus, is especially intriguing given recent discussions of coalitional 
politics among different racial minority groups in Congress. Tyson (2016) discusses the 
rise of the Tri-Caucus due to a sense of linked political fate across the Congressional 
Black, Hispanic, and Asian Pacific American Caucuses. Tyson argues that members of 
the Tri-Caucus are pulled together by their shared experiences of marginalization and 
exclusion in Congress and American politics broadly speaking, and thus share a sense of 
a linked political fate that all three racial groups must work to improve. Such a discussion 
presupposes, though, that such coalitional politics exists within each of the racial groups 
that comprise the Tri-Caucus in the first place. The Black Caucus had what some scholars 
refer to as its “collective stage”, when the Black Caucus “was depicting itself as a single, 
unified group representing a political construct called ‘the Black community’” (Barnett 
1975, 38). Barnett argues that over time the Black Caucus moved on from this collective 
phase and members began to focus more on their own constituencies and position in 
Congress. What is unclear for the Hispanic Caucus is whether it has ever had a collective 
stage similar to that of the Black Caucus, or if it has only ever been in an ethnic stage 
where members focus on representing their own constituencies first, and Latinx interests 
second. While there is some evidence to support the idea that Hispanic Caucus members 
view the Caucus as a coalition among Latinxs (Rodriguez 2002), there is no systematic 
analysis of the Hispanic Caucus over time that traces the development of this coalitional 
politics, and how it shapes the Hispanic Caucus’s actions. 
Such an analysis is especially useful if we take Congress to be an institution 
wherein it matters just as much who members associate with as it does why they do so. 
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There is a social utility to the relationships that legislators forge in Congress, and the 
creation of these social networks is facilitated by the caucus system (Victor and Ringe 
2009). If the caucus system is so important in shaping the social networks of members of 
Congress, then we are faced with questions about the social network created by a 
collective representation enterprise such as the Hispanic Caucus. Are Hispanic Caucus 
members, as Victor and Ringe put it, simply trying to maximize the social utility of their 
relationships within Congress, or do they participate in the Caucus because of a larger, 
more sincere desire to represent the interests of Latinxs as a national constituency? There 
certainly seems to be evidence of the latter when discussing the role of the Hispanic 
Caucus as a collective force in the immigration reform debates of the mid-2000s (Wilson 
2017), but there is no evidence as of yet when discussing the collective efforts of the 
Hispanic Caucus over time or with regard to the internal diversity of Latinx identity. 
  
Methods 
 The questions I address here are not easily answered through statistical analyses 
of empirical data. What can a regression coefficient tell us about the particular way the 
CHC constructs Latinx identity and sets the boundaries around what it means to be a 
member of either the group or the Latinx community it represents? However, a 
quantitative approach does have its merits—talking to CHC members or staffers does not 
allow for conclusions to be drawn about the causal relationship between the CHC’s 
efforts in Congress and the chances of legislation becoming law. 
Because neither a solely qualitative nor quantitative approach can sufficiently 
address all the questions I raise, I thus rely on a mixed methods approach. Questions 
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about the history of the CHC, the motivations driving the actions of its members over 
time, and the CHC’s conceptualization of Latinx identity are addressed using an 
interpretive approach that draws on both archival research and interviews, as well as 
systematic analysis of several other sources containing information on the CHC. Over the 
course of several months, I read through the archived records of the CHC, held at the 
National Archives Building in Washington, D.C. These records span from 1982 to 1994, 
when the CHC was forced to reorganize as a congressional member organization 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2), and include several thousand pages worth of 
meeting minutes, official memorandums, letters sent by the CHC to other legislators and 
political figures, history files, and administrative files of the Caucus. Initially, I read 
through the documents to get an idea of what was contained within the archives; after this 
reading, I coded individual documents based on what information they provided about 
the CHC—e.g. details of the CHC’s legislative agenda, evidence of how the CHC defined 
Latinx identity, the CHC’s position on a specific piece of legislation or executive 
nomination, etc. I supplemented the material from the archive with materials from other 
sources that cover the years after the CHC’s forced reorganization as a CMO and 
subsequent decline in record-keeping practices. These sources include the Congressional 
Record, Congressional Quarterly, and the press releases of the CHC. 
I also conducted 18 interviews with CHC members and congressional staffers 
who worked for or alongside the CHC in order to provide first-hand accounts of how the 
CHC operated, and how and why it made specific decisions throughout the years. The 
interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours in length, with the average much closer to 
the 30-minute mark. They were conducted in person in Washington, D.C. or via 
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telephone. Interview subjects were identified through archival papers, lists of CHC 
members, and referral from other interviewees. Interviewees’ identities are confidential. 
The quantitative empirical analyses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5—concerning the 
influence of the CHC on the Democratic Caucus and the legislative effectiveness of the 
CHC, respectively—are informed by the information gathered from the archives and the 
interviews. The actual data for these analyses, though, is drawn from the Congressional 
Bills Project. The Project, constructed by Adler and Wilkerson (2012), includes all bills 
and resolutions introduced in Congress and codes them based on the primary issue area 
affected by the legislation. I analyzed data on legislation prioritized by the CHC over the 
last forty years. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 Given the variety of factors and questions at play in this dissertation, there are 
many aspects of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus that must be explored. The central 
goal of this project is to assess the coalitional representation of Latinx interests provided 
by the CHC. While each of the following chapters looks at a different aspect of the CHC, 
they all find, to varying degrees, that having the CHC in the House positively contributes 
to the representation of Latinx interests, even when there are nuances and complexities 
within the Latinx population that are difficult to grapple with, even among the Latinx 
political elite. 
In Chapter 2, I explore the historical foundations of the Hispanic Caucus. Relying 
primarily on interpretative analysis of archival documents of the CHC and media 
accounts of the CHC, I situate the formation of the CHC in the appropriate political 
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context and climate that its members experienced and observed in the 1970s. From the 
archives, I draw on the CHC’s own documents laying out the history of the Caucus, as 
well as clippings saved by the CHC from various newspapers chronicling the early years 
of the CHC. I also systematically analyze accounts of the CHC in national newspapers—
including the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post. I then trace the 
evolution of the CHC over the last forty years, paying attention to how the political 
environment in which the CHC operates has changed and how the CHC has adapted to 
those developments, most notably with the shift in CHC membership in the late 1990s 
from a bipartisan composition to a purely partisan collection of Democratic Latinx 
representatives. I supplement my interpretive analysis of archival and media accounts 
with interviews of current and former CHC members and staffers, as well as other 
congressional staffers who are deeply familiar with the CHC. Through these interviews, I 
present an insider perspective on how the CHC has evolved and adapted over time in 
order to maintain its influence in Congress and its ability to work towards its goal of 
representing Latinxs throughout the US. 
 Chapter 3 proceeds with my qualitative analysis of the CHC. In this chapter, I 
answer the critical question of how the CHC defines Latinidad—essentially, what it 
means to be Latinx—and how that particular conceptualization of Latinidad shapes the 
motivations and actions undertaken by the CHC. This question also requires a closer look 
at the concept of panethnicity—in this context, the belief that all Latinxs have a shared 
set of experiences and preferences regardless of differences in national origin, generation, 
and so on—and what role it plays, if any, in the decisionmaking processes of the CHC 
and its individual members. 
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To answer both of these questions, I rely again on the CHC’s archive and 
interviews with CHC members and staffers. From the archive, I draw on meeting 
minutes, official memorandums, and other sources that demonstrate the position of the 
CHC on what exactly it means to be Latinx and how they shape their policy goals around 
that conceptualization. This approach is again interpretive, as there are few if any 
instances where the CHC explicitly addresses the question of what Latinidad ought to 
look like within the CHC. A necessary corollary to this is an examination of some of the 
legislative priorities the CHC chooses to focus on—does the CHC prioritize issues that 
matter more to a particular Latinx subgroup, e.g. Mexicans and Mexican Americans, or 
does the CHC only take a stand on issues that affect all Latinx subgroups? I address this 
question here through interpretation of meeting minutes and memos sent by CHC 
members and staffers that discuss position-taking on key issues that sometimes matter to 
all Latinxs, but other times matter to only one Latinx ethnic group, and what position the 
CHC chose to take on such an issue, if any. 
Through my analyses of the archive and the interviews, I also assess the extent to 
which the Caucus has treated Latinidad in panethnic terms and what effect this has had 
on the efforts of the Caucus to represent all Latinxs living in the U.S. Based on the 
archives and the interviews, panethnicity is present only in name and the CHC primarily 
defines Latinx interests in a way that pays attention to the complexities and nuances of 
Latinx political preferences when formulating its own panethnic form of Latinidad. The 
decision to rely on panethnicity is largely a strategic one focused on doing whatever is 
necessary in order to get Latinx interests incorporated into policies (Mora 2014). This is 
not intended, though, as an attempt to state unequivocally whether panethnicity is good or 
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bad for Latinx politics—the focus of this chapter is to simply explore whether the 
particular approach used by the CHC is conducive to the CHC’s own stated goal of 
representing all Latinxs in the U.S. 
Chapter 4 begins my empirical analysis of the CHC and its efforts to represent 
Latinxs in Congress. In order to better understand the efforts of the CHC to represent 
Latinx interests, it is necessary to first determine exactly what are “Latinx interests.” 
Doing so requires an in depth understanding of the legislative agenda and priorities of the 
CHC throughout its existence in the House. Thus, in this chapter I conduct a systematic 
analysis of the CHC’s agenda and agenda-setting process from 1976 to 2016, paying 
particular attention to the issue areas that receive perpetual attention from the CHC and 
the related bills and resolutions that receive the CHC’s attention in everyday House 
proceedings. The main goal of this chapter is to address the responsiveness of the CHC 
agenda to the issues of Latinx diversity discussed in Chapter 3, as well as to shed light on 
what factors make an issue or bill more likely to make it onto the CHC’s agenda in a 
given session of Congress. 
The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the systematic analysis of the CHC’s 
legislative agendas over the last twenty sessions of Congress, from the 94th to the 114th. 
Using systematic analysis of several sources including the Congressional Record and 
Congressional Quarterly I identify the content of the CHC’s legislative agendas over 
time and discuss how these agendas do reflect the diversity within the Latinx community 
mentioned in Chapter 3. After this systematic analysis of the CHC’s legislative agendas, I 
turn to statistical analysis to determine the influence of the CHC’s own internal agenda 
on the broader legislative agenda of the Democratic Caucus. I estimate the probability of 
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issues or bills ending up on the House’s legislative agenda if they are also included on the 
CHC’s legislative agenda. Controlling for a variety of factors including the party 
affiliation, ideology, gender, and committee assignments of the primary sponsor of a 
piece of legislation, I find that the CHC’s agenda has little to no influence on the agenda 
of the Democratic Caucus. Even though the two groups share many of the same political 
goals, the CHC is still a minority faction within the Democratic Caucus that is hard-
pressed to translate its coalitional nature into substantive influence at the agenda-setting 
stage of the legislative process. 
 Where the fourth chapter focuses on what issues and bills comprise the legislative 
agenda of the CHC, the fifth chapter focuses on how successful the CHC is at achieving 
the goals associated with that agenda, i.e. passing or blocking legislation. In this sense, 
the fifth chapter deals most explicitly with the question at the core of this dissertation: 
How effective is the CHC at representing Latinx interests, and what does this say about 
the nature of political representation of racial minorities in the United States? Relying on 
a traditional measure of legislative effectiveness—i.e. whether or not legislation passes 
the House—the CHC does not appear to be terribly effective at representing Latinx 
interests. When the CHC increases its support for a specific piece of legislation, that 
legislation is less likely to survive throughout the legislative process, even at times where 
the Democratic Caucus is in the majority in the House and the CHC ostensibly enjoys the 
benefits of being a faction within the majority party. 
However, I also find evidence that thinking of effective representation solely in 
terms of passing legislation does not tell the full story of the CHC and coalitional 
representation. As a coalitional representative, the CHC engages in a variety of other 
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activities in Congress that are designed to provide a louder voice for the interests of the 
Latinx community. The CHC influences committee assignments in the House, grooms its 
members for positions in Democratic leadership, attempts to influence executive 
appointments, and engages in outreach efforts designed to both inform and persuade 
other legislators to adopt the CHC’s position on key pieces of legislation. Through these 
actions, the CHC is making present the Latinx community not just in the halls of 
Congress but also in the executive branch and the federal judiciary, an inarguable boon 
for the community and awareness of its interests. 
 The sixth and final chapter summarizes my findings and discusses the broader 
implications of this study for Latinx representation in Congress. My findings offer insight 
into the coalitional nature of Latinx representation in Congress and shifts the parameters 
of this discussion in a way that has not received much scholarly attention. If Latinx 
representation is better realized through collective efforts on the part of the CHC in terms 
of defining Latinx interests and drawing attention to them in the House, then we are 
forced to reconsider how we think of Latinx representation in Congress, as well as the 
representation of racial minorities and their interests more generally. While the link 
between descriptive and substantive representation for racial minorities might be seen as 
strong in only limited instances, the presence of a coalitional representative entity 
augments the power of those descriptive representatives and provides a more stable, 
vocal, and effective route to the effective substantive representation of minority interests. 
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2| Crafting the Coalition: The History of the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus 
 
 In October 1993, one year after the 1992 midterm elections saw the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus (CHC) add five new members to bring its total to 19, the CHC flexed its 
political muscle. The CHC opposed H.R. 3167, the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1993, a bill supported by Democratic party leaders, because of the 
proposed funding mechanism for the bill, which included cutting welfare spending for 
elderly legal immigrants (Cooper 1993). Rather than attempt to block the final passage of 
the bill outright—the CHC’s 19 votes could not harm Democrats’ 83-vote margin in the 
House—the CHC focused its efforts at the procedural level. The special rule governing 
consideration of H.R. 3167, House Resolution 265, was restrictive and not projected to 
pass by as large a margin as the bill itself. Seeing an opportunity, Representative José 
Serrano (D-NY), the Chair of the CHC, informed Democratic leadership that all Latinxs 
in the House3 would vote against H.Res. 265 in an attempt to stop consideration of H.R. 
3167 unless the Ways and Means Committee altered the proposed funding mechanism for 
the bill. 
This move by Serrano and the rest of the CHC forced Democratic leadership to 
postpone the vote on H.Res. 265. The bill was sent back to the Ways and Means 
Committee so its members could come up with a new way to fund the unemployment 
                                               
3 During the 103rd Congress, there were 20 Latinx members in the House and 19 of them were members of 
the CHC. The lone holdout was Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX), a founding member of the group who had left 
amid concerns that he might be pigeonholed as a Latinx legislator with little regard for other constituents. 
 36 
benefits that did not target immigrants. The strategy paid off for the CHC, and for the 
Democratic leadership—H.R. 3167 was modified, and H.Res. 265 subsequently passed.4 
Even with only 19 members, the CHC won an important victory by threatening to bring 
down the rule with the help of those concerned about the rule for other reasons. During 
the same session of Congress, Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM) was appointed as 
a chief deputy whip within the Democratic Caucus, signaling greater CHC influence 
within the Democratic Party in the House overall, and raising the possibility of the CHC 
exerting more influence over which bills might be considered in the future. (Cooper 
1993). 
 The fact that the CHC, too small to threaten the Democrats’ 83 seat majority, was 
apparently strong enough to force Democratic leadership to amend Democratic-priority 
legislation, raises some questions about the CHC. How did it manage to gain this level of 
influence in the Democratic Caucus, especially when it consisted of an insufficient 
number of members and votes to affect the Democratic majority’s margin on key votes? 
What motivated the CHC to rebel against the Democratic majority on the unemployment 
compensation bill, and other pieces of legislation preferred by the rest of the Democratic 
Caucus? 
In this chapter, I answer these questions by tracing the history and development of 
the CHC through its first forty years of existence, from 1976 to 2016. In doing so, I draw 
upon theories about the nature and role of congressional caucuses, asking how well they 
                                               
4 The final margin for H.Res. 265 was 239-150, indicating that the CHC’s was no idle threat. Had every 
CHC member and Rep. Gonzalez voted no, in addition to any other Democratic defections, the resolution 
would have failed. It is also worth noting that even after the changes were made to H.R. 3167, the CHC 
vote on H.Res. 265 was split: nine members plus Rep. Gonzalez voted yes, three members voted no, and 
two members did not vote. 
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explain the formation and activities of the CHC—i.e., does the CHC play an 
informational role, or does membership in the group allow members to signal their 
commitments to their constituents? I also examine the shifting political context within 
which the CHC operates and how this—alongside ideological and partisan shifts within 
the CHC—shapes the Caucus’s prospects in Congress. I also examine evolving dynamics 
within the CHC tied to national origin and gender diversity both within the CHC and 
within the broader Latinx community, and how these affect the CHC’s attempts to serve 
as a representative for the large, and highly diverse, Latinx community. 
 I begin with a brief discussion of the nature of congressional caucuses and the 
various roles they play in Congress, more specifically in the House. As a national 
constituency caucus, the CHC attempts to represent a constituency—Latinxs—that is 
widely dispersed throughout the United States by providing its members with 
information, signaling their commitment to Latinx interests, and also by providing unique 
benefits that are only derived from the particular type of coalitional representation offered 
by a group like the CHC. I then trace the history of the CHC over time, focusing on 
periods of shifting party control in the House and the changing role of the Caucus both as 
a whole and as a part of the larger Democratic Caucus. The size of the CHC matters 
immensely, meaning that even in a period of lengthy Democratic control of the House the 
CHC was somewhat weak, even if strong in its convictions, because even if all of its 
members defected, it could not prevent Democrats from amassing 218 Democratic votes. 
However, operating as a minority faction within the majority party is still greatly 
preferable to operating during periods of Republican control, when the CHC is forced on 
the defensive even as its membership—and votes—grew. I then discuss the evolving 
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diversity of the CHC’s membership, focusing on national origin and gender dynamics 
within the group, and consider how variations in these two categories can affect the 
efforts of the CHC to carry out its primary goal of representing the Latinx community as 
a whole. 
 
The CHC as a Caucus 
 To understand the CHC, it is first necessary to situate it within broader 
discussions of congressional caucuses and their roles in Congress. This includes 
reviewing the different types of caucuses, what drives members to join them, and what 
benefits are conferred upon caucus members. 
 According to Hammond et al. (1985), congressional caucuses are “voluntary 
associations of members of Congress, without recognition or line item appropriations, 
which seek to have a role in the policy process” (583). This is true whether congressional 
caucuses are classified in the House as legislation service organizations (LSOs) or 
congressional member organizations (CMOs). This does not mean all caucuses are the 
same though. Hammond (1998) identifies six primary types of caucuses: party caucuses, 
personal-interest caucuses, national constituency caucuses, regional caucuses, 
state/district caucuses, and industry caucuses. For the majority of these caucuses—
especially personal-interest, regional, industry, and state/district caucuses—their goals 
are relatively limited and focus on the particular interest that draws members of Congress 
together for the purposes of forming the group in the first place. Party caucuses are 
essentially the political parties in Congress, namely the Democratic Caucus and the 
Republican Conference. These two groups represent the parties as a whole and construct 
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legislative agendas that each group then tries to implement through legislation. However, 
there are other partisan caucuses that exist and function within the larger party caucuses, 
such as the Democratic Blue Dog Coalition or the Republican House Freedom Caucus. 
These intraparty caucuses represent members within each political party who share a 
particular vision of how they believe the party ought to operate—Blue Dog Democrats 
are more moderate and want to draw the Democratic Party toward the center, while 
Freedom Caucus members are more strongly conservative than the Republican 
Conference as a whole and attempt to pull the Republican Party even further to the right. 
While these intraparty caucuses sometimes comprise a relatively small portion of the 
broader party caucus, there is still clear evidence of their ability to influence the 
behaviors of their respective parties (Bloch Rubin 2017). National constituency caucuses, 
by contrast, are caucuses that are primarily focused on representing a constituency that is 
dispersed throughout the U.S., regardless of issue or partisan affiliation. This includes 
groups such as the CHC, but also the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional 
Caucus on Women’s Issues.5 
Congressional caucuses can be a critical source of information for members of 
Congress, especially as caucuses provide information in a way that “augment[s] the 
institutional structure of Congress” by “acting as informational counterparts to 
committees” (Ainsworth and Akins 1997, 408; see also Hammond 1991, 284).6 While 
                                               
5 According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) there 
were at least 800 officially registered caucuses in the U.S. Congress. The overwhelming majority of these 
were personal-interest, regional, industry, or state/district caucuses that have little impact on the policy 
process; there were only a handful of party and national constituency caucuses, but these are the caucuses 
with the most influence in Congress. 
6 This informational role of caucuses is especially useful in the contemporary Congress, where party 
leaders have even more power and control what information the rank and file have access to (Curry 2015). 
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committees provide members with information and foster specialization among members 
of Congress, caucuses can provide their members with additional information such as 
how members’ constituents think about a particular issue. There are also structural 
constraints within committees and the House as a whole that limit representative efforts 
undertaken by members of Congress. Some of these constraints include the limited scope 
of legislation committees handle—they only take on legislation that falls within the 
committee’s designated jurisdiction; committee leaders are also able to control the flow 
of information within the committee, making junior members reliant on more senior 
members for crucial information about legislation; finally, factions within the parties are 
constrained by party leadership and its ability to determine whose voices are heard within 
the party. Caucuses, owing to their informal nature, provide members with a way to 
circumvent some of these constraints (Stevens Jr. et al. 1981)—they have no limits on 
their jurisdiction, seniority does not condition who can receive the caucus’s information, 
and caucuses can operate independent of the party leadership—though this also limits 
their ability to affect the policy process in the same manner as a congressional committee 
operating with the imprimatur of both the party and the House. 
 In a similar vein, caucuses are shown to help increase the perceived 
responsiveness of members of Congress to their constituents. Because members of 
Congress are “driven by the need for regular re-election,” they have “restructured 
Congress to be as responsive to constituencies as possible”, including building up the 
caucus system as a way for members to work together on issues of common interest 
                                               
Of course, this also assumes that caucuses are insulated from partisan politics, which I show is not always 
the case for the CHC. 
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outside the institutional constraints of Congress. (Caldwell 1989, 634). As such, caucus 
membership can also act as a signal to constituents that their representative is paying 
attention to their concerns. This is especially true in districts where constituent interests 
are more heterogeneous, and a representative is forced to signal to a wider variety of 
groups that s/he is paying attention. Legislators representing these heterogeneous districts 
are more likely to join a greater number of caucuses, with the representative’s 
membership in each caucus derived from some perceived interest of some subset of their 
constituents. Members are then able to gather information on a variety of legislative 
issues that are of interest to their constituents and represent those interests, whether this 
representation is “rooted in their desire to be reelected, their interest to make good policy, 
or simply their commitment to reflecting their voters” (Miler 2011, 890). Caucus 
membership, then, seems to facilitate members’ attempts to be good substantive and 
symbolic representatives for their constituents. Caucuses can also provide networking 
benefits, as they allow legislators to maximize the social utility of their relationships with 
other relationships and form expansive networks that they can draw upon when necessary 
(Victor and Ringe 2009). According to Victor and Ringe, most members thus join 
caucuses with an eye toward “building and maintaining relationships and associations 
with other legislators” (746), with most legislators focused on forming social connections 
with legislators who also hold positions of formal power in the House because of the 
perceived benefit of association with party leaders and committee chairs in particular. 
Because of this prioritization of connecting to formal leaders within the informal space of 
caucuses, the caucus system “replicates and reinforces, rather than supplements and 
challenges, the formal distribution of power in the legislature” (762). 
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 The CHC meets the criteria in Hammond’s (1998) typology to be classified as a 
national constituency caucus. That is, the CHC draws together Latinx members of 
Congress who desire to represent the Latinx community in the U.S. as a whole, regardless 
of whether their own districts contain a significant proportion of Latinxs.7 The CHC does 
this by providing members with information on issues that significantly affect the Latinx 
community, and also provides members with an opportunity to signal their commitment 
to the Latinx community by participating in a wide variety of Caucus activities. The CHC 
goes beyond these traditional benefits of caucuses, though, by virtue of being a 
coalitional representative for the Latinx community. Members of the CHC work together 
as a coalition to define what it means to be part of the Latinx community and what the 
interests of that community are. For example, issues like bilingual education are taken up 
because of their perceived equal importance to all members of the Latinx community due 
to the shared Spanish language; immigration primarily affects Latinxs from Mexico and 
Central and South America, but non-Mexican members of the CHC do not treat the issue 
as any less important because of this fact; all CHC members are willing to support efforts 
by the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico to ensure more equitable access to 
government aid in the form of welfare and disaster relief. Members work as a collective 
entity to provide a voice for the Latinx community within Congress and the legislative 
process, incorporating members’ own views and experiences with the realities of Latinx 
diversity to provide representation that addresses the concerns of all members of the 
Latinx community rather than the desires of a simple majority of Latinxs. Being the 
                                               
7 The average CHC district, though, is at least 50% Latinx in each session of Congress since 1976. 
 43 
coalitional representative for the Latinx community magnifies the role of the CHC—there 
is no other group that possesses the awareness of the diversity of the Latinx community 
and willingness to incorporate that awareness into its legislative behaviors in the same 
way as the CHC (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
The History of the CHC 
 The CHC was formed in 1976. Little is known in general about the CHC and its 
historical role in shaping Latinx representation in Congress through its unique brand of 
coalitional representation. I divide the CHC’s history into three distinct time periods that 
reflect the shifting political context within the House. The first period, 1976-1994, 
includes the foundation and growth of the Caucus and also the first half of its existence in 
Congress. This is a lengthy period of Democratic control of the House and provides an 
opportunity to examine the early development of the majority-Democrat CHC in an 
environment that we might expect to be conducive to the CHC’s representation efforts. 
The second period spans from 1995 to 2006 and includes the shift of party control of the 
House to the Republicans in the 1994 midterm election. This period also includes two 
significant moments in the CHC’s history: the move by Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) 
and the GOP to ban legislative service organizations (LSOs) such as the CHC, and the 
decision by Republican Latinxs to leave the CHC over policy disagreements. The third 
period, 2007-2016, encapsulates both Democrats’ reclamation of the House in 2007 and 
Republicans’ return to power in 2011, as well as the ideological homogenization of the 
Democratic Caucus that allowed the CHC to wield even more influence as it continued to 
add more members. 
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1976-1994: Foundations and Growth 
 The CHC was officially founded late in 1976, near the end of the 94th Congress. 
Five Latinx members of Congress joined together to make this move: Ed Roybal (D-CA), 
Herman Badillo (D-NY), Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX), E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX), and 
Baltasar Corrada del Rio (D-PR). According to coverage in the New York Times, this 
move “[culminated] years of efforts to create a united voice for the national interests of 
the nation’s growing Hispanic population” (Vidal 1976). By another account, the main 
motivation of the CHC’s founders was to “reverse the national pattern of neglect, 
exclusion, and indifference suffered for decades by Spanish-speaking citizens of the 
U.S.” (Vigil 1989, 23) Yet another perspective maintained that, while the creation of the 
CHC had been years in the making, the actual launch came “in the wake of a political 
storm that developed after Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, Cuban-Americans in 
Florida and Puerto Ricans in the Northeast fought for spoils in Jimmy Carter’s 
presidential victory.”8 
 While each of these ideas about why the Caucus formed has a degree of truth to it, 
by the midpoint of the 95th Congress (1977-1978)—the first full Congress in which the 
CHC existed—the representational motivation was the most prominent, evidenced by the 
CHC’s mission statement: “to assure that all legislative action, as well as activities of the 
executive and other branches of government, meet the needs of Hispanic Americans.”9 
                                               
8 “Hispanic Caucus gets organized,” San Antonio Express-News, June 3, 1977. Records of the CHC, 
History Files of the CHC 1982-1994, Box 1, Folder 1. 
9 “Congressional Hispanic Caucus Leads the Fight for Rights for Spanish-Speaking Citizens.” Reporter, 
November-December 1977. Records of the CHC, History Files of the CHC 1982-1994, Box 1, Folder 1. 
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Caucus members did not see their role as a unified representative voice for the Latinx 
population as limited to their activities in Congress—the CHC sought to influence all 
political institutions to be more attentive and responsive to the interests and concerns of 
the Latinx community. 
 Given this desire to respond to the interests of the Latinx community as a whole, 
the CHC also believed that non-voting members—such as the Resident Commissioner of 
Puerto Rico, or delegates from Guam, the Virgin Islands, or the Northern Mariana 
Islands—were equally important and ought to be fully included in the CHC’s decision-
making processes. This is underscored by Baltasar Corrada del Rio’s role as one of the 
founding members of the CHC while serving as Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, 
but also the fact that Corrada del Rio had full voting privileges within the CHC that he 
did not have in the House; this was true also for delegates who joined the CHC in the 
future, such as Robert de Lugo (Virgin Islands), Ben Blaz (Guam), and Gregorio Kilili 
Camacho Sablan (Northern Mariana Islands). There are also several instances of the other 
members of the CHC deferring to the Resident Commissioner on key issues affecting 
Puerto Rico.10 Having a say in the actions of the CHC also marked a significant victory 
for the Resident Commissioner and the Delegates, as well as a boost in representation for 
their constituents. These members did not, and still do not, have voting privileges in the 
House as a whole despite their ability to serve on congressional committees, sponsor 
legislation, and give speeches on the floor of the House. 
                                               
10 One such example occurred in 1993. The CHC drafted a letter concerning the appointment of the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney for Puerto Rico. However, the letter was never sent—a note stapled on top of the 
letter indicated the letter was pulled due to a conflict with the office of Resident Commissioner Carlos 
Romero Barceló. 
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 The CHC also has a clear organizational structure designed to streamline 
decision-making without limiting the input of individual members on the CHC’s agenda 
or activities in the House. At the top is the Chair of the CHC, responsible for being the 
public face and voice of the CHC at press conferences and on the floor of the House, in 
addition to guiding the agenda-setting process in the CHC alongside the rest of the 
leadership team. Below the Chair is the Vice Chair, who runs meetings in the Chair’s 
absence and aids the Chair in guiding the agenda-setting and decision-making processes 
within the group. The third-highest position early on was the Secretary-Treasurer, 
responsible for recording meeting minutes in addition to keeping track of the CHC’s 
budget. The position of Secretary-Treasurer was eliminated in 1994, though, and the 
CHC split the Vice Chair position into First and Second Vice Chair. The two Vice Chairs 
now split the duties that were previously handled by the Secretary-Treasurer, though the 
First Vice Chair is second in the CHC’s hierarchy. This leadership team is responsible for 
shaping the agenda of the CHC and deciding how to expend its resources; however, these 
three members do not have carte blanche to do whatever they want. The other members 
of the CHC are always communicating their concerns to leadership and bringing forward 
various initiatives they are working on.11 There were no formal rules about what issues 
members could or could not propose to include on the agenda, so long as it was an issue 
that significantly affected members of the Latinx community. However, one informal rule 
that CHC leadership had to consider when crafting an agenda from members’ suggestions 
was whether the CHC members were unified in their position on a given issue. If the 
                                               
11 Representative C, personal interview. 
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CHC did not have unanimous agreement on an issue, then the CHC was significantly less 
likely to publicly engage with the issue. In the words of one member, “We’re divided and 
we send out a divided message.”12 
Table 2.1 Number of CHC Members by Party, 95th-103rd Congress 
 
Congress 
 
No. Democrats No. Republicans Pct. Of Dem. 
Caucus 
Dem. 
Margin 
95th (1977-78) 
 
6 1 2.04% +149 
96th (1979-80) 
 
5 1 1.77% +121 
97th (1981-82) 
 
7 1 2.82% +51 
98th (1983-84) 
 
10 1 3.64% +103 
99th (1985-86) 
 
12 2 4.63% +73 
100th (1987-88) 
 
11 2 4.17% +81 
101st (1989-90) 
 
11 2 4.14% +85 
102nd (1991-
92) 
 
12 2 4.38% +101 
103rd (1993-94) 
 
16 3 6.08% +83 
 
However, at this point in time—and throughout the majority of this time period—
the CHC was too small to wield much power in the House, as shown in Table 2.1. In the 
95th Congress, the CHC was comprised of only seven members. Six of those seven were 
Democrats and thus members of the majority party; however, they only accounted for 
about 2% of all Democrats in the House at that point. Even if the CHC voted cohesively 
                                               
12 Representative D, personal interview. The various factors influencing agenda-setting within the CHC are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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during this session of Congress, it could not successfully block legislation or motions that 
the Caucus deemed harmful to the Latinx community if the rest of the House Democrats 
supported those bills or motions. Even as the CHC grew in size later in this time period, 
the group was never sufficiently large to threaten the Democratic majority in the House—
losing all the CHC’s votes would still leave at least 218 Democrat votes. This numerical 
limitation was exacerbated by the Democrats’ choices for Speaker of the House 
throughout this era. Tip O’Neill (D-MA), Jim Wright (D-TX), and Tom Foley (D-WA), 
as Speakers, prioritized the desires of the Democratic Party above all else. They were less 
willing to entertain requests from minority factions within the Democratic Caucus 
(Pearson 2015). This was especially the case when those minority factions did not control 
enough votes to threaten the comfortable margin enjoyed by Democrats throughout this 
time period. 
Thus, the CHC was in an odd position for much of its first 20 years. Its members 
had lofty goals to influence the legislative process in favor of Latinxs, but there seemed 
too few of them to make much headway even when the vast majority of Caucus members 
were part of the House majority. The oddity of this position was heightened with the 
increasing political prominence of the Latinx community. Several members of Congress, 
Joan Mondale, wife of former Vice President and 1984 presidential hopeful Walter 
Mondale, and Charles Manatt, Chair of the Democratic National Committee, attended 
Caucus events, such as a national symposium on issues affecting Latinxs in 1982. These 
individuals attended not necessarily because of their desire to support the CHC, but 
because of a larger desire to devise a successful strategy to court Latinx voters in the 
1984 election (Buxton 1982). A CHC dinner in 1983 was also considered “a must on the 
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crowded schedule of the political powers,” including presidential hopeful Gary Hart, 
Walter Mondale, Annie Glenn on behalf of her husband John Glenn, DNC Chair Manatt, 
and Speaker O’Neill. The main goal for these power players was to court the CHC not for 
its support or to listen to its desires, but rather to use the CHC as a potential inroad to win 
Latinx votes in the 1984 election. This was true whether it meant beating Ronald Reagan, 
maintaining the Democratic majority in the House, or winning individual races further 
down the ticket (Hall 1983; see also Smothers 1983). Even coverage of internal 
developments within the CHC focused more on the Latinx community and its political 
potential rather than the CHC itself. When Bill Richardson was elected Chair of the 
Caucus in 1984, media coverage described the CHC’s growing influence as contingent 
upon the growth of the Latinx population, rather than the merits of the CHC and its 
individual members (Trescott 1984). 
The CHC maintained its focus, though, and continued to try and boost the 
representation of Latinxs. The group finally scored a legislative victory in 1983. The 
CHC strongly opposed the Immigration Reform and Control Act—sponsored in the 
House by a fellow Democrat, Rep. Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky. In part due to the 
CHC’s efforts, Speaker O’Neill decided to pull the bill before it could be debated or 
receive a vote on the House floor. In the words of Rep. Robert García (D-NY), “‘This 
was a major victory for the Hispanic Caucus’” (Pear 1983). This victory, though, was 
short-lived. The IRCA reappeared in 1984, prompting the CHC to introduce an 
alternative bill—H.R. 4909, the Immigration Reform Act of 1984—that proposed a series 
of immigration reforms without including the employer sanctions provision that made the 
IRCA an anathema to the CHC. As an example of members’ growing confidence and the 
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strength of their opposition to the IRCA, García made a public appeal through a letter to 
the editor in the New York Times arguing for H.R. 4909 over the IRCA (García 1984). 
This muscle flexing ultimately failed, as the IRCA—with the support of 161 
Democrats—ultimately passed the House and was signed into law by President Reagan in 
1986.13 
As the era wore on, the CHC faced other obstacles to increasing its influence and 
enacting its agenda in the House. One such hurdle was internal—while many Latinxs 
from different backgrounds agreed on the importance of such issues as bilingual 
education funding, differences in national origin lead to divergent interests among 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and especially Cubans (May 1987; see also Chapters 3 and 4). 
Another hurdle was the unwillingness of politicians to commit to aiding Latinxs or 
supporting the CHC’s priorities. This is somewhat paradoxical, given the increased desire 
for Latinx votes that emerged in the 1980s. But when it came to meaningful action that 
would benefit Latinxs—at least in the estimation of the CHC—such as a presidential 
candidate promising to name a Latinx person to their Cabinet, politicians balked. 
According to Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA), who was CHC Chair at the time, this was “an 
indicator that Anglos view Latinos as ‘a community that really hasn’t shown it can make 
a difference’” (May 1987). Perhaps this is why at other times the CHC was described as 
“but a shadow of its role model and ally, the Black Caucus” (Rampe 1988), even though 
                                               
13Despite their strong opposition two years prior, the CHC broke ranks on the vote to accept the conference 
report for the IRCA in 1986. Of 11 CHC members eligible to vote on the conference report, five voted in 
favor: Tony Coelho (D-CA), Esteban Torres (D-CA), Bill Richardson (D-NM), Albert Bustamante (D-TX), 
and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX). 
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the CHC never mentioned the CBC as a role model.14 This lack of substantive impact on 
the part of the CHC was attributed at least in part to the difficulties in representing a 
constituency as diverse as the Latinx community (see Chapter 3), but could also be a 
consequence of the still-small size of the CHC even in the late 1980s. 
By 1988, though, the CHC appeared to find a way to maximize its influence 
despite having so few members. In September 1988, the CHC had members with 
significant positions in committees and Democratic House leadership. Kika de la Garza 
was Chair of the Agriculture Committee, Ed Roybal chaired a subcommittee on the 
powerful Appropriations Committee, and Tony Coelho (D-CA) was House Majority 
Whip, the third-ranking post in the House Democratic leadership behind only the Speaker 
of the House and the Majority Leader (Rampe 1988). This did not guarantee legislative 
victories for the CHC. However, it did signify the potential for future success, assuming 
members could win reelection and carry on with the CHC’s mission of providing a voice 
to Latinxs within government. It is worth noting, though, that committee assignments 
were not a reliable resource the CHC could draw on to boost Latinx representation—
committee assignments and leadership positions within the Democratic Caucus are 
heavily influenced by seniority, with the most senior Democrat on a committee typically 
serving as chair. The CHC was fortunate in this era that many of its members did have 
seniority within the Democratic Caucus—by 1988 both Ed Roybal and Kika de la Garza 
had served over 20 years in the House. Leadership positions within the Democratic 
                                               
14 There is no denying that the CHC and the CBC derived mutual benefit from working with each other in 
this and following eras (see Tyson 2016). However, the idea of the CBC as a role model which the CHC 
aspired to emulate has its basis in media coverage, rather than the actual activities and statements of the 
CHC. 
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Caucus were a more accessible resource for representation—these positions were not tied 
to seniority, evidenced by Tony Coelho serving as Majority Whip after only eight years 
in the House or Ben Ray Luján being named Chair of the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee in 2015 after only six years in office. 
The CHC received a massive boost four years later as a result of the 1992 
midterm elections. The CHC gained several new members, bringing the total number of 
members to 19. There were now five Puerto Rican members—including the Resident 
Commissioner of Puerto Rico—and three Cuban members, accounting for around 42% of 
the CHC’s membership. The number of Latinas also tripled, with Lucille Roybal-Allard 
(D-CA) and Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) joining Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) in the CHC. 
The former change was underscored by the election of Rep. José Serrano (D-NY)—a 
Puerto Rican—as Chair of the Caucus (Welch 1992). Other signs of the growth of the 
CHC in terms of both size and influence included the group’s creation of a task force 
system that mirrored the role of congressional subcommittees, indicating a desire within 
the CHC for greater policy knowledge that could be used to influence the legislative 
process. The CHC also temporarily blocked the extension of unemployment benefits over 
a proposal that would fund the extension of benefits by cutting welfare payments to 
elderly immigrants. At this point, the CHC controlled enough votes to threaten the 
chances of a procedural motion on the extension passing, forcing Democratic leaders to 
postpone the vote until they could get the CHC on board with the legislation. While this 
was going on, the CHC also benefited from Speaker Foley’s decision to appoint Bill 
Richardson as deputy majority whip, a sign that Democratic leadership was finally 
starting to take the CHC seriously (Cooper 1993). 
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1995-2006: Toiling in the Minority 
 The gains made by the CHC in the 103rd Congress, though, were short-lived. In 
November of 1994, the Republican Party finally succeeded in retaking the House for the 
first time since the 83rd Congress (1953-1954). The GOP campaign touted the proposed 
Contract for America, which included a call to rein in wasteful spending within Congress. 
Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), one of the authors of the Contract, used this promise 
within the Contract to call for an end to congressional caucuses, on the grounds that they 
were wastefully spending taxpayer dollars. Gingrich and other Republicans portrayed the 
move as essential to shrinking the size of Congress and cutting down on wasteful 
spending. To some legislators, though, the move was strictly partisan in nature. In 
addition to targeting the CHC, many Democrats viewed this as an attempt to defang the 
Democratic Study Group, with Rep. Martin Olav Sabo (D-MN)—a former DSG Chair—
calling this “another attempt to preempt dissent by centralizing all information under the 
leadership” (Ross 1994). 
Even though LSOs did not receive line item appropriations, members paid dues 
out of their own House funds, i.e. taxpayer dollars. These dues were used, in the case of 
the CHC, to pay the salary of the Executive Director as well as several other staffers who 
worked for the Caucus rather than a single member. The Caucus also had a dedicated 
office space on the Hill, providing a centralized location for meetings and storing of 
research and documents utilized by the Caucus on a regular basis. Under Gingrich and 
the GOP’s proposal, the CHC and other caucuses would not be able to use their funds in 
this way and caucuses would no longer receive office space within the Capitol, meaning 
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caucuses would lose their staffs, their physical presence on the Hill, and ostensibly much 
of their ability to influence the legislative process. 
 The CHC knew this was coming, as the Contract was unveiled before the 1994 
election; the CHC discussed the issue at a meeting held on November 30, 1994—the last 
Caucus meeting of the 103rd Congress. At this meeting, Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart of 
Florida—a Republican—asked why this move by Gingrich should not go forward, and 
the CHC be closed down. Chair Serrano argued that the GOP’s description of caucuses as 
an example of wasteful spending was untrue, as caucuses were “subject to the same 
requirements and restrictions placed upon Congressional offices and Committees.” Rep. 
Bob Menendez (D-NJ), however, gave a response that demonstrated how consistent the 
motivation of CHC members had been for 20 years. Menendez stated that the CHC and 
similar groups, such as the CBC and the CCWI, “play a special role in voicing concerns 
of underrepresented groups in Congress.”15 
 This role of the CHC in voicing the concerns of underrepresented Latinxs in 
America became the main talking point in discussions about why the Caucus should 
continue to operate, regardless of the success of Gingrich’s proposal.16 In fact, many 
media accounts portrayed this move by the GOP as an attempt to disempower minority 
groups that had benefited immensely from the 1992 midterms and were perceived as 
threatening to the Republican agenda (Ross 1994). This further strengthened the belief 
that the CHC, as well as the CBC and the CCWI, served a function in Congress that went 
                                               
15 CHC Meeting Minutes for November 30, 1994. Records of the CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, 
Box 1, Folder 2. 
16 Talking Points on The 104th Congressional and People of Color, January 10, 1995. Records of the CHC, 
Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 1, Folder 2. 
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beyond providing members with information or signaling their commitments to their 
district-based constituents. 
 At the first CHC meeting of the 104th Congress (1995-1996), the group discussed 
its options: reorganization as a congressional member organization (CMO), moving the 
group of Capitol Hill entirely and reconstituting it as either a 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4), or 
becoming a political action committee.17 As part of the decision-making process, the 
CHC sent a letter to Rep. Bill Thomas (R-CA)—Chair of the House Administration 
Committee—asking about the details of reorganizing as a CMO. The letter focused 
primarily on determining how the CHC might employ an Executive Director through a 
shared hire position split among its members—essentially making the Executive Director 
an employee of one of the CHC’s members, rather than an employee of the CHC itself.18 
The CHC also entered into an agreement with the National Archives to deposit the papers 
and historical materials of the CHC in the Center for Legislative Archives in order to 
preserve the group’s history in the event it ceased to exist.19 Ultimately, the CHC chose 
to remain on the Hill and reorganize as a CMO. This entailed the significant reduction in 
resources mentioned earlier. The only official staffer was the Executive Director, who 
was technically employed by whoever was Chair of the Caucus; the Caucus no longer 
had a dedicated office space, with the office of the Chair becoming the de facto CHC 
                                               
17 CHC Meeting Minutes for January 5, 1995. Records of the CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 
1, Folder 2. See also Memo to CHC Officers Re: Revised Options for the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 
January 12, 1995. Records of the CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 1, Folder 2. 
18 Letter from Ed Pastor, CHC Chair, to Representative Bill Thomas, January 9, 1995. Records of the 
CHC. Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 1, Folder 2. 
19 Deposit Agreement regarding the Administration of the Papers and other Historical Materials of the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus Deposited in the Center for Legislative Archives, 1995. Records of the 
CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 1, Folder 2. 
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office; and the CHC no longer had its own legislative assistants, relying instead on 
members’ designated CHC liaisons to help carry out the research activities of the CHC on 
behalf of their members. 
These changes, coupled with Democrats’ minority status, appeared to weaken the 
CHC significantly, several short months after the group had finally started to wield more 
influence in the House. This diminution of the CHC was seen in an agenda that consisted 
more of opposing and blocking legislation, rather than sponsoring and pushing bills.20 
Even though the CHC continued to add members and make up a larger proportion of the 
Democratic Caucus in the House, as shown in Table 2.2 below, this shift in tactics was 
necessary. One member remarked on this dynamic, describing the Caucus’s agenda as 
being more reactive when the Caucus and Democrats were in the minority as a necessary 
response to attempts by the Republican majority to pass legislation the CHC considered 
antithetical to Latinx interests.21 
  
                                               
20 The effect of this shift on the CHC’s agenda, and the relationship between that agenda and the agenda of 
the Democratic Caucus in the House, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
21 Representative C, personal interview. 
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Table 2.2 Number of CHC Members by Party, 104th-109th Congress 
 
Congress 
 
No. Democrats No. 
Republicans 
Pct. Of 
Democratic 
Caucus 
Dem. 
Margin 
104th (1995-96) 
 
16 3 7.51% –25 
105th (1997-98) 
 
17 0 7.91% –17 
106th (1999-
2000) 
 
17 0 7.80% –11 
107th (2001-02) 
 
18 0 8.29% –7 
108th (2003-04) 
 
20 0 9.39% –23 
109th (2005-06) 22 0 10.68% –31 
 
Thus, regardless of Caucus growth, the realities of partisan politics in the House 
significantly affected the approach of the CHC. This continued as the GOP maintained 
control of the House through the 1996 midterm election. In one account, Hispanic 
legislators in general were referred to as “a ragtag group of volunteer firefighters 
confronting a scorched earth campaign against immigrants” (Alvarez 1997) that was 
spearheaded by House Republicans. Despite this, though, the CHC continued to make 
gains in the House with members serving on the three powerful committees in the House: 
Ways and Means, Rules, and Appropriations (Alvarez 1997). 
 The continued growth of the Latinx population also ensured the CHC did not fade 
from the political landscape. Many politicians, including Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
continued to court the Latinx vote, especially leading up to the 2000 election and yet 
another opportunity for Democrats to retake the House while holding on to the 
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presidency (Connolly 1999).22 But again, this desire for Latinx votes did not guarantee 
influence for the CHC, especially if Latinxs did not turn out to vote for Democrats in 
large enough numbers to convince Democrats that appealing to Latinx voters was a 
beneficial strategy. Another snag for the CHC in this regard was a lack of recognition 
among Latinxs in the mass public. For example, a Latina working at the 25th Anniversary 
Gala of the CHC’s non-profit arm—the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute—stated 
that she had never heard of the CHC and generally distrusted politicians, regardless of 
whether they were Latinx or not, as “‘they promise everything to Hispanic people, and 
they don’t do anything to help them’” (Martinez 2002; see also Suro 2005).23 
 Aside from minority status and forced reorganization as a CMO, the CHC 
experienced a third major change during this time period. Early in the 105th Congress 
(1997-1998) Chair Xavier Becerra (D-CA) traveled to Cuba and, while there and upon 
his return, did not denounce the Castro government. The Cuban Republican members of 
the CHC at the time—Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart, both of Florida—
viewed this as a tacit endorsement of Castro and his actions against political opponents 
and the people of Cuba. They both left the Caucus, and were followed out by Henry 
Bonilla of Texas, who was the only other Republican member at the time. For the first 
time, the CHC now comprised only Democrats; there had never been more than three 
Republican members in the group at any one time, but this owed more to the lack of 
                                               
22 Democrats were unsuccessful on both counts, with George W. Bush receiving 35% of the Latinx vote en 
route to becoming president, while Republicans maintained their majority in the House. 
23 This lack of recognition has never appeared to bother the CHC though. At no point in interviews or in 
the archival materials was there an indication of the CHC worrying about the perception of the Caucus 
among Latinxs; rather, the focus was always on whether the members felt the CHC was doing a good job at 
working toward its goal of effectively representing all members of the Latinx community. 
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Latinx Republicans in Congress overall than a choice made by the CHC. From the 
beginning, the CHC viewed itself as a bipartisan to the point of including the descriptor 
in its bylaws. However, there were signs of growing partisan divides within the CHC 
stretching back to President Bill Clinton’s first term. At a meeting on health care reform 
and how it would affect Latinxs, a handwritten note on the back of a memo seems to 
warn that members of Díaz-Balart’s staff were in the room.24 Another memo, containing 
copies of signed appointment letters sent by the CHC on behalf of specific appointees, 
was only sent to Democratic members of the Caucus.25 Thus, even though Caucus 
members claimed to be motivated by the desire to give Latinxs a voice in Congress, there 
were clearly differences emerging along partisan lines about what precisely this entailed 
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.26 
 
2007-2016: The CHC in the Age of Partisan Polarization 
 Now bipartisan in name only, the CHC’s position was significantly boosted when 
Democrats managed to take back the House in the 2006 midterm election, though the 
CHC did not add any new members through the election and held steady at 21 members. 
                                               
24 Memo to CHC Health Legislative Assistants Re: Meetings to Discuss Questions Concerning Health Care 
Reform and Hispanics, October 6, 1993. Records of the CHC, Official Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 3, 
Folder 7. 
25 Memo to All CHC Members Re: Appointment letters, November 17, 1993. Records of the CHC, 
Administrative Files 1985-1993, Box 1, Folder 8. 
26 Republican Latinxs went on to form the Congressional Hispanic Conference in the early 2000s as a 
Republican counter to the CHC. To at least one CHC member, the Conference was not born out of a desire 
to represent Latinxs with a different point of view, but rather as retaliation by President Bush for the CHC 
refusing to endorse Miguel Estrada’s judicial nomination. As the member put it, “So what Bush did was 
retaliate—Bush was the first president that no longer met with the Caucus…what he did was create a 
counter-caucus that they called the Hispanic Conference, Republicans” (Representative F, personal 
interview). 
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Right off the bat the CHC put pressure on the Bush administration on immigration 
reform—as a faction within the majority party, the CHC could now be proactive in 
introducing legislation rather than playing defense against Republican proposals. Further 
aiding the CHC in this era was a fundamental change in the relationship between the 
CHC and House Democratic leadership. Where past Speakers O’Neill, Wright, and Foley 
were focused on the party as a whole and largely ignored the smaller factions within the 
Democratic Caucus, newly elected Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) was more open to the 
interests of groups within the Democratic Caucus. As Speaker, Pelosi strove to include 
these groups more in agenda-setting and decisionmaking for the Democratic Caucus, 
offering them a seat at the table at a time when the gap between the parties was widening 
(Peters, Jr. and Rosenthal 2010; Pearson 2015). This provided the CHC with more 
opportunities to push its own agenda in an attempt to influence the broader Democratic 
agenda (see Chapter 4), while members maintained their committee assignments and the 
CHC continued to both add members and account for a larger share of the Democratic 
Caucus, shown in Table 2.3 below. 
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Table 2.3 Number of CHC Members and Share of House Democratic Caucus, 110th-
114th Congress 
 
Congress 
 
No. Members Pct. Of Democratic 
Caucus 
Dem. Margin 
110th (2007-08) 
 
21 8.16 +31 
111th (2009-10) 
 
25 8.99 +79 
112th (2011-12) 
 
22 10.24 –49 
113th (2013-14) 
 
26 11.90 –33 
114th (2015-16) 
 
26 12.82 –59 
Note: CHC member Bob Menendez (D-NJ) is excluded from these 
calculations—he was appointed to an open Senate seat in January 2006, and 
won a full Senate term in November 2006. 
 
 The CHC’s continued growth also allowed the group to flex its muscles within the 
Democratic Caucus as well. In 2007, Pelosi scheduled a vote on H.Res. 809, setting the 
rule for H.R. 3996, the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007. Pelosi expected this rule to 
pass with the full support of the Democratic Caucus. However, prior to this rule vote 
Pelosi allowed a vote on a proposal to exclude non-English speakers from federal 
workplace protections. In the eyes of the CHC, this was just the latest example of 
“Democratic leaders’ policy of allowing members to vote in support of numerous 
immigration-related motions offered by the Republican minority.” Other examples 
included excluding the CHC from negotiations on the children’s health insurance bill, 
and the removal from the bill of a provision that would make children of legal 
immigrants eligible for the program. To protest this perceived ignorance of the CHC in 
important legislative matters, 13 members of the CHC voted no on H.Res. 809, 
prompting majority leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) to reportedly accuse CHC Chair Joe 
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Baca (D-CA) and the rest of the group of “destroying the party”; CHC member Raúl 
Grijalva (D-AZ) viewed this as an issue where “‘there’s a level of respect that needs to be 
extended’” (Yachnin 2007; see also Wilson 2017, 218). In previous years, the CHC was 
not well suited to challenge Democratic leadership in this manner—the group was too 
small to register on the radars of previous Democratic Speakers when Democrats were in 
the majority with a few exceptions, such as forcing changes to the unemployment 
compensation bill mentioned earlier. And when the CHC was larger but Democrats were 
in the minority, both the CHC and the Democratic Caucus were too focused on blocking 
Republican legislation for the CHC to consider significantly challenging Democratic 
leadership. With 13 members voting against H.Res. 809, and more threatening to do so, 
the CHC now had the numbers to threaten the slim Democratic majority in the House. 
The rule ended up passing by a vote of 220-185, once the CHC felt Democratic 
leadership had gotten their message on the unacceptability of allowing more votes on 
Republican-sponsored immigration-related motions without also impressing upon other 
Democrats the problems with supporting these motions. 
 Members of the CHC again tested the Democratic Caucus in 2009, on the vote for 
the financial industry bailout. Characterized by Pelosi as a vital Democratic priority, 12 
of the CHC’s 20 members voted against the bill. Xavier Becerra was one of the 12, even 
though at the time he was serving as Assistant Speaker, one of the top leadership 
positions within the Democratic House majority (Archibald 2008). Of course, the 12-8 
split within the CHC makes it difficult to argue that opposition to the financial industry 
bailout was truly a Caucus position. The fact that a majority of the CHC did vote against 
the bill, though, indicated the potential for the group to break with the rest of the 
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Democratic Caucus on issues more wide-ranging than just immigration, even at a time 
when Democratic leadership was stressing party unity and party line votes in Congress 
were quickly becoming the norm. 
 This conflicted relationship between the CHC—or at least parts of the CHC—and 
the Democratic Party was on display even after Barack Obama was elected president in 
2008, giving Democrats unified control over the federal government. The CHC 
constantly pressured Obama to act on immigration reform when it had the greatest chance 
to pass in Congress. Early in Obama’s first term the CHC issued several press releases 
indicating their eagerness to move forward on immigration reform with Obama. In a 
press release announcing the introduction of H.R. 4321 the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity Act of 2009—sponsored by CHC member 
Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)—the CHC specifically cited Obama’s campaign promise “to 
make immigration reform a top priority” as reason for their excitement at H.R. 4321’s 
prospects in the 111th Congress (Congressional Hispanic Caucus 2009). However, Obama 
chose to focus on health care reform in the first half of his first term. This contributed to 
the perception among some CHC members, most notably Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL), that 
Obama was failing to fulfill a promise made during his campaign (Preston 2010). For 
Gutiérrez, Obama’s inaction on immigration reform was so unacceptable that Gutiérrez 
was reportedly considering pushing Latinx voters to stay home during the 2010 midterms 
to punish Obama and the rest of the party leadership Congress (Hunter and Bendery 
2010). While this sentiment did not permeate the entirety of the CHC, it did contribute to 
the belief that despite Pelosi’s more open leadership style and the Caucus’s increased 
growth, the CHC was still lacking in political power within the Democratic majority. 
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Matters were not helped later in Obama’s second term as the administration stepped up 
raids and deportations of undocumented immigrants, despite statements of concern not 
just from Gutiérrez and other CHC members but also House Majority Whip Steny Hoyer 
(D-MD) (Constable 2016). Thus, even though the CHC was at this point entirely 
comprised of Democratic Latinxs, it was difficult to assume that the CHC would 
automatically fall in line with any and all Democratic proposals. 
 Concomitant with the growth of the CHC in this era was an increase in the 
diversity of the CHC’s members. This is explored in more detail in the next section but 
suffice it to say here that the CHC now had younger members, and these differences in 
age contributed to varying and competing perceptions about what direction the Caucus 
ought to take going forward. When Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX), Chair of the CHC in the 
112th Congress (2011-2012), announced his retirement from Congress at the end of the 
term, this tension was brought to the fore. Typically, the First Vice Chair would advance 
to the position of Chair if they so desired. However, some had reservations about Rubén 
Hinojosa (D-TX) becoming Chair of the CHC. These concerns centered on Hinojosa’s 
perceived deficiencies as a communicator and public speaker. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
was presented as a possible alternative, not because he was necessarily a better public 
speaker but because of the belief that the second-term congressman was a better 
fundraiser than Hinojosa. More importantly, as a younger member of Congress Luján 
would be better able “to energize the young Hispanic community” (Newhauser 2011). 
Not only was the average age of CHC members decreasing, but the CHC was beginning 
to consider more seriously the role of younger Latinxs, as they were quickly approaching 
the time when they could vote in elections and ostensibly help get more Latinxs elected 
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to the House, boosting the profile and power of the CHC. This was especially crucial in 
light of the GOP retaking the House in the 2010 midterms, forcing the CHC and other 
Democrats back onto the defensive while crafting a strategy to regain majority status.27 
 Perhaps echoing this logic, and reflecting the steadily growing influence of the 
CHC, in November 2014 Minority Leader Pelosi named Ben Ray Luján as Chair of the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Martin 2014). The CHC now had a 
member who wielded significant power within the Democratic Caucus. As Chair of the 
DCCC, Luján was responsible for overseeing fundraising and electoral support for 
Democratic House candidates and incumbents, including races that might yield new 
potential members for the CHC. In prior years this might not have helped the CHC all 
that much. Figure 2.1 below shows the mean ideologies of the CHC and the Democratic 
Caucus from the 95th to 114th Congress, based on the DW-NOMINATE scores of each 
group’s respective members. A score closer to -1 indicates a higher degree of liberalism, 
while a score closer to 0 indicates greater moderation. With a few exceptions, the CHC 
has always been decidedly more liberal on average than the rest of the Democratic 
Caucus, meaning the DCCC was less likely to offer Latinx candidates—who, because of 
the CHC, may be perceived as “too liberal”—substantial electoral support, especially if 
they were competing in a primary against a more establishment-friendly Democratic 
candidate. This is not the case in the 112th, 113th, or 114th Congresses though. In the 112th 
and 113th the Democratic Caucus as a whole is actually slightly more liberal than the 
                                               
27 Ultimately, Hinojosa was elected Chair of the CHC for the 113th Congress. As of 2019, Ben Ray Luján 
has never served as Chair and will not get the opportunity, as he is retiring to run for one of New Mexico’s 
Senate seats. 
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CHC—though the substantive difference between the two groups is negligible—while the 
mean ideology of the two groups is the same in the 114th Congress, demonstrating the 
growing ideological congruence between the CHC and their fellow Democrats.28 
Figure 2.1 Average Ideology for CHC and Democratic Caucus, 95th-114th Congress 
 
Over time and especially in the era of partisan polarization, the Democratic Caucus 
became more homogeneously liberal, lessening the ideological gap between the two 
caucuses. This allowed the CHC to present its agenda as complementary to the 
Democratic agenda, despite the instances of conflict mentioned earlier. Thus, the CHC 
                                               
28 The slightly stronger liberalism of the Democratic Caucus in the 109th Congress might be attributed to 
the elections of two moderate Democrats who joined the CHC—Jim Costa (CA) and Henry Cuellar (TX). 
Excluding their ideology scores, the mean ideology of the CHC is more liberal than that of the Democratic 
Caucus in the 109th Congress. 
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was able to more actively pursue its years-long goal of advocating “for issues important 
to Hispanics through the legislative process” (CHC website) by pushing legislation, but 
also by identifying and supporting Latinxs running for office while the CHC and 
Democrats worked to retake the House.29 
 
Shifting Dynamics Within the CHC 
 Over the last forty years, the CHC has navigated significant shifts in its internal 
dynamics and membership while dealing with a changing political context around it. 
There are two primary dynamics that affected the CHC significantly over this time span: 
increasing diversity in members’ national origin and gender diversity. As the CHC’s 
internal diversity increased, the CHC faced more challenges to its ability to follow 
through on its core mission—acting as a coalition to effectively represent the Latinx 
community through legislative activity. 
 
National Origin 
 The difficulties inherent to representing a group as internally diverse as the Latinx 
community are exacerbated by the underappreciated diversity present within the CHC. 
Far from being a political bloc comprised of Latinx legislators who look and think the 
same, there is also significant diversity within the CHC, in particular diversity based on 
national origin. Latinxs trace their heritage and identity to at least one of several 
                                               
29 These efforts finally paid off in the 2018 midterm election, with Democrats retaking the House and the 
CHC gaining seven new members. For his efforts, Ben Ray Luján was rewarded with the position of 
Assistant House Speaker, the fourth-highest position in Democratic House leadership behind the Speaker, 
Majority Leader, and Majority Whip. 
 68 
countries; the most prominent national origins within the Latinx community in the U.S. 
are Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.30 Latinxs also hail from countries in Central and 
South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and other U.S. territories such as Guam and the 
Northern Mariana Islands. It is this diversity that, for some, significantly complicates 
attempts to create a “one-group, one-spokesman front” for the Latinx community. This is 
because “the Mexican community in Los Angeles will have different concerns from the 
Puerto Rican community in New York, or the Cuban community in Miami” (Galvan 
1982). 
 At its inception, the CHC did not reflect the diversity within the Latinx 
community. Of the five founding members, three were Mexican Americans and two were 
Puerto Rican—there were no Cuban members, or members from any other national origin 
group within the Caucus. However, this did not stop the CHC from moving forward with 
its mission of representing all Latinxs, even those groups that did not have a member in 
Congress or the Caucus. Despite these differences in national origin, and the perceived 
inability of the CHC to account for the unique interests of those groups not represented 
among its ranks, members still felt the CHC was well suited to this task. According to 
Puerto Rican Rep. Robert García (D-NY), this diversity was “a unifying bond” among 
Latinxs, with the CHC itself “symbolic of the search for common ground among 
Hispanics.” Even though the CHC at the time of García’s comments consisted of eight 
                                               
30 Puerto Rico is unique among these three in that it is a territory of the United States and its people are 
U.S. citizens. However, many Puerto Ricans identify as Puerto Rican rather than American owing to a 
significant perception of both the island’s independence from the US and the belief that many in the U.S. 
view Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans as inferior to other American citizens.  
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Mexican Americans and three Puerto Ricans, García averred, “it effectively represents 
the entire community” (1983). 
Table 2.4 National Origin Groups in the CHC, 95th-114th Congress 
 
Congress 
 
Mexico Puerto 
Rico 
Cuba Portugal C/S Am. Terr. 
95th (1977-78) 
 
4 (57%) 3 (43%) 0 0 0 0 
96th (1979-80) 
 
4 (67%) 2 (33%) 0 0 0 0 
97th (1981-82) 
 
5 (63%) 3 (38%) 0 0 0 0 
98th (1983-84) 
 
8 (73%) 3 (27%) 0 0 0 0 
99th (1985-86) 
 
9 (64%) 3 (21%) 0 1 (7%) 0 1 (7%) 
100th (1987-
88) 
 
8 (62%) 3 (23%) 0 1 (8%) 0 1 (8%) 
101st (1989-
90) 
 
7 (54%) 4 (31%) 1 (8%) 0 0 1 (8%) 
102nd (1991-
92) 
 
8 (57%) 4 (29%) 1 (7%) 0 0 1 (7%) 
103rd (1993-
94) 
10 (53%) 5 (26%) 3 (16%) 0 0 1 (5%) 
       
104th (1995-
96) 
11 (58%) 4 (21%) 3 (16%) 0 0 1 (5%) 
       
105th (1997-
98) 
11 (65%) 4 (24%) 1 (6%) 0 0 1 (6%) 
       
106th (1999-
2000) 
11 (65%) 4 (24%) 1 (6%) 0 0 1 (6%) 
       
107th (2001-
02) 
12 (67%) 4 (22%) 1 (6%) 0 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 
       
108th (2003-
04) 
14 (70%) 4 (20%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 1 (5%) 0 
       
109th (2005-
06) 
15 (68%) 3 (14%) 2 (9%) 2 (9%) 1 (5%) 0 
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110th (2007-
08) 
14 (67%) 3 (14%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 0 
       
111th (2009-
10) 
16 (64%) 4 (16%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 0 1 (4%) 
       
112th (2011-
12) 
13 (59%) 4 (18%) 2 (9%) 2 (9%) 0 1 (5%) 
       
113th (2013-
14) 
16 (62%) 4 (15%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 0 1 (4%) 
       
114th (2015-
16) 
 
17 (65%) 4 (15%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 
 
 Over time though, the CHC began to more closely resemble the national origin 
diversity within the Latinx community. In the mid-1980s the Caucus admitted its first 
Portuguese member, Tony Coelho (D-CA), and its first Chamorro member, Ben Blaz (R-
Guam). The Caucus did not have a Cuban member until the election of Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (R-FL) in 1988. According to coverage in the Washington Post, Ros-Lehtinen’s 
election “stretched the boundaries of what national pollsters and politicians still refer to 
as the ‘Hispanic vote’.” Others hoped her election would “stimulate reassessment of the 
usefulness of labels that lump Chicano grape farmers with Cuban-American dentists and 
Puerto Rican cab drivers with Argentine-American schoolteachers” (Mathews 1989). 
 Even as the CHC continued to grow, including after the 1992 election that saw a 
record number of Latinxs elected to Congress (Cooper 1992), Mexican Americans still 
dominated the group. In every full session of Congress in which the CHC has existed, 
Mexican Americans account for at least 50% of members and 63% on average. Puerto 
Ricans, though, have seen their influence diminish steadily—in the 95th Congress (1977-
1978) they accounted for 43% of CHC members, but in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
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they only accounted for 15% of all members. Cubans on average make up about 6% of 
the group31, while members from Central or South American countries only account for 
1% on average. This does mirror the large proportion of Latinxs in the US who identify 
as Mexican or Mexican American, but does not instill confidence about the 
representativeness of the CHC for other national origin groups within the Latinx 
community. 
 The proportions of various national origin groups within the congressional 
districts of the CHC members over time also point to the need for more diversity based 
on national origin within the CHC itself. As Figure 2.2 below shows, the average 
congressional district of a CHC member is always majority-Latinx. The average hovers 
around 63% in each session of Congress from the 95th to the 114th. 
Figure 2.2 Average Percent Latinxs in CHC Districts, 95th-114th Congresses 
 
                                               
31 This owes in part to the decision of Republican Cubans to leave the CHC during the 105th Congress, as 
discussed earlier. The Cuban population is traditionally more conservative than other Latinxs, resulting in 
most Cuban elected officials identifying as Republicans. There were still Democratic Cubans in the CHC 
after the Republicans’ departure, and currently there are two: Sen. Bob Menendez and Rep. Albio Sires, 
both of New Jersey. 
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However, these district populations are not homogeneous. Figure 2.3 shows the 
mean proportion of Latinx groups within the Latinx population of CHC members’ 
congressional districts from the 95th to 114th Congresses, based on data from the National 
Historical Geographic Information System through the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series at the University of Minnesota. On average, the bulk of CHC members’ districts 
are made up of Mexicans, though this mean is skewed by high proportions in Texas and 
California districts. In districts in New York, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey there are 
significant proportions of Cubans and Puerto Ricans within CHC districts, indicating the 
need for a more nuanced approach to representation on the part of the CHC that does not 
overly rely on the interests of Mexicans and Mexican Americans. The data also 
demonstrate the need to look beyond the three major Latinx national origin groups—
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans—given that an average of at least 20% of Latinxs 
in CHC districts trace their national origin outside of these groups.32 
Figure 2.3 Average Percent of National Origin Groups within Latinx Population of 
CHC Districts, 95th-114th Congresses 
 
                                               
32 The implications of this diversity within the Latinx community are explored in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Gender 
 Less frequently discussed is the increasingly important role of gender in the CHC. 
This owes in part to the fact that the CHC did not include a single Latina until Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen’s election made her the first Latina in Congress as well as the first Cuban in the 
CHC. She was still the only Latina until the 1992 midterm election, known as the “year 
of the woman.” In this election, two more Latinas were elected—Lucille Roybal-Allard 
(D-CA) and Nydia Velázquez (D-NY). The number of women stayed the same until the 
1998 midterm election, when Grace Napolitano (D-CA) was elected. Overall, Latinas 
have never made up more than one third of the CHC’s membership, despite Latinas 
making up a significant proportion of the Latinx community. Even then, that high point 
was only recently attained, as shown below in Table 2.5. While having more Latinas in 
Congress and in the CHC is desirable, though, the representation of Latinas is still better 
than the representation of women in the House in general—Latinas account for 33% of 
the CHC, higher than the 23.4% mark women have reached in the 116th House. 
 What is also notable is that since the 106th Congress (1999-2000), five Latinas 
have served as Chair of the CHC. This began with Lucille Roybal-Allard in the 106th 
Congress, and includes two recent Chairs in Linda Sánchez (D-CA) in the 114th Congress 
(2015-2016) and Michelle Lujan Grisham (D-NM) in the 115th Congress (2017-2018).33 
Today, in the 116th Congress (2019-2020), two Latinas are part of the CHC leadership—
Nanette Diaz Barragán (D-CA) is the Second Vice Chair, rising to the third-highest 
                                               
33 A full list of CHC Chairs and Members from the 95th-114th Congresses is available in Appendix 1. 
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position in the CHC in only her second term of office; Veronica Escobar (D-TX) serves 
as the Freshman Representative. 
Table 2.5 Gender in the CHC, 95th-116th Congress 
 
Congress 
 
Men Women Pct. Women 
in House 
95th (1977-78) 
 
7 (100%) 0 4% 
96th (1979-80) 
 
6 (100%) 0 4% 
97th (1981-82) 
 
8 (100%) 0 5% 
98th (1983-84) 
 
11 (100%) 0 5% 
99th (1985-86) 
 
14 (100%) 0 5% 
100th (1987-88) 
 
13 (100%) 0 5% 
101st (1989-90) 
 
12 (92%) 1 (8%) 7% 
102nd (1991-92) 
 
13 (93%) 1 (7%) 6% 
103rd (1993-94) 16 (84%) 3 (16%) 11% 
    
104th (1995-96) 16 (84%) 3 (16%) 11% 
    
105th (1997-98) 14 (82%) 3 (18%) 12% 
    
106th (1999-
2000) 
13 (76%) 4 (24%) 13% 
     
107th (2001-02) 13 (72%) 5 (28%) 14% 
    
108th (2003-04) 14 (70%) 6 (30%) 14% 
    
109th (2005-06) 16 (73%) 6 (27%) 16% 
    
110th (2007-08) 17 (81%) 4 (19%) 17% 
    
111th (2009-10) 20 (80%) 5 (20%) 17% 
    
112th (2011-12) 17 (77%) 5 (23%) 17% 
    
113th (2013-14) 19 (73%) 7 (27%) 18% 
    
114th (2015-16) 
 
19 (73%) 7 (27%) 19% 
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115th (2017-18) 23 (74%) 8 (26%) 20% 
    
116th (2019-20) 25 (66%) 13 (34%) 23% 
 
 Of the five former Latina Chairs of the CHC, two currently hold significant 
committee assignments. Roybal-Allard is Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security of the House Appropriations Committee, while Velázquez is the 
Chair of the House Small Business Committee. Linda Sánchez served as Vice Chair of 
the Democratic Caucus in the 115th Congress, providing the CHC with a significant 
opportunity to influence the activities of the broader Democratic Caucus, although this 
effect was somewhat limited as Sánchez’s time as Democratic Caucus Vice Chair 
occurred when Democrats were still in the minority in the House. While the CHC may 
not have a membership that truly reflects gender diversity within the Latinx 
community—especially when also considering LGBTQ Latinxs—the group has worked 
to both accept and empower its Latina members, helping them attain significant positions 
in the House while simultaneously being shaped by these Latinas’ years spent chairing 
the group and bringing Latina interests to the fore.34 
 
Conclusion 
 Founded in 1976, the CHC has undergone significant changes in the last forty 
years. These changes have largely been precipitated by increases in Caucus membership, 
                                               
34 For example, prior to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen’s election the CHC never included legislation that specifically 
targeted the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). After she 
was sworn in at the start of the 101st Congress in 1989, the CHC agenda included H.R. 24, the Child 
Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 1989. Other Latina-interest agenda items that post-date the 
inclusion of Latinas in the CHC include H.R. 1 the Civil Rights and Women’s Equity in Employment Act 
of 1991 (102nd Congress), H.R. 3415 the Family Violence Prevention Act (103rd Congress), and H.R. 4439 
the Latina Suicide Prevention Act (106th Congress). 
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as well as changes in the political context in which the group operates. Through all of 
this, though, the motivation and mission of the Caucus has stayed the same: to “advocate 
for issues important to Hispanics through the Congressional legislative process.” The 
language used to express this mission is not always the same—in the beginning there was 
reference to neglect and indifference experienced by Spanish-speaking citizens, and at 
other times reference to influencing the executive and judicial branches as well as the 
legislative—but the core ideal remains unchanged. In response to the perceived and real 
underrepresentation of Latinxs and their interests in Congress, five Latinx 
Representatives joined together and formed a coalition for the express purpose of 
correcting this representational inequality. 
 For the first eighteen years of its existence, the CHC was typically too small to 
significantly affect vote outcomes in the House. This did not mean the Caucus could not 
persuade other legislators to take actions preferred by the Caucus—as evidenced by 
Speaker O’Neill’s decision to pull the IRCA from the floor in 1984—but such instances 
were few and far between. Even with a Democratic majority in both the House and the 
CHC, the substantive influence of the CHC was limited due to political factors beyond 
the group’s control. 
 Once Republicans became the House majority in the 104th Congress (1995-1996), 
things only got harder for the CHC. The group now had 19 members—16 Democrats and 
3 Republicans—and accounted for more votes in the House. However, with Democrats in 
the minority and perceptions of the CHC as a Democratic caucus in all but name—a 
perception reinforced when Republicans left the CHC in 1997—the CHC was forced to 
play defense against Republican proposals, especially on immigration issues. The CHC’s 
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abilities were further limited by Speaker Gingrich’s move to ban LSOs. The CHC was 
able to reorganize as a CMO but lost significant resources in the process. Helping the 
CHC in the face of these immense changes was the persistent belief among the rest of the 
Democratic Caucus that winning the Latinx vote would be essential to retaking the 
House, especially after George W. Bush won 35% of the Latinx vote in 2000 and 40% in 
2004. This belief led Democrats to engage more with the CHC in hopes it would aid their 
attempts to court Latinx voters; this also gave the CHC more access to Democratic 
leadership, and thus more opportunities to wield significant influence as the group 
continued to welcome new members to its ranks. 
 This mutually beneficial relationship paid off when Democrats regained control of 
the House in 2007. Not only was the CHC now both larger and part of the House 
majority, it now had a Speaker in Nancy Pelosi who was more willing to include the 
CHC in policy discussions of the broader Democratic Caucus. Democratic leadership and 
the CHC did not get along all the time though, especially with the perception among 
some CHC members that Democrats in the mid-2000s were too willing to cede ground to 
the GOP on immigration, even when Barack Obama was elected president and 
Democrats had unified control over the federal government for two years. When 
Republicans took back the House in 2011, the CHC was once again forced on the 
defensive against a GOP onslaught that took the form of several pieces of immigration 
legislation with which the CHC vehemently disagreed. However, the CHC was not as 
weak now as in the past—the group was larger and had fostered significant positive 
relationships with the House Democratic leadership. This culminated with Ben Ray 
Luján’s appointment as chair of the DCCC, signifying both the Democratic Caucus’s 
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belief in the need to appeal to Latinx voters and the growing political influence of the 
CHC going into the 2016 and 2018 elections. 
 The CHC has also reckoned with growing diversity within its membership, and 
how this diversity implicates the Caucus’s desire to equally and adequately represent all 
members of the Latinx community. This is most immediately noticeable with regard to 
Latinx diversity based on national origin and gender. The Caucus has always been 
dominated by Mexican Americans, but that dynamic has slowly shifted as Latinxs from 
other national origin groups are elected to Congress and join the CHC. Members who 
trace their origins to Nicaragua, Colombia, Portugal, Guam, or the Northern Mariana 
Islands add their unique perspective to discussions that too often in the past centered on 
Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. This is not to say that the perspectives 
of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, or Cubans are unimportant—rather, it is to argue 
that the CHC grew stronger as a coalition and as a political force the more it expanded its 
membership and began to more closely reflect the national origin diversity present in the 
Latinx community. 
 Further adding to this growth and evolution was the election of Latinas to 
Congress, beginning with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in 1988. For over a decade the voices of 
Latinas were not present in CHC meetings and discussions, even though Latinas have 
their own unique preferences and interests within politics and society. With Ros-
Lehtinen’s election, closely followed by the elections of Lucille Roybal-Allard and Nydia 
Velázquez, the CHC began to incorporate an awareness of those interests into its 
activities. And as more Latinas get elected to Congress, they also see their fortunes in the 
CHC rise. Both Roybal-Allard and Velázquez went on to serve as CHC Chair—with 
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Roybal-Allard the first Latina to hold that position—and paved the way for future CHC 
Chairs Grace Napolitano, Linda Sánchez and Michelle Lujan-Grisham. Even though 
Latinas still only account for about one third of CHC members in the 116th Congress, the 
future of the CHC seems likely to be shaped by Latinas for years to come: of seven new 
members to join the CHC in January of 2019, five were Latinas—including Debbie 
Mucarsel-Powell (D-FL), who also became the first CHC member of Ecuadorean 
descent. 
 Given these various shifts and fluctuations both within the CHC and the 
environment in which it operates, we are still left with questions about the CHC’s role as 
a coalitional representative for the Latinx community. First and foremost, we must ask to 
whom the Caucus refers when it mentions representing the Latinx community—given the 
large number of Mexican American members and the significant proportion of Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans in CHC members’ districts over time, does this only mean 
Mexican Americans? What about Puerto Ricans or Cubans, or people from Central or 
South America? That is, how precisely does the Caucus define Latinx identity for the 
purposes of pursuing its goal of increasing Latinx representation? Second, what does the 
CHC’s legislative agenda look like when it is attempting to balance these divergent 
interests that exist within the Latinx community? And how successful is the CHC at 
leveraging its growing share of the Democratic Caucus into tangible influence on the 
Democratic agenda? Finally, how effective is the CHC when it comes to representing 
Latinxs—whether by passing legislation in the House, or other forms of influence such as 
shaping committee assignments and executive appointments? This first question 
implicates the others in significant ways and is where I now turn.  
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3| Representing the Community: The CHC and Latinx Identity 
 
In Directive No. 15, adopted on May 12, 1977, the Office of Management and 
Budget officially defined as Hispanic “a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.” This 
definition is used for all federal statistics and administrative reporting, including the 
decennial Census. When the seven Latinx members of the 95th Congress decided to form 
the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, though, they did so without reference to the 
population defined by the OMB’s Directive. Rather, the CHC’s founding members 
expressed a desire to reverse “a national pattern of neglect, exclusion, and indifference” 
suffered by Spanish-speaking citizens (Vigil 1989, 23). As mentioned in Chapter 2, at 
this point the CHC was only comprised of Mexican American and Puerto Rican 
members, two groups that are most obviously connected by their shared use of the 
Spanish language. By defining its goal as such, the CHC indicated that its core 
constituency comprised those American citizens who identified as Hispanic or Latinx 
through their shared language. However, not all Latinxs living in the US speak Spanish—
given assimilation pressures and accompanying punishment for speaking Spanish, many 
Latinxs of later generations were not taught the language by their parents or grandparents. 
Focusing on the Spanish language as the primary characteristic that defines membership 
in the Latinx community, and thus the right to representation by the coalition embodied 
by the CHC, risks excluding a significant proportion of the Latinx population. 
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 The CHC today, for its part, does present a certain awareness of the 
representational disparities that result from a focus on speaking Spanish as the core of 
Latinx identity. In the Caucus’s official mission statement on its website, the Caucus 
refers to “addressing national issues and crafting policies that impact the Latino 
community in the US.” There is no explicit reference to speaking Spanish or not; 
however, there is also no clarification on the terms of the CHC’s particular brand of 
coalitional representation. In the previous chapter, I discussed the growing diversity in 
the Caucus, especially in terms of national origin—today, several national origin groups 
are represented among the CHC members, and there is no clear hierarchy dictating that 
one group is more important than another. There are also clear instances of blurred 
boundaries between these groups. For example, former Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) is 
Puerto Rican, but for many years served as the CHC’s voice on immigration issues that 
primarily affect Mexicans and Mexican Americans. How, though, does this happen? How 
is a Puerto Rican legislator able to adequately represent the interests of Mexican or 
Mexican American constituents? Similarly, how are non-Cuban Latinxs able to 
adequately represent Cuban interests? What about differences in gender, race, class, age, 
or some other identity group? 
These questions point to one of the significant difficulties faced by the CHC in its 
endeavors to address issues and craft policies that impact the Latinx community, namely 
figuring out what precisely the CHC means when it is referring to the Latinx community. 
Part of this discovery necessitates a focus on how the CHC defines Latinidad, or Latinx 
identity. Accounts vary on what exactly constitutes Latinidad. Some contend that the 
concept implies pan-Latinismo or panethnicity that links all Latinxs together (Aparicio 
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and Chávez-Silverman 1997; García 2003), while others view Latinidad as contingent 
and fluid, shaped by the experience and social location of an individual (Price 2007; 
Beltrán 2010). When considering the representativeness of the CHC, it is vital that we 
assess the extent to which the CHC’s own definition of Latinidad accounts for the various 
identities that intersect for those who identify as Latinx, most notably in terms of national 
origin, gender, and race but also including generational status, acculturation, and 
Spanish-speaking ability. This concern does not just apply to how CHC members define 
the grounds for membership in the coalition itself or the national constituency they claim 
to represent—such a decision carries enormous implications for members’ decisions on 
legislative priorities and strategies, from what broad issue areas to focus on to what bills 
to support or oppose, and even which individuals to support for executive nominations. 
Normatively speaking, how the CHC navigates the construction of Latinidad affects the 
quality of representation for all those Latinxs whose Latinidad intersects with several 
other identities. Prior studies demonstrate the pitfalls of political approaches that doubly 
marginalize subgroups within groups that are already marginalized by society at large, 
reducing the extent to which we can claim representation for the groups as a whole 
actually benefits all members of the group. This is the case with Black political elites’ 
attitudes toward Black people living with HIV/AIDS (Cohen 1999), as well as interest 
groups that represent racial minority groups (Strolovitch 2007). 
 In this chapter, I address these questions and issues in order to better understand 
the specific terms of the coalitional representation practiced by the CHC. Coalitional 
representation in the abstract assumes that there is broad agreement among coalition 
members on what precisely the coalition ought to be doing in service of its general goals. 
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This plays out differently for each coalition, necessitating a closer look at how the 
coalition defines itself and its members and how those decisions, made in the case of the 
CHC by Latinx political elites, impact those individuals who stand to benefit the most 
from coalitional representation while also being vulnerable to experiences of double 
marginalization (Cohen 1999). In the case of the CHC, the construction of a particular 
notion of Latinidad is especially important beyond the risk of marginalizing some 
constituencies, insofar as how the CHC defines Latinidad establishes a criterion for who 
can even be a member of the Caucus. Given that the CHC works as a coalition within 
Congress, understanding the basis on which the CHC decides who can even be in the 
room where decisions are made about the interests of the Latinx community is vital to 
understanding the nature of Latinx representation in Congress. Who is part of CHC 
meetings, I will show, shapes discussions within the CHC about how to balance its 
representation in a way that accounts for a wide variety of groups within the Latinx 
community without sacrificing the political influence the CHC enjoys because of its 
ability to function as a collective rather than a collection of individuals. 
 I rely on an interpretive approach that focuses on the archives of the CHC, 
alongside 20 semi-structured interviews with current and former CHC members and 
congressional staffers who either worked for or closely with the CHC in the House. My 
goal is to clarify how the CHC defines Latinidad when forging itself as a coalition that 
ostensibly provides representation to all members of a racial group with significant 
intersections between its primary identity and several other identities, most notably 
national origin, gender, generation, and immigration status. The focus is on how the CHC 
defines Latinidad for itself and its members, but also on how the CHC interpolates this 
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notion of Latinidad into the Latinx community and how this interpolation factors into the 
debate over the desirability of panethnicity within Latinx politics more broadly. The CHC 
treats Latinidad as more ambiguous and fluid than one might think based on its public 
statements, leaving membership open to those members who self-identify as Latinx—
though conditioned on national origin—and similarly treating membership in the Latinx 
community as a matter of choice rather than legal designation. There are instances where 
the CHC refers to the Latinx community in broad terms, but the decision to do so is 
strategic and provides a political benefit to the CHC and does not reflect a disregard for 
the intersectionality within the Latinx community. 
 I begin by examining prior studies on social identity theory and group 
consciousness, which form the basis of the claim that Latinx identity can be treated as 
monolithic regardless of its intersectional nature, especially when considering issue areas 
that appear to affect all Latinxs in some way, e.g. immigration. I then discuss specific 
theories of Latinidad that debate the value of defining Latinidad in panethnic terms, and 
what role Latinx political elites play in shaping that debate. I then present my 
interpretation of relevant archival documents and interviews, shedding light on the 
CHC’s attempts to define Latinidad in broader terms than one might assume at first 
glance, and the implications this has for Latinx representation in Congress. 
 
Theories of Identity and Latinidad 
 Discussions about the relationship between identity and politics are wide-ranging 
and cover many different topics. However, when considering how the CHC constructs 
Latinidad both internally and for the Latinx community. I focus on social identity theory 
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and its treatment of racial group identity—found mostly in the subfield of political 
psychology—as well as accounts of the role of political elites in shaping notions of 
identity within the mass public. That is what I explore in this section, as well as how 
these theories contribute to the ongoing debate about the benefits of panethnicity within 
Latinx politics, and how these all come together to shape what we ought to expect out of 
the CHC and its particular construction of Latinidad. 
 
Social Identity Theory and Group Consciousness 
 In political science, many discussions of identity draw heavily from the literature 
on social identity theory. According to Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), 
people have a greater sense of belonging and self-esteem when they are members in a 
particular group and positively associate with other members of the group. Under these 
conditions, members of a social group are more likely to treat the in-group with 
favoritism, while being more likely to engage in negative behavior toward other groups 
with whom they do not affiliate, or out-groups. Even when people are randomly assigned 
to a group, there is an increased likelihood of conflict with out-groups, emphasizing the 
social nature of identity and the strength of group membership in shaping behavior. 
 Self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987) builds on this, emphasizing that 
feelings of similarities among group members “positively distinguishes group members 
from outsiders” (Huddy 2001, 134), leading people to be more likely to self-categorize 
with the group because of the perceived benefit and positivity they associate with being a 
member of the group. As an extension of this, Huddy (2001) argues that “minority group 
membership should be extremely salient to African Americans, Hispanics, and 
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Asians…overwhelming national identity” (129) because of greater attachment to their 
social (racial) identity. This finding is echoed in other studies that specifically examine 
the role of social identity theory in discussions of Latinx identity, providing evidence to 
corroborate both social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Huddy and 
Virtanen 1995; Ethier and Deaux 1994). 
 This salience of racial identity, insofar as it can be considered a social identity, is 
further boosted by studies on the effects of group consciousness. Group consciousness 
refers to the belief that members not only positively identify with the group, they also 
have a strong psychological attachment to the group that manifests in the belief that all 
members of the group share a common set of preferences and interests, and thus perceive 
politics according to an evaluation of what is best for the group rather than the individual 
(Conover 1984). This also affects how much political sympathy we feel for our own 
group as opposed to any other group (Conover 1988). Concerning the Latinx population, 
multiple studies examine the existence of group consciousness within the community. In 
many of these studies, evidence is marshaled to support the argument that there is 
significant group consciousness among Latinxs, especially when it comes to issue areas 
that are perceived to significantly affect the Latinx community as a whole such as 
immigration or bilingual education (Sanchez 2006). Minta (2011) also finds evidence of 
this in a different form, insofar as he examines the role of group consciousness in the 
activities of Latinx political elites serving in Congress. Focusing on what he terms 
“strategic group uplift,” Minta finds that Latinx legislators are more likely to engage in 
particular committee activities in the House because of the belief that the issue at hand is 
of importance to the Latinx population, and thus must be addressed through legislation.  
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 The findings in Mora (2014), as well as Padilla (1985), provide stronger evidence 
for the role of Latinx political elites in shaping Latinidad. For Mora, Latinx political 
elites comprised one of the groups of stakeholders that actively worked to create and 
publicize the political usage of the identity “Hispanic”; however, she does not delve more 
deeply into what those efforts looked like beyond the 1970s or how they coincide with 
the political representation of Latinxs in Congress. Márquez (2003) also demonstrates the 
power of Latinx elites in shaping Latinidad, focusing specifically on political action 
groups. According to Márquez, “whenever organizations adopt a position on race, class, 
or culture, they reconfigure the meaning of those concepts rather than reacting in any 
predetermined manner” (2003, 125). Thus, organizations can have a significant effect on 
how identity is conceptualized and deployed, whether that deployment relies on 
panethnicity or not. There is also strong evidence that demonstrates the influence of elites 
on identity generally speaking (Chandra 2012; Drury and Reicher 2000; van Zomeren, 
Leach, and Spears 2010). Common to these studies, as well as Márquez (2003), is the 
belief that it is incumbent upon elites to impress upon the mass public the importance of 
embracing the identity as laid out by the elites, whether for social or political gain. 
 
Latinidad: Panethnic, or Intersectional? 
However much influence we can assign to Latinx political elites in shaping Latinx 
group consciousness or social identity, the fact remains that social identity theory does 
not provide the entire frame for answering questions about the CHC. Social identity 
theory presumes that members of the mass public derive a psychological benefit from 
group membership; however, in the case of the CHC we cannot be sure that members of 
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the mass public, i.e. Latinx individuals, are necessarily aware of how the CHC constructs 
Latinidad for itself and the community.35 The CHC is primarily focused on using 
Latinidad within Congress as part of its efforts to identify legislation that significantly 
affects the Latinx community, and in determining its own approaches to these issues on 
behalf of the community.  
One aspect of social identity theory and group consciousness that bears holding 
on to, though, concerns the assumption that the Latinx community has a core that can be 
clearly defined, a definition which may subsequently be used as a shorthand for 
understanding Latinxs’ various social or political concerns. The desirability of this 
panethnic approach, though, has been the subject of significant debate in research on 
Latinidad outside of political psychology. Central to those who criticize a panethnic 
conceptualization of Latinidad is the belief that racial identity is significantly shaped by 
social and institutional factors. According to these theories, racial identity is defined—
and racial hierarchies reinforced—by those who wish to maintain a racial hierarchy that 
keeps whites at the top and diminishes the role and influence of minority groups such as 
Latinxs (Omi and Winant 1994; Roth 2012; Molina 2014; Hero 1992; Haney López 
1995). To some, even the decision to use the terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” to refer to the 
population or community embodies a choice to refer to the group in monolithic or 
homogenizing terms that ignore the various differences in lived experience for Latinxs of 
various backgrounds (Oboler 1995). For Oboler, the panethnicity implied by terms like 
                                               
35 A detailed investigation into the relationship between Latinxs in the mass public and the CHC is a 
promising avenue of future research. Such research has the potential to show where Latinx political elites 
and Latinx constituents agree and disagree on how to define the Latinx community, what issues matter to 
that community, and what the best tactics are for representing those interests—whether within Congress or 
through other avenues such as interest groups or social movements. 
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Hispanic is problematic due to the fact that it “connotes that the group has or is assumed 
to have a presumed negative attribute of some kind—a ‘social handicap’ (lack of English 
skills, for example)” to the point that the label Hispanic becomes a means of 
stigmatization rather than simply referral (1995, xvi). 
This becomes even more problematic when coupled with an active push for unity 
within Latinidad, which historically has been used as a tactic that pushes discrimination 
against Latinas within Latinx social movements, and in general ignores the gender 
diversity of the Latinx community (Beltrán 2010). This was most notable within the 
Chicano movement in the 1960s, but also animates current references to the Latinx 
community as the “sleeping giant” in American politics—according to Beltrán, this 
particular narrative assumes that the entire Latinx community has the potential to awaken 
and, acting as one, affect the outcomes of elections and the policymaking process, all 
without taking into account the fact that not all Latinxs think the same about politics and 
do not participate in politics in the same manner. 
Other studies further highlight the differences within Latinidad that are ignored 
by reliance on the panethnic assumptions of social identity theory and group 
consciousness. Gutiérrez (1995) closely examines the historical differences between 
Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants with regard to immigration policy. He 
argues that, because of their belief that they are truly Americans and a concomitant desire 
to assimilate, Mexican Americans harbor more conservative views on immigration 
because of their perception that Mexican immigrants—undocumented or not—harm 
Mexican Americans’ standing in American society by speaking Spanish and holding on 
to aspects of Mexican culture. Mexican immigrants, however, hold more liberal views on 
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immigration and do not see holding on to Mexican culture as being mutually exclusive 
with becoming American. Similarly, Branton (2007) finds strong evidence that level of 
acculturation among Latinxs significantly affects Latinxs’ views in several policy areas. 
Specifically, Branton finds that less acculturated Latinos tend to hold more favorable 
positions toward issues such as increasing government spending, government aid to the 
poor, and affirmative action than more acculturated Latinos, in addition to supporting less 
restrictive immigration policy than more acculturated Latinos (298). 
Thus, there are significant differences that exist within the Latinx community that 
seriously complicate attempts to define the community in panethnic terms. However, 
there is also evidence for a more generous treatment of panethnicity when it comes to the 
U.S. Latinx population. According to Mora (2014), the use of Hispanic as a panethnic 
identifier was a strategic move by a diverse group of stakeholders, i.e. Latinx political 
elites, to boost the social and political influence of the Latinx population. These 
stakeholders chose to deploy the identifier Hispanic the way they did because “while they 
framed Hispanic ethnicity differently, they also referred to a common, albeit ambiguous, 
narrative about Hispanic cultural values and they became reliant on one another for 
expertise, data, and resources” (6). The ambiguity here is critical, especially when 
considering the significant diversity within the Latinx community, because “[a]mbiguous 
categories can be combined with others, since their broad definition makes it difficult to 
discern who lies outside of the group,” allowing elites to “preempt resistance from those 
who feel that they must give up one identity in order to be part of a new category” (Mora 
2014, 158). That is, when faced with dissatisfaction from those whose interests run 
counter to the broad Hispanic interest as defined by Latinx elites, those elites can 
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internally shift what they mean by Hispanic without necessarily broadcasting that shift 
publicly. Mora’s discussion of ambiguity mirrors other treatments of the concept and its 
relationship to politics. Kertzer (1988) discusses ambiguity as a potential means to 
“[produce] bonds of solidarity without requiring uniformity of belief” (67). That is, 
ambiguity in the deployment of symbols and rituals in politics can draw people together 
across their differences by focusing on their shared support of those symbols or rituals, 
but without forcing them to actually agree with each other. Mexicans and Cubans may 
disagree on immigration policy, but the ambiguity of “Hispanic” within politics can draw 
support from both groups for different reasons and without forcing them to reconcile their 
differences on more specific issues. Thus, a wider variety of Latinx interests can be 
represented through the strategic deployment of a panethnic identity in public while 
maintaining a clear vision of the differences and nuances within the Latinx community. 
That is, the CHC can publicly discuss “the Latinx community” and speak in broad terms, 
even though its own terms for membership in the coalition and how it determines its 
legislative agendas and behaviors are decidedly not panethnic in nature. 
Mora’s treatment of Hispanic panethnicity echoes an earlier study by Padilla 
(1985), establishing Latino ethnic identity as what he terms a “situational ethnic identity.” 
By this, Padilla means 
“…this multiethnic unit is fabricated and becomes most appropriate or salient for 
social action during those particular situations or moments when two or more 
Spanish-speaking ethnic groups are affected by the structural forces noted above 
and mobilize themselves as one to overcome this impact” (4) 
 
In this sense, a broad Latinidad is only present when multiple Spanish-speaking groups 
interact as one when the situation demands such agreement. This does not mean that, for 
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example, Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans give up their own unique preferences or 
ideals; rather, it means that they recognize situations where these preferences or ideals are 
temporarily in congruence, and work together to realize those goals. Panethnicity, then, is 
not always detrimental to the political standing of Latinxs in American society and 
politics—it has strategic benefit when deployed in particular situations, and in many 
ways can help Latinx political elites insert Latinx interests into high-level discussions 
without allowing opponents to exclude specific groups, owing to the intentionally 
ambiguous definition of “Hispanic” or “Latino” used by these groups. 
The risk of worsening representation for members of the Latinx community 
places an even higher burden on the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and how it chooses 
to define the terms of its coalition, i.e. how it defines Latinidad and the Latinx 
community that it wants to represent. Does the CHC rely on panethnicity in the simplistic 
sense criticized by Oboler, Beltrán, and others? Or is the CHC strategically presenting 
itself as representing a broad “Latino” or “Hispanic” community as a means of 
strategically engaging with other actors in the American political system in a way that 
boosts rather than hinders Latinx representation? This should not be taken as a question 
of choosing panethnicity or not—Beltrán, Oboler, and others who criticize panethnicity 
are focused more specifically on appeals to unity and solidarity within the Latinx 
community that necessitate the effacement of nuance and complexity within the 
community. Panethnicity in the abstract does not require this, but simply the affirmation 
that there is something within Latinidad that draws Latinxs together. The more 
appropriate question, then, concerns how well the CHC identifies and navigates the 
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diversity of the Latinx community and whether the group’s deployment of panethnicity 
appears more problematic or beneficial for the political representation of Latinxs. 
The decision by the CHC to use “Hispanic” in the coalition’s name certainly 
provides some grounds for skepticism in this regard. However, the name of the group 
does not tell the whole story about the CHC’s relationship to Latinidad. Using an 
interpretive approach that draws on close readings of the CHC’s archival documents and 
elite interviews, I investigate the ways in which the CHC 1) constructs a vision of 
Latinidad that incorporates an awareness of the inherent diversity of the Latinx 
community; and 2) actively utilizes this vision of Latinidad when determining 
membership in the Caucus, the scope and nature of the Caucus’s legislative behaviors, 
and representing the Latinx community. While the group sometimes issues statements 
and takes actions that appear to prioritize one group of Latinxs over another, or that focus 
on the Latinx community broadly defined, its members still demonstrate awareness of 
Latinx intersectionality and its importance in Latinx representation. 
 
The CHC and the Construction of Latinidad 
 How can we know, though, that the CHC constructs Latinidad in a way that goes 
beyond speaking Spanish and that accounts for the intersectionality within the Latinx 
community? I take up each of these concerns in turn, focusing first on the CHC’s 
attempts to reconcile the perceived necessity of speaking Spanish with its desire to allow 
any member who identifies as Latinx or Hispanic. I then discuss the various ways in 
which the CHC has shown its acute awareness of the other identities that intersect with 
Latinidad—especially national origin, gender, and race—and has taken several steps over 
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the years to not only maintain this awareness, but to actively incorporate it into the 
activities the Caucus engages in as part of its attempts to equally represent all Latinxs. 
 
The Role of Language 
 There is no mistaking the historical and cultural role of the Spanish language in 
shaping Latinx identity. While the U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s official 
definition of Hispanic does not mention speaking Spanish as necessary for claiming 
Hispanic identity, there is an unspoken assumption that speaking Spanish is inextricably 
linked to identifying as Hispanic or Latinx. Studies in political science and other fields 
also demonstrate this reliance on language. Padilla (1985) explicitly defines situational 
ethnic identity as the context-driven union of two or more Spanish-speaking groups—in 
his study Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans—without reference to self-identification 
(see also Capetillo-Ponce 2010). This viewpoint is at times complicated by assimilation 
pressures that attach a negative connotation to speaking Spanish, which is often 
juxtaposed with the belief that one who speaks little or no Spanish cannot possibly be 
Latinx (García Bedolla 2003). Carter and Callesano (2018) take this even further, 
showing that even distinct dialects of Spanish can be integral to “constructing the kinds 
of difference within the category ‘Latino’” mentioned earlier here and in prior research. 
 With the Spanish language playing such an important role in conceptions of 
Latinidad at the local level, we must ask what role Spanish plays in the CHC’s own 
construction of Latinidad. Does the CHC prioritize Spanish-speaking ability when 
deciding who can be a member and who is represented by the coalition it embodies? Or is 
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language only an ancillary characteristic of the CHC’s Latinidad, neither necessary nor 
sufficient grounds for defining Latinidad for the purposes of political representation? 
 The archives of the CHC contain records of a sequence of events that help answer 
these questions. As mentioned earlier, the CHC initially defined its purpose in terms of 
aiding Spanish-speaking citizens who experienced neglect, exclusion, and indifference 
within American society and politics. This was challenged, though, near the end of the 
CHC’s first decade of existence. Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA) formally requested to join 
the CHC as a full member. Being of Portuguese descent, it was not immediately clear that 
Coelho could join as a full member—the CHC’s bylaws said only Hispanic legislators 
could occupy such a position within the CHC and enjoy the voting rights associated with 
full membership. 
 However, the CHC’s bylaws at the time did not explicitly define what it meant to 
be Hispanic.36 Coelho’s request was discussed by the CHC in multiple meetings over 
several months and two sessions of Congress. The first meeting took place on February 
29, 1984. At this meeting, Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) mentioned to the rest of the 
CHC that Coelho’s request had been made—there was no actual vote at this meeting on 
whether or not to admit Coelho.37 The CHC next broached the issue on September 27, 
1984, nearly seven months later. Notably, this was right before the end of the 98th 
Congress, when there was no guarantee that Coelho—or any other CHC member—would 
be in Congress at the start of the 99th Congress in January of 1985. At this meeting, 
                                               
36 Bylaws of the CHC as amended October 9, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 2, Folder 5. 
37 CHC Meeting Minutes for February 29, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 
1984-1994, Box 1, Folder 3. 
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Richardson—now Chair of the CHC—submitted a report that cited the OMB definition 
of Hispanic as based primarily on self-identification rather than language. On this basis 
the CHC would be able to admit Coelho because he identified as Latinx, despite the fact 
that he traced his heritage to a Portuguese-speaking rather than a Spanish-speaking 
country. However, the CHC again did not vote on Coelho’s request—instead, they 
requested a legal briefing on the issue from the Library of Congress, indicating some 
uncertainty within the CHC as to whether the group was bound by the OMB’s definition 
of Hispanic, or if the CHC had more leeway in determining its criteria for membership.38 
One week later, on October 3, 1984, the CHC again discussed Coelho’s request to join 
the coalition. Richardson again advocated on behalf of Coelho, relying largely on the 
phrase “other Spanish origin” in the OMB’s definition of Hispanic to negate concerns 
that Coelho traced his ancestry to a Portuguese-speaking rather than Spanish-speaking 
country. There is no evidence of contestation or disagreement here on the part of the 
other CHC members—Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) seconded Richardson’s motion to 
admit Coelho as a full member, and the rest of the CHC agreed to the motion by 
unanimous consent.39 
 Despite the fact that the vote to admit Coelho was unanimous, the entire sequence 
of events served as a critical juncture in the history of the CHC after less than a decade of 
existence. The CHC was faced with a decision not only on how to define Latinidad for 
the purposes of membership and participating in coalitional representation for the Latinx 
                                               
38 CHC Meeting Minutes for September 27, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 1, Folder 1. 
39 CHC Meeting Minutes for October 3, 1984. Records of the CHC, History Files of the CHC 1982-1994, 
Box 1, Folder 4. 
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community, but also with a critical moment to decide whether the Caucus would 
prioritize panethnicity in its approach. On the first count, the CHC chose to rely on self-
identification more heavily than language in defining Latinidad for its members. 
However, there were still reservations about opening up membership to any member who 
might arbitrarily claim Latinx identity. As with Coelho, the CHC conditioned acceptance 
of potential members’ self-identification on the ability to trace one’s ancestry to a 
Spanish-speaking nation, or at the very least a nation with a language closely related to 
Spanish including but not limited to Portuguese40. This ensured that those members who 
traced their lineage to non-Spanish speaking countries could still be full members of the 
coalition, without forcing the CHC to undertake the uncomfortable task of denying 
someone’s self-identification. The reliance on self-identification combined with national 
origin, but without requiring the actual ability to speak Spanish, in determining Latinidad 
for CHC members was further reinforced in November of 1985, with the decision to 
admit Rep. Ben Blaz (R-Guam)—who identified as Chamorro—to the Caucus as a full 
member even though the initial motion was to invite Blaz only as an honorary member.41 
On the second count, concerning panethnicity, the Coelho and Blaz decisions 
provide evidence of the CHC acting strategically. The CHC made a decision that both 
took into account the fact that language can and does matter for many people, and went 
further by demonstrating the CHC’s belief that Latinidad ought to be defined by more 
                                               
40 This underscores the importance of national origin to the CHC both in terms of decision-making and 
behavior discussed in Chapter 2. 
41 CHC Meeting Minutes for November 19, 1985. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 1, Folder 5. This precedent continues to hold true in the 116th Congress, with 
the CHC including members of Portuguese descent (Jim Costa, D-CA, and Lori Trahan, D-MA), from 
Guam (Michael San Nicolas, D) and from the Northern Mariana Islands (Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, 
D). 
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than linguistics. In this sense, the CHC pushed back against panethnicity and provided 
support for a more particularistic vision of Latinidad. However, the CHC still portrayed 
itself after admitting Coelho as a group dedicated to representing the Latinx community 
as a whole and did not change its messaging to refer to itself as a group that represented 
Mexican Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Portuguese. The Caucus still chose to 
publicly present itself as a broad Latinx organization, though what is important here is 
that the criteria for deciding who would be in the room and thus able to participate in 
significant decisions affecting the Latinx community did not require members to give up 
their own unique identities for the sake of the Latinx collective. 
 This broad approach also comes out in an interview with a CHC member. In this 
member’s recollection, there was “diversity within diversity in [the CHC]” due to 
members being Mexican American, Cuban, or Puerto Rican. After members like Jim 
Costa (D-CA) joined the CHC, “we had Portuguese!”42 The tone here is not one of 
dismay or confusion; rather, this member was genuinely excited at the prospect of the 
diversity within the CHC increasing due to the presence of members of Portuguese 
descent. This member goes on to describe how the internal diversity of the CHC—
reflecting the diversity within the Latinx community as a whole—came out in subtle 
ways, such as how individuals spoke Spanish. According to this member, 
“…my Spanish was horrible, I’m embarrassed to say—but those members who 
were totally bilingual, the Spanish of Nydia Velázquez was markedly different 
from the Spanish of Solomon Ortiz. The Spanish of Bob Menendez from New 
Jersey was markedly different from even Nydia Velázquez…And there was a 
difference between Solomon Ortiz or Silvestre Reyes from Texas. So you know, 
that’s a big challenge even today—the diversity within the Latino community”43 
                                               
42 Representative A, personal interview. 
43 Representative A, personal interview. 
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Relying on Spanish-speaking ability, then, would result in a coalition that did not 
adequately account for a factor that significantly divides the Latinx community (García 
Bedolla 2003). Even this member, who is of Mexican American descent, could have been 
excluded from the CHC on the basis of their Spanish being “horrible,” diminishing the 
representativeness of the CHC and its conception of Latinidad. The differences between 
Nydia Velázquez and Bob Menendez are also important to note, as Velázquez is Puerto 
Rican and Menendez is Cuban. How could the CHC hope to represent Latinxs if it relied 
on a definition of Latinx identity that considers Puerto Ricans and Cubans in similar 
terms even though they are markedly different not just culturally or in terms of historical 
experiences, but also how they speak Spanish? 
 The fact that Representative A is aware of these nuances, combined with the 
CHC’s bylaws not explicitly defining Latinx identity in terms of language, points to the 
CHC as a whole being aware of these complexities both within the Caucus itself and 
among Latinx constituents living throughout the United States. In other interviews no 
other member or staffer considered membership in the Caucus, or access to 
representation via the Caucus and its activities, as conditioned on the ability to adequately 
speak Spanish. Multiple references are made to national origin, gender, and age, pointing 
to a conceptualization of Latinidad by the CHC that is more complicated and more 
cognizant of the intersectionality of Latinx experiences in the U.S. 
 
Intersectionality and Latinidad 
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  What does it look like for the CHC to foreground intersectionality in how it 
defines its own membership and Latinidad, though? As Representative A mentioned 
earlier, relying on some other factor beyond language was crucial for the CHC as only 
drawing on language could theoretically disqualify certain members from CHC 
membership, or perhaps create conflict among those who spoke a different type of 
Spanish than others. Consequently, as hinted at in the discussion within the CHC on the 
OMB definition of Hispanic, self-identification plays a significant role in shaping how 
the CHC thinks of Latinidad both for its members—and the coalition of which they are 
members—and its constituents, i.e. the Latinx community. 
 This is so because, as a whole, the CHC is aware of the intersectional nature of 
Latinx identity—being Latinx is affected by other identities, such as national origin, 
gender, and race.44 This is captured in interviews when members refer to “diversity 
within diversity” within the Caucus.45 Reference is also made to an increased 
diversification of the CHC over time. This development is especially appreciated as the 
CHC is, in the view of one member, a group “that’s usually clamoring for 
diversification”46 both internally and within American politics and society more broadly 
speaking. This diversification has a direct impact on the CHC’s ability to realize its 
representational goal, for Representative D, because the continued growth of the Caucus 
                                               
44 In this particular context, race is largely characterized by differences in skin color. For many who 
identify racially as Latino/a/x, Hispanic, or with their country of origin, differences in skin color do not 
hold the same significance as they do in the US. However, they are confronted with American conceptions 
of race when they are in the US, and must attempt to reconcile this with their own personal views of race 
despite those racial identities ascribed to them by others. 
45 Representative A, personal interview. 
46 Representative D, personal interview. 
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ensures that “there will be more people from different parts of the country with different 
understandings to bring to the Caucus.”47 
In a specific sense, this comment reflects an awareness of the effect of geography 
on Latinidad—being from or living in a different part of the U.S. shapes one’s 
experiences and preferences in a meaningful way. Geography also affects the legislative 
approaches of individual CHC members. According to Staffer G, members from New 
York or California tend to be more liberal and activist than members from Texas, who 
tend to be more ideologically moderate and prefer a more traditional approach to policy-
making48. For example, more moderate members such as Henry Cuellar (D-TX)—who 
represents a district close to the U.S.-Mexico border—have proven more likely to vote 
for incremental immigration reform measures that fall short of granting legal status to all 
undocumented immigrants while also increasing funding for border security measures; 
more liberal members like Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) frequently vote against these same 
measures, owing to their belief that this incremental approach perpetually kicks the 
promise of citizenship or permanent resident status further down the road. Other non-
geographic instances of disagreement within the CHC include divides among Puerto 
Rican members on whether Puerto Rico should remain a commonwealth or become a 
state. At one point, Nydia Velázquez (D-NY)—the CHC Chair—and Gutiérrez both 
opposed legislation that would mandate a vote in Puerto Rico on the island’s status. 
Pedro Pierluisi (D-PR), the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, sponsored the 
                                               
47 Representative D, personal interview. 
48 Staffer G, personal interview. 
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legislation and giving the residents of Puerto Rico the chance to vote on their future 
(Sherman 2010).49 
Thus, the CHC must attempt to craft policies and positions that successfully 
balance these competing ideologies within its ranks. The CHC signaled a commitment to 
balancing these competing motives and preferences in a meeting held on March 4, 1993. 
At this meeting, the CHC met with President Bill Clinton’s Chief of Staff, Mack 
McLarty. While McLarty used this opportunity to try and get the CHC to commit to 
supporting Clinton’s proposed economic package in the House, the CHC had a different 
goal. After Chair José Serrano (D-NY) informed McLarty of the diversity of the CHC, 
members “requested more sensitivity to communities’ diversity in the appointments of 
government officials; more flexibility on immigration procedures” and “sensitivity to the 
territories’ needs and the inequities in service to these areas.”50 What we see here is an 
instance of the CHC using its position and its ability to hold meetings with powerful 
members of the presidential administration to not only inform those individuals of the 
diversity within the CHC and the Latinx community, but also to request more awareness 
of this diversity in executive decision-making processes. Serrano did not have to mention 
the diversity of the CHC’s membership, and the members did not have to refer to 
communities in the plural when speaking with McLarty; these choices reflect a conscious 
                                               
49 Given this internal divide on the issue, the CHC as a whole did not formally take a position on H.R. 
2499, the Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010. The bill passed the House with 18 CHC members voting 
yes, Gutiérrez and Velázquez voting no, and Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) and Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) not 
voting. 
50 CHC Meeting Minutes for March 4, 1993. Records of the CHC, Official Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 
3, Folder 5. 
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effort on the part of the CHC to treat Latinidad as diverse and multifaceted, rather than 
homogenous and monolithic. 
Aside from this general focus on diversity within the Latinx community, the CHC 
has most often concerned itself with acknowledging the various ways in which national 
origin intersects with the Caucus’s notion of Latinidad. Many Latinxs identify with their 
country of origin, rather than Latino/a/x or Hispanic, and think of this as their primary 
identity. Many of the differences in Latinx preferences and politics discussed earlier in 
this chapter arise from differences in national origin. In part, this is because Latinxs from 
different countries have divergent experiences within American society and politics. 
Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans are the largest Latinx national origin groups in the 
US, and they all think differently about politics. In the interviews Representative F—as 
well as Representative A and Staffer E—demonstrated an awareness of the historical 
rootedness of these differences between national origin groups: 
“Well yeah, sure, there were some differences and they are differences because 
each one of us has a different history—as Mexican Americans…if you tell my 
wife when she came over she will get all over you and tell you that literally the 
river crossed us, we didn’t cross the river. And so Mexican Americans have a 
different perspective because, in all honesty, we were conquered and defeated, 
and that changed everything there in terms of treatment.”51 
 
But what Representative F also speaks to are the benefits of having these diverse 
experiences represented within the Latinx community. While Mexicans and Cubans, for 
example, might differ on significant policy issues such as immigration, according to 
Representative F “[Mexican Americans] benefited tremendously when the Cubans came 
over because a lot of the bilingual stuff wouldn’t have come about but because it was 
                                               
51 Representative F, personal interview. 
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meeting the needs of the Cubans”52 those bilingual education programs were treated more 
favorably and ultimately received federal funding. If not for the CHC’s recognition of 
these complexities, and its willingness to represent Mexicans and Cubans equally despite 
the significant Mexican influence among CHC membership over time (see Chapter 2), 
perhaps bilingual education programs would not have received the federal support they 
did, ultimately harming a significant legislative priority of the CHC and its constituents. 
 Perhaps because the CHC was aware of the implications of not paying sufficient 
attention to national origin diversity both internally and within Latinidad, the coalition 
was active in ensuring legal recognition of and protection against discrimination on the 
basis of national origin. An internal memo sent from the CHC’s Executive Director, Rick 
López, to a staffer of the House Judiciary Committee referenced a colloquy that took 
place on the floor of the House between CHC Chair Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) and Rep. 
Jack Brooks (D-TX), who at the time was Chair of the House Judiciary Committee. The 
colloquy centered on H.R. 1, Civil Rights and Women’s Equity in Employment Act of 
1991—sponsored by Brooks—and the bill’s effect on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji. In Saint Francis, the Court ruled that 
discrimination protections in Section 1981 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
extended to ancestry and ethnic origin; Ortiz and the CHC were concerned, though, that 
the proposed wording of Section 102 of H.R. 1 would nullify that ruling. Ortiz explicitly 
asked Brooks if national origin should be afforded the same protection against 
discrimination as ancestry or ethnic origin—Brooks agreed, stating that Section 1981 
                                               
52 Representative F, personal interview. 
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extended to discrimination based on national origin and that this application was not 
changed by H.R. 1. Rather than focusing broadly on Hispanic or Latinx ancestry, Ortiz 
chose to explicitly discuss the effects of this legislation on national origin, using his 
position as Chair to signal the CHC’s commitment to coalitional representation and a 
notion of Latinidad that holds onto, rather than ignores, the nuances introduced because 
of national origin diversity.53 
 A third example of the CHC’s attention to and incorporation of national origin 
diversity in its approach to representing the Latinx community occurred in April of 1993. 
At their regular meeting, the CHC’s members were discussing the recent Supreme Court 
vacancy after Justice Byron White’s retirement announcement. At issue for the CHC was 
whether to endorse the list of potential Latinx nominees created by the National Hispanic 
Bar Association. For Cuban Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart (R-FL), it was highly important 
that the process of creating a list of potential Latinx Supreme Court nominees be “a 
comprehensive one including the full participation of the three major groups within the 
U.S. Hispanic community: Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans.” 
Díaz-Balart also stated that he would not support any process or list that did not include 
at least one Cuban American candidate. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) echoed this view, 
prompting what the minutes refer to as a “dynamic discussion” among the members on 
how to approach the issue. As a solution, the CHC agreed to commend the work of the 
National Hispanic Bar Association on creating its list and to endorse the concept of a 
Hispanic candidate for the Supreme Court but not the list created by the Association. The 
                                               
53 Memo to House Judiciary Committee Re: Colloquy on National Origin, November 5, 1991. Records of 
the CHC, Official Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 3, Folder 1. 
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latter part of the solution arose from Díaz-Balart’s concerns, as well as Rep. Kika de la 
Garza (D-TX) stating his reservations about the CHC endorsing a list based on outside 
research with no input from the CHC or its members.54 Not only did this discussion 
demonstrate the bipartisan nature of the CHC’s brand of coalitional representation, it also 
clearly demonstrated the awareness of the CHC’s members to the need to represent 
Latinxs from all national origins equally and meaningfully. Endorsing the National 
Hispanic Bar Association’s list—with its lack of a potential Cuban American nominee—
was an easy option that still would have fulfilled the CHC’s goal of pushing for increased 
Latinx representation broadly speaking. However, the CHC chose to take a more difficult 
route, endorsing the concept of having a Latinx Supreme Court nominee while calling for 
a process that would give fair consideration to potential nominees of Mexican, Cuban, 
and Puerto Rican origin.55 
 While national origin receives the bulk of the CHC’s attention when it comes to 
crafting an intersectional notion of Latinidad for the coalition and its constituents, there is 
also a clear commitment to recognizing the role of gender diversity within the Caucus 
and the Latinx community. A clear example of this comes from a CHC meeting held in 
November of 1994. In Chapter 2, we saw the CHC had no Latina members until 1989 
with the election of Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL). She was the only Latina both in the 
                                               
54 CHC Meeting Minutes for April 1, 1993. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 
1984-1994, Box 3, Folder 1. 
55 Of course, this does not speak to the CHC’s awareness of Latinxs from Central or South American 
countries, and their representation within American politics. This owes in part to the lack of members from 
those countries serving in Congress. In recent years, though, there are CHC members who trace their 
national origin to the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Guam, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands. Based on the behavior of the CHC in the early 1990’s, it is not unreasonable to think that 
these members have been able to push the CHC to broaden its focus from the three major Latinx national 
origin groups to all Latinx national origin groups, regardless of size or influence. 
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Caucus and in Congress until the famous “year of the woman” in 1992, which saw both 
Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) and Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) elected to the 
House. 
 Ros-Lehtinen briefly served as Secretary-Treasurer—the 3rd highest position in 
the CHC’s leadership, behind the Chair and the Vice Chair—for the Caucus during the 
102nd Congress (1991-1992); however she stepped down from the position before her 
term expired, meaning there was no Latina serving in the CHC’s leadership for the 
remainder of the 102nd Congress. There also was not a Latina among the CHC’s 
leadership team in the 103rd Congress, despite the steadily growing number of women in 
Congress, and the increasing influence of women on American politics. In November of 
1994, the CHC was discussing nominations for leadership positions for the 104th 
Congress, set to begin in January of 1995. At this meeting Bill Richardson (D-NM), a 
former Chair of the CHC, remarked on the necessity of nominating a Latina for a 
leadership position within the CHC, specifically the position of Secretary-Treasurer. At 
this same meeting, Roybal-Allard contended that the Secretary-Treasurer position was 
obsolete, and that the CHC should reorganize the leadership structure. Roybal-Allard 
proposed a structure with a First and Second Vice Chair, both ranked below the Chair and 
sharing the old duties of the Secretary-Treasurer, but with both positions more equal in 
nature than Secretary-Treasurer had been relative to Vice Chair in the old structure. The 
rest of the CHC agreed to Roybal-Allard’s proposal, and voted to amend the bylaws and 
institute this new leadership structure.56 
                                               
56 CHC Meeting Minutes for November 30, 1994. Records of the CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, 
Box 1, Folder 2. 
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 Following the amendment to the bylaws, Roybal-Allard was nominated and 
unanimously elected to the position of Second Vice Chair, making her the first Latina in 
the CHC’s leadership in nearly two years. This development also signaled a stronger 
commitment on the part of the CHC to internally empowering Latina members. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, five Latinas have served as Chair of the CHC in the last ten 
sessions of Congress, beginning with Roybal-Allard in the 106th Congress. This is in part 
because the new leadership structure adopted in November of 1994 has created an 
informal line of succession—typically, the First Vice Chair will ascend to the role of 
Chair, and the Second Vice Chair will become First Vice Chair with the expectation that 
they too will become Chair in the future if they so desire. This is especially important as 
the number of Latinas in the CHC continues to grow—in the 116th Congress (2019-
2020), Latinas account for one third of CHC members57, compared to a paltry 7% in the 
101st Congress (1989-1990). 
 When it comes to race and its intersection with Latinidad, there are differing 
perspectives within the Caucus. For some CHC members, Latinidad reflects an ethnic 
rather than a racial identity. Representative A, for example, stated that 
“[Mexican Americans] weren’t a race so it wasn’t as African Americans were 
distinctly another race and identified as such, [Mexican Americans] were an 
ethnic group that...basically suffered the same type of prejudice and 
discrimination that Blacks did.”58 
 
                                               
57 Latina members also account for some of the increase in national origin diversity in the CHC: Rep. 
Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (D-FL) is the first member of Ecuadorean descent, while Rep. Norma Torres (D-
CA) is of Guatemalan descent. 
58 Representative A, personal interview. 
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For members who share this view, more emphasis is placed on national origin diversity 
and how this shapes Latinidad, affecting how the CHC defines both the terms of its 
coalition and its core constituency. 
 However, this is not the only perspective in the CHC. For Representative E, 
Latinidad is itself a racial identity that transcends the typical marker of racial identity in 
the United States, skin color: 
“I mean we were Hispanics and that included Cubans, it included Mexican 
Americans and even Blacks were included because there were some Blacks from 
Cuba and other parts of South America that they didn’t consider themselves 
Black, they considered themselves Hispanics. SO the Hispanic Caucus covered all 
of them, regardless of where you’re from the Caucus was very interested in your 
needs, to see if we could resolve them.”59 
 
In many Central and South American countries, as well as Caribbean nations such as the 
Dominican Republic, race is not defined by skin color as it is in the U.S. For example, 
darker-skinned people from the Dominican Republic might always identify themselves as 
Dominican, or perhaps Latino/a/x or Latin American, but not as Black. However, upon 
arrival in the U.S. they are identified as Black or African American because of their skin 
color, regardless of their own self-identification. Representative E’s statement indicates 
awareness of this issue within Latinidad, and the importance of the CHC being willing to 
represent people of Latinx origins who might not speak Spanish or “look Latinx.” Even 
though these experiences of misidentification are typically negative, they add even more 
nuance to the intersectionality of Latinidad to which the CHC must pay attention when 
crafting its policies and pursuing legislation in the House. 
                                               
59 Representative E, personal interview. 
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 What is again important here is the emphasis on self-identification, though it is 
once again conditioned on national origin. While CHC members in the past appeared to 
limit Latinidad to those who speak Spanish, they are ultimately willing to represent 
anyone who identifies as Latinx or Hispanic as long as they trace their ancestry to a 
Spanish-speaking country or a country with a close linguistic relationship to Spanish, as 
in the decision to admit legislators with Portuguese or Chamorro heritage as full 
members. The CHC also attempts to set boundaries on Latinidad in a more partisan 
sense, limiting members to those who share the CHC’s stated position on key issue areas 
such as immigration. Thus, even if a legislator self-identifies as Latinx and has the 
appropriate ancestry, they are not guaranteed membership in the CHC. A clear example 
of this is former Rep. Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) and his attempt to join the CHC in 2017. A 
majority of CHC members voted against Curbelo’s request—despite his Cuban heritage 
and self-identification as Latino—largely because of the perception that his political 
beliefs did not line up with the interests of the Latinx community as defined by the CHC. 
This included Curbelo’s refusal to sign on as a cosponsor of the DREAM Act in the 
House, signaling to many CHC members his unwillingness to support the immigration 
priorities deemed by the CHC to be vital to the Latinx community (Caygle 2017).60 
Regardless, the core idea remains: the Latinx community is, in the eyes of the CHC, a 
diverse community that encompasses the intersections of many different identities. The 
goal of the Caucus, then, is to represent anyone and everyone who identifies with 
                                               
60 This does, of course, raise questions about whether the CHC’s determination of the “Latinx position” on 
immigration, and other issues, is an accurate reflection of the preferences of Latinxs or simply a reflection 
of the extent to which partisan polarization influences how the CHC defines and characterizes Latinx 
interests. 
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Latinidad, loosely defined, even as doing so fundamentally alters the CHC itself. In the 
words of Representative D: 
“We now have more women in the Caucus, we have people from different parts 
of the country that we didn’t have before, we have more members in general, we 
have more veterans in general than we’ve had before, we have more people who 
are professionals…So there’s a lot of different experience that people bring to the 
Caucus, personal experiences, and this has been very good, and in that sense the 
Caucus has changed dramatically.”61 
 
Latinidad and Representation 
Latinidad is complex—Latinx identity intersects with various other identities, 
including national origin and gender, in meaningful ways. These intersections are not lost 
on the CHC. For both its members and its constituents, Latinidad is not limited only to 
those who speak Spanish. Latinxs are anyone who self-identifies as such, with the caveat 
that their national origin or ancestry must be linked to a Spanish-speaking country or a 
country with a language closely related to Spanish.62 In leaving its definition of Latinidad 
intentionally vague and fluid, the CHC ensures that all individuals who identify as Latinx 
both feel heard and represented by the group even though the distinct preferences of 
Latinx individuals and groups may be at odds with each other. This is reflected in the 
CHC’s recognition of significant differences based on national origin and gender in the 
                                               
61 Representative D, personal interview. 
62 In the cases of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, the relationship between Chamorro and Spanish 
is itself the product of Spanish colonization of the islands. 
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Caucus’s position on judicial nominees63 and in leadership structure,64 as well as the 
CHC’s active attempts to work with rather than against these intersections. 
Why, then, does the CHC make statements and issue press releases that do not 
highlight the varied experiences and preferences of Latinxs, opting instead to refer to the 
broad, panethnic “Latinx community”? As mentioned earlier, despite its awareness of and 
attention to intersectionality within the Latinx community, the CHC is similar to the 
stakeholders described by Mora (2014) and acts strategically in its usage of panethnicity. 
Were the CHC to explicitly tie a policy or position to a specific subgroup within the 
Latinx community, opponents would use the opportunity to label the issue as too 
particularistic and undeserving of sustained legislative or political focus. Or, opponents 
might take the opportunity to stoke tensions between Latinx subgroups and heighten the 
perception that they are competing for representation and resources in a two-tiered 
system that works to disadvantage racial minority groups (Hero 1992). The decision to 
publicly use the language of panethnicity is thus strategic, as shown earlier in the 
discussion of bilingual education, but also implied in the discussion of the April 1993 
meeting regarding nominating a Latinx to replace Byron White on the Supreme Court. 
While the other members of the CHC agreed with Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart that the 
process of identifying potential nominees ought to include all national origin groups and 
produce an inclusive list, the CHC would likely have presented its choices as simply 
good Latinx nominees rather than good Mexican American, Puerto Rican, or Cuban 
                                               
63 CHC Meeting Minutes for April 1, 1993. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 
1984-1994, Box 3, Folder 1. 
64 CHC Meeting Minutes for November 30, 1994. Records of the CHC, Administrative Files 1985-1993, 
Box 1, Folder 2. 
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American nominees. In fact, this was the case in a letter the CHC sent to President 
Clinton prior to that April meeting, urging him to nominate a Hispanic to replace Justice 
White without reference to national origin or any other kind of diversity within the Latinx 
community.65 
This has significant implications for Latinx representation in Congress. According 
to Representative A, there is strength in numbers rather than individuals in Congress66—
but how do you ensure that those numbers accurately reflect the entire constituency you 
represent? Both for its members and its constituency, i.e. the Latinx community, the CHC 
defines Latinidad broadly and with some deference to individuals’ self-identification. 
The CHC is also active in its attempts to recognize the diversity and intersectionality 
within the community, whether in discussing what it means to be Latinx and a member of 
the CHC, diversifying the leadership of the CHC, or explicitly highlighting diversity in 
policy decisions or endorsements for executive appointments, among other things. The 
difference here between the coalition and the individual goes back to what Representative 
A said—there is strength in numbers. An individual legislator surely can push other 
members of the House and Congress as a whole to be more attentive to diversity, and to 
pay attention to intersectionality within their own communities. However, this does not 
guarantee that legislation will reflect this awareness. As a coalition, the CHC not only 
allows its members to actively explore what being Latinx means for themselves and by 
extension, their own communities—whether this means congressional districts, gender 
                                               
65 Letter to President Bill Clinton, March 23, 1992. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 3, Folder 1. 
66 Representative A, personal interview. 
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groups, national origin group, or something else—it also allows the members to leverage 
their collective influence and power in a more meaningful way, namely pushing 
legislation that benefits multiple groups within the Latinx community instead of focusing 
on those groups within the community that are more sizable and thus perceived by some 
to be more important. 
But what does this look like in practice? In a press release from January 27, 1983, 
the CHC announced that Rep. Robert García (D-NY) was unanimously reelected as Chair 
of the CHC. In his remarks, García highlighted the necessity of a CHC agenda that 
reflected the needs of “our community”. He also stated, though, that members each 
represented their “own communities,”67 implying that the broad community represented 
by the CHC was in fact comprised of several smaller communities. The challenge faced 
by the CHC in 1983, and today, was to craft a legislative agenda that appealed to all of 
these communities. 
García specifically mentioned health, education, housing, and employment issues 
as especially important, but did not explain why he and the rest of the CHC believed 
these to be the core issue areas that demanded attention within the Latinx community. 
Also unclear from García’s statements was precisely which groups within the Latinx 
community would benefit the most from a focus on these issues—would health or 
education policies equally affect Mexican Americans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans? What 
about younger versus older Latinxs, new immigrants or citizens, men or women? In short, 
we are left wondering how exactly the CHC is able to construct a legislative agenda that 
                                               
67 Press Release, “Garcia Re-Elected Chairman,” January 27, 1983. Records of the CHC, History Files of 
the CHC 1982-1994, Box 1, Folder 3. 
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attempts to balance the wide range of interests that are encompassed within the coalition 
that is the CHC precisely because of its decision to define Latinidad broadly, and how 
well the CHC is able to wield its collective power to get this agenda accepted by other 
members of the House and effectively implement its policy goals from year to year. I 
address these questions and discuss the diversity of the CHC’s legislative agenda 
alongside its influence on Democratic priorities in the House as well as the overall 
effectiveness of the CHC, in the next two chapters. 
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4| The CHC and Agenda-Setting in the House 
 
In October of 1983, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill (D-MA) pulled the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983 (H.R. 1510) from the House floor schedule 
and shelved it for the remainder of the 98th Congress. Speaker O’Neill’s decision to 
remove a bill scheduled for debate from the congressional agenda was somewhat 
uncommon, illustrating the influence of the CHC on immigration policy. In O’Neill’s 
words, he pulled the bill because “he could find ‘no constituency’ in favor of it” 
(Cohodas 1983). This is surprising, given that the bill was sponsored and championed by 
Democrats, most notably Rep. Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky and Rep. Peter Rodino, Jr. 
of New Jersey. Why, then, did the Speaker remark that he could find no constituency in 
favor of passing the legislation, especially when a related bill—S. 529—had already 
passed the Senate months prior? O’Neill indicated that his decision was driven by the 
vocal opposition to H.R. 1510 by members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. In 
fact, CHC Chair Rep. Robert García (D-NY) considered O’Neill’s decision to pull H.R. 
1510 to be “the first victory we’ve had as a cohesive body” (Cohodas 1983). 
 Although the Immigration Reform and Control act ultimately passed the House 
and Senate and was signed into law by President Reagan in the 99th Congress, O’Neill’s 
decision to act on the concerns of the Caucus in the 98th Congress raises significant 
questions not only about the role of the Hispanic Caucus in shaping the legislative agenda 
of the Democratic Party in the House—both its priorities and positions—but also about 
the extent to which the CHC’s own legislative agenda represents the significant diversity 
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within the Latinx community (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). In this chapter I analyze the 
substantive content of the CHC’s legislative agendas from 1977 to 2016 in order to assess 
the diversity of the legislation on the agendas from year to year. For this analysis, I rely 
on systematic analyses of several data sources in order to determine which bills, 
resolutions, amendments, and broad issue areas were on the CHC’s agenda in each 
session of Congress that the group has existed. Drawing on the Congressional Bills 
Project, I then examine the substantive diversity of the CHC’s agendas from year to year 
alongside the differences in political perspective among various Latinx subgroups, most 
notably those defined by national origin. While the CHC may appear to be an 
organization that broadly homogenizes Latinxs for the sake of political expediency, 
variation in the content of the CHC’s agendas over time indicates an awareness of Latinx 
diversity that results in legislative agendas that cover a wide variety of issue areas that 
matter differently to Mexicans or Puerto Ricans or Cubans or Latinxs from other 
countries, but without sacrificing the coalitional nature of the CHC or its goal of 
representing all Latinxs. 
I also analyze the extent to which the Hispanic Caucus influenced the agenda of 
the Democratic Caucus—i.e., the bills that the majority party brings to the House floor—
from 1977 to 2016. Did the Hispanic Caucus leverage its own legislative agenda, filled 
with bills and resolutions designed to benefit the Latinx community, in order to help craft 
a House Democratic Caucus agenda that encompassed the concerns of this specific 
constituency within the Democratic Caucus? I engage this question here, in an attempt to 
assess the relationship between the Hispanic Caucus and the House Democratic Caucus 
as the CHC attempted to enhance the political representation of Latinxs. Using the CHC’s 
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agendas—as identified in the systematic analysis described above—in conjunction with 
Democratic Caucus agendas for the same time period, I empirically assess the 
relationship between the two groups’ agendas. Just as CHC opposition to H.R. 1510 
caused the bill to be removed from the Democratic agenda, I expect that the opposite 
relationship also holds true and that sufficient CHC support for legislation can get the 
Democratic leadership to pay similar attention to the legislation. However, I do not find 
significant evidence that the Caucus agenda spills over onto the Democratic agenda, 
regardless of whether the Democratic Party is in the majority or minority in the House. 
This raises questions about the extent to which non-Latinx Democrats actually represent 
Latinx interests, and highlights the necessity of the CHC’s coalitional representation at 
other stages of the legislative process. 
 
Caucuses and Agenda Politics in Congress 
 Prior studies on agenda setting in Congress demonstrate the strong influence of 
political parties and congressional committees. While agenda setting in the House follows 
a complicated process with some limited opportunities for individual members to attempt 
to insert their own preferences on to the agenda, the final impact of these individuals is 
often considered miniscule compared to the influences of political parties and party 
leadership. In the House, the majority party typically constructs a legislative agenda with 
many items designed to realizing that party’s political and policy goals and that will 
attract 218 majority party votes (e.g., Rohde 1991). The minority party has few 
opportunities to meaningfully obstruct the implementation of the majority party’s agenda 
if it has the support of 218 majority party members. 
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 Cox and McCubbins (2005; 2007) theorize House political parties as legislative 
cartels, where the majority has an advantage at every stage of the legislative process. The 
majority party is careful to balance its usage of positive and negative agenda powers 
depending on the political context. When the majority party is fairly homogeneous, the 
majority will tilt the balance toward positive agenda power—bills introduced in such 
conditions are likely to be supported by a majority of the majority and have high chances 
of passing the House. The majority party is cautious though when it is more 
heterogeneous, as rank-and-file members who deviate from the preferred position of 
party leaders may use positive agenda power to introduce legislation unfavorable to the 
majority of the party. In this scenario, the majority party will rely more on negative 
agenda powers in order to block bills that would divide the majority party and hurt its 
reputation.68 
The exercise of positive or negative agenda power by party leaders, though, is not 
the only method of influencing the agenda in the House. Committees can and do play a 
significant role in the agenda setting process by acting as gatekeepers that control access 
to the agenda and the rest of the legislative process (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). 
Committees promote a “specialization of production that can result in higher-quality 
policy responses at lower cost” (Adler and Wilkerson 2012, 64). That is, committee 
members can craft compulsory legislation that they prefer and which falls within the 
committee’s jurisdiction, and then push that legislation on to the House agenda because 
                                               
68 It is important to note here that party leaders in the House were not always so powerful. Prior to a series 
of reforms instituted between 1970 and 1977, committee chairs wielded considerable power and shaped the 
day-to-day operations of the House (Rohde 1991). 
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of the deference afforded to committees in this system of specialized production.69 Even 
today, when party leaders in the post-reform House wield significant control over the 
agenda, committees still play an important role by winnowing out bills that the committee 
decides do not deserve the committee’s attention (Krutz 2005). While Krutz finds that the 
intensity of a bill sponsor’s efforts to push their bill through a committee plays a 
significant role in shaping the outcomes of the winnowing process, this does not take 
away from the overall power of committees to determine which bills will get the chance 
to be debated on the floor of the House70. 
 
Congressional Caucuses and the Agenda 
 If the agenda-setting process in the House is so tightly controlled by parties, party 
leaders, and congressional committees, then what room is left for member organizations 
to assert themselves with respect to the agenda? Consideration of the role played by 
congressional member organizations, i.e. congressional caucuses, sheds light on unique 
organizations that provide members with an alternative means to access and influence the 
legislative agenda. Caucuses provide members of Congress with an opportunity to 
influence the legislative agenda even if those members represent a minority faction 
within the majority party, insofar as caucuses function as collective entities that have 
more relative power than individual members of Congress, especially considering that 
                                               
69 For a differing perspective on committees that highlights their informational role in Congress, see 
Krehbiel (1991). 
70 Rank-and-file members use discharge petitions, which force bills out of committees without a formal 
committee vote, as a check on the agenda powers of committee chairs and party leaders (Crombez, 
Groseclose, and Krehbiel 2006; see also Pearson and Schickler 2009). The CHC, however, does not have a 
history of utilizing discharge petitions in its representational efforts. 
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caucuses can leverage the threat of withholding votes in order to see their own agenda 
priorities realized. Many different caucuses exist in the House, and each caucus has a 
unique basis for its membership. Some caucuses are based on partisan identity, while 
others are based on regional concerns, or the caucuses draw in members who share a 
concern with a particular issue area. Indeed, caucuses provide members of Congress with 
a unique opportunity to signal to a wide variety of constituents the members’ attention to 
issues that are not always captured in campaigns or roll call votes (Miler 2010). 
 When it comes to congressional agenda setting, though, not all types of caucuses 
have the same goals or utilize the same methods. According to Hammond et al. (1985), 
different types of caucuses choose to focus on either agenda setting—getting issues and 
bills the caucuses care about on the agenda—or agenda maintenance—keeping the issues 
important to the caucuses salient in the eyes of both Congress and the mass public. 
National constituency caucuses, e.g. the Congressional Hispanic Caucus or the 
Congressional Black Caucus, engage in both agenda setting and agenda maintenance. 
Both groups focus on “increasing saliency among the mass and attentive publics and 
among congressional and administrative decision-makers” (594). These efforts are 
bolstered by the fact that, because these are national constituency caucuses and are thus 
presumed to speak for the entirety of the national constituency in question, the CBC and 
the CHC and their members “often serve as spokespersons for their national 
constituencies, and they are considered so by the national media” (595). Such perceptions 
by the media help cement the status of national constituency caucuses in the eyes of the 
public, and facilitate success for these groups in getting issues on both public and 
governmental agendas, i.e. making issues salient and getting them attention in Congress. 
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Ultimately, Hammond et al. conclude, caucuses are generally successful when they 
engage in both agenda setting—actually putting items on agendas—and agenda 
maintenance—keeping salient those issues that are already on agendas (584). As such, 
caucuses are able to wield a significant amount of agenda influence in Congress (603). 
 Hammond (1991) also argues that, at the time, the influence of caucuses was 
further bolstered by the decentralized nature of Congress. In her view, the 
decentralization of Congress contributed to a scenario where congressional leaders were 
expected to pay more attention to the demands of individuals and groups within 
Congress. Even as Congress today is increasingly centralized in the hands of party 
leaders, caucuses—especially national constituency caucuses—help crystallize these 
individual and group demands, serving an informational function that is critical to party 
leadership in its efforts to be as responsive as possible to the demands of the rank and file 
within Congress. Indeed, as Hammond puts it, caucuses “supplement leadership functions 
through information activities and by identifying and training future leaders” (293), 
raising the prospect of future leaders who are already aware of the demands of caucuses 
and who in fact are committed to realizing the goals of caucuses through legislative 
activities. 
Hammond’s view is complicated, though, by later developments in Congress, 
most notably the ban on Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs) implemented by Newt 
Gingrich and Republicans in the 104th Congress. Gingrich’s move barred LSOs from 
receiving congressional funding, staff, and office space, attempting to shut caucuses out 
of the proceedings of the House both formally and informally. The effects of this measure 
continue to be seen today even as groups such as the CHC and the CBC have continued 
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to exist in the face of Gingrich’s ban—both groups reorganized as Congressional 
Member Organizations (CMOs) and altered their staffing and funding structures to be in 
compliance with House rules. Despite these changes—including significant reductions in 
the CHC’s operating budget and staff—the CHC has continued to focus on representing 
Latinx interests in Congress through its members’ legislative activities and through 
agenda setting within the Democratic Caucus. While there are certainly complications 
arising from the claim that the CHC represents all Latinx interests, it is difficult to argue 
against the claim that the CHC is a coalitional entity comprising Latinx legislators who 
try to work together on issues that are considered critical among the Latinx population 
such as bilingual education, higher education access, and immigration (Rodriguez 2002; 
Wilson 2017). Rodriguez offers a broad account of various Latinx political coalitions—
including the CHC but also Latinx interest groups such as the National Council of La 
Raza—and their efforts to empower Latinxs. Rodriguez presents the CHC as a coalition, 
though his account does not examine the tangible effects of the CHC on aspects of the 
legislative process such as agenda setting. Wilson’s study of the inclusion and 
incorporation of Latinxs and their interests in Congress digs a bit deeper, providing 
anecdotal evidence of the CHC pushing the Democratic Party toward the CHC’s position 
on immigration issues. 
Despite the claims made by Hammond et al., Hammond, and Rodriguez, there is 
still little empirical evidence showing the specific influence that the CHC is able to exert 
on the legislative agenda of the Democratic Party or the general legislative agenda of the 
House of Representatives as a whole. Power in Congress is more centralized now than it 
was in the early 1990’s, and the role of congressional caucuses was fundamentally altered 
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by the restrictions placed upon LSOs in the 104th Congress. Some accounts do 
demonstrate the possibility that the CHC can affect the Democratic agenda on key Latinx 
issues such as immigration (Wilson 2017). However, Wilson’s account is comprised of a 
case study of CHC efforts on immigration with no investigation of how those efforts 
empirically affect the agenda setting of the Democratic Party. There is also no 
investigation here of the collective efforts of the CHC on other issue areas that are 
traditionally of interest to the Latinx population, including bilingual education, access to 
higher education, minority business promotion, health care, and employment 
discrimination. 
Other research demonstrates the power of intraparty organizations such as the 
Democratic Study Group, the Republican Study Committee, and the House Freedom 
Caucus to influence the congressional agenda even when these groups are minority 
factions within their respective political parties (Bloch Rubin 2017). According to Bloch 
Rubin, intraparty organizations “empower legislators of varying ideological stripes to 
achieve collective and coordinated action by providing selective incentives to cooperative 
members…and instituting rules and procedures to promote group decision making” (4). 
What is unclear is where groups such as the CHC fit into Bloch Rubin’s theorization of 
the power of intraparty organizations: the CHC is technically a bipartisan interparty 
organization, and the basis of its formation was not strong disagreement with the 
direction of one of the political parties but rather a desire to do more for Latinxs 
alongside members’ broader work within Congress. Nevertheless, Bloch Rubin’s 
findings demonstrate the ability of factions within the House to significantly affect the 
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legislative agenda despite the strong efforts made by party leaders to keep control over 
the agenda to themselves.  
 
Legislative Agendas of the CHC 
 The legislative agendas of the CHC are important to analyze because they provide 
information on what issues the Caucus determines to be of the utmost importance, and 
they illuminate how Caucus members think about the Latinx community and its interests. 
The Latinx community has a high degree of internal diversity—based on national origin, 
age, immigration status, and level of acculturation—and also lacks a strong unifying 
experience that provides all Latinxs with the same social or political experience in the 
United States. Contrast this to the Congressional Black Caucus, which embodies a 
continued commitment to the civil rights movement that has shaped the social and 
political experiences of all African Americans living in the United States for over five 
decades (Barnett 1975; Singh 1998; Pinney and Serra 1999). Latinxs have not 
experienced an event or era that equally affects all Latinxs in the same way—during the 
fights for inclusion and over assimilation in the 1950s and 1960s, members of different 
Latinx ethnicities had their own viewpoints rather than a unified approach. Mexicans 
living in the southwestern United States were treated differently than Puerto Ricans living 
in the northeast, and Cubans fleeing the Castro regime were themselves treated 
differently than either Mexicans or Puerto Ricans. There are also marked differences 
within each ethnic group that make it difficult to argue that all Latinxs view politics in the 
same way (Gutiérrez 1995; Beltrán 2010; Fraga et al. 2010). 
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 This is not to say that it is impossible for there to be an issue area that equally 
affects all Latinxs. Immigration issues, while primarily affecting Mexicans and Latinxs 
from Central and South America, have over time come to affect Latinxs from Puerto Rico 
and Cuba as well. This is not because of a change in status—Puerto Rico is still a US 
territory, meaning people born in Puerto Rico are legally US citizens, while Cubans 
fleeing communism are still welcomed with (relatively) open arms—but because of the 
increased racialization of ethnicity. While the languages used to define race and ethnicity 
are considered different, their utility is still the same—to mark and exclude certain groups 
from American citizenship and whiteness (Hattam 2007). Thus, while Puerto Ricans and 
Cubans have different experiences and interests with regard to immigration issues than 
Mexicans or Central or South Americans, to be Puerto Rican or Cuban today is 
considered analogous to being Mexican or Central or South American because members 
of these groups are racialized in the same way. This development is not lost on members 
of the CHC—in the words of one member, with regard to immigration Cubans “were 
treated very differently but now are starting to be treated just the same, getting kicked out 
the way that Mexicans do.”71 
 Does the Caucus’s legislative agenda reflect these developments, though? It is one 
thing for a member of the Caucus to acknowledge that the dynamics surrounding issues 
such as immigration have changed and affect members of Latinx ethnic groups in 
different ways. It is another thing to say that the Caucus incorporates this understanding 
into its efforts at coalitional representation. To determine which scenario is the case, 
                                               
71 Representative F, personal interview. See also Molina 2014. 
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though, it is important to first understand the various factors that go into the construction 
of the CHC’s agenda. 
For the most part, the CHC’s agenda is constructed in response to input from 
members on what issues they want to focus on in a given session of Congress. According 
to one congressional staffer, the Caucus treats as more important those issues that are 
salient to the Latinx community as a whole, providing the specific examples of 
immigration, health care, and education. Smaller issues tend to be more district-specific 
and are brought up by individual members appealing directly to the chair or the executive 
director of the Caucus to try and get these issues on the agenda.72 Such an approach is 
echoed by members of the Caucus: 
“You know obviously members all have some input and you’re going to start with 
how it impacts their local districts; and then we have to, within the Caucus itself 
we have to start defining what is the greater interest for communities that look 
like ours.”73 
 
That said, members suggested there are certain issue areas that are always going to be on 
the Caucus’s agenda because of their lasting importance to the Latinx community: 
“We had maybe three to five major issues that are never going to change and our 
position on them – the importance of federal assistance on education and things 
like that, on immigration, health care. And so members that wanted to come into 
our organization pretty much had to be aligned with those because why would 
they want to be such a minority voice out of twenty-something?”74 
 
Even if a member didn’t have a strong stance on immigration, health care, or education, 
then, it is likely that they still would decide to go along with the Caucus’s decision to 
                                               
72 Staffer A, personal interview. 
73 Representative A, personal interview. 
74 Representative A, personal interview. 
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prioritize these issues because of the feeling that these are the core issues for Latinxs 
across sessions of Congress. 
Something else intimated in Representative A’s comments is a seeming desire 
among Caucus members to present a united front and speak with one voice on those 
issues of primary concern to the Caucus. As another member put it, there is a simple 
reason this happens: 
“Because our plan is to be a voice that you recognize, that someone like you 
working for a college or a newspaper would say, ‘As professor of this college I 
can tell you, class, that the Hispanic Caucus supports or does not support such and 
such.’ We’re divided and we send out a divided message.”75 
 
Representative D’s response here is telling when determining whether the Caucus 
incorporates concerns of specific Latinx ethnic groups when constructing its own agenda. 
Given the desire of the Caucus to be seen as a strong coalition that represents Latinx 
interests, and to not send a divided message, it seems the Caucus may avoid taking up 
issues that could create disagreements among members. In this regard, the internal 
agenda setting politics of the CHC closely mirrors that of intraparty organizations, 
wherein organization leaders play a significant role in “managing the substance and scope 
of their blocs’ ambitions, and balancing members’ competing views on policy design and 
strategy” in order to construct an agenda of stated goals that “may not reflect the primary 
priorities of all members, but instead those issues on which group members are least 
likely to disagree” (Bloch Rubin 2017, 15, emphasis added). This was further emphasized 
in other interviews by staffers and members alike, with the common sentiment being that 
                                               
75 Representative D, personal interview. 
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the Caucus avoids taking a clear position on an issue where there is not a clear consensus 
among Caucus members on what that position should be: 
“There’s other issues that I think the Caucus shies away from because there is 
division among the members about which direction to go – probably the Puerto 
Rican statehood issue is probably the perfect example of that. Even within the 
Puerto Rican members of Congress…there is a split among them.”76 
 
Consequently, the Caucus tends to avoid taking strong positions on the Puerto Rico 
statehood question or the desirability of the Cuban embargo. According to one staffer 
though, even with these general division on Puerto Rico or Cuba policy, members would 
still band together on key issues like immigration reform.77 Immigration, for example, is 
often seen as an issue that primarily affects Mexican Americans but Puerto Rican and 
Cuban members of the Caucus still work together with Mexican American members to 
realize positive immigration reform.78 Perhaps the most telling sign of the Caucus’s 
efforts to be cognizant of Latinx diversity while constructing an agenda responsive to all 
Latinxs’ interests comes from a Caucus member explicitly discussing the complex nature 
of Latinidad as a racial identity: 
“I mean we were Hispanics and that included Cubans, it included Mexican 
Americans and even blacks were included because there were some blacks from 
Cuba and other parts of South America that they didn’t consider themselves 
black, they considered themselves Hispanics. So the Hispanic Caucus covered all 
of them, regardless of where you’re from the Caucus was very interested in your 
needs.”79 
 
Caucus members and staffers, then, appear to be cognizant of the issues of diversity that 
potentially plague attempts to create a cohesive legislative agenda that represents the 
                                               
76 Representative C, personal interview. 
77 Staffer C, personal interview. 
78 Representative C, personal interview. 
79 Representative E, personal interview. 
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interests of all Latinxs across a wide variety of ethnic groups. While members of these 
ethnic groups have in some ways been racialized such that they are treated the same in 
American society, there are still marked differences to which the Caucus is attentive 
when determining what issues to prioritize when working on behalf of a panethnic 
“Latinx community.” What, then, do the resultant legislative agendas actually look like? 
 
Identifying the CHC’s Agendas 
 Identifying the legislative agendas of the CHC over the last forty years is not as 
simple as searching for a statement from the Caucus in each session of Congress. Rarely 
does the CHC issue a statement detailing the issue areas and legislation they are going to 
focus on in a given session of Congress. More often, the CHC may offer a list of issues 
that it considers important, but the specific legislation is determined by what is 
introduced in Congress or what issues come up during the session and to which the CHC 
must react. Thus, identifying legislative agendas requires a systematic analysis of 
multiple sources that contain information on legislation debated in Congress and the 
positions taken by various individuals and groups on the legislation. 
 I systematically analyze five different sources to determine the CHC’s legislative 
agendas going back to 1977. First, I searched the Congressional Record, which records 
all actions on the floors of the House and Senate including speeches, roll call votes, and 
extensions of remarks. The Record is an ideal source because it is available for every year 
the Caucus has existed and includes all legislation debated on the floor of the House or in 
committees. I also relied on CQ Weekly, which publishes articles and information on 
various aspects of the legislative process, including positions taken by individual 
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members of Congress or groups on certain pieces of legislation. For both the 
Congressional Record and CQ Weekly, I used the same systematic approach. I conducted 
targeted searches using the terms “Hispanic Caucus” and “CHC”, limiting my results to 
each individual Congress, and went through each search result to determine if the result 
included a clear indication of the CHC’s position on an issue. I kept track of those items 
with clear CHC positions in a database that also includes the session of Congress the item 
was introduced, the date of the CQ article or entry in the Record, the appropriate citation 
for those items found in the Record, and if applicable the name and number for the bill, 
resolution, or amendment. For CQ Weekly, the searches are conducted in CQ’s internal 
search engine; for the Congressional Record, I utilize the ProQuest Congressional 
database and limit results to those that can be found in both the bound and daily editions 
of the Record. 
 I also analyzed the press releases issued by the CHC, hosted on the webpage of 
the current chair of the Caucus. Press releases offer clear insight into the position of the 
Caucus on an issue, but they are limited in two respects: 1) previous press releases are 
only available as far back as the 108th Congress, from 2003-2004; and 2) press releases 
do not capture all instances where the CHC has taken a clear stance on an issue, as not all 
of the legislation the CHC prioritizes may be considered salient enough to merit inclusion 
in a press release. I copied and pasted the text of each press release into a single 
document for each session of Congress and read through each of the press releases to see 
which ones indicate the CHC’s position on an issue, or whether an issue is deemed 
important by the CHC. I kept track of these results in the same database as results for the 
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Congressional Record and CQ Weekly, logging the same identifying information for each 
result. 
 The third source I use for identifying the CHC’s legislative agendas is the 
archived materials of the CHC itself, housed at the National Archives in Washington, 
D.C. Over the course of multiple trips to the National Archives, I scanned hundreds of 
documents from the CHC archive in order to facilitate reading and coding the documents. 
Like the press releases, the archival materials are limited in that they only cover a short 
time period within the Caucus’s forty years of existence, from 1982-1995.80 For those 
years, though, the archival materials are especially helpful. The materials include minutes 
of CHC meetings and copies of official memorandums sent among CHC members and 
staff. These minutes and memos include CHC debates over which issues to focus on, as 
well as what position the CHC ought to take on a given piece of legislation. As with the 
press releases, I read through the meeting minutes and memos, as well as the attachments 
to the memos, making note of any clear indication of the CHC’s position on an issue. I 
make note of the date of the archival document in question in the database, and record 
issues prioritized by the CHC as well as bills, resolutions, or amendments mentioned in 
the archival documents. 
 The final source I use to identify the content of the CHC’s legislative agendas 
focuses specifically on bills. First, I identified all bills introduced between the 95th and 
114th Congresses that were sponsored by a member of the CHC. For each of these bills, I 
                                               
80 Once the CHC became a CMO without a dedicated office space, it became much harder to keep the 
CHC’s records organized as the records moved with the Executive Director (who also often changed from 
one Congress to the next) to the new Chair’s office at the beginning of each session of Congress. 
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then determined how many other members of the CHC cosponsored each bill. If a CHC 
member sponsored a bill and the number of cosponsors plus the sponsor equaled a 
majority of the CHC’s membership in the session of Congress that bill was introduced, 
the bill was considered part of the CHC’s agenda for that session of Congress. I used this 
threshold to control for legislation sponsored by CHC members that does not address 
broad Latinx interests, e.g. district-focused legislation, that other CHC members might 
cosponsor due to friendship or a desire for reciprocal cosponsorship on their own district-
focused legislation. 
 After using these sources to identify issue areas, bills, resolutions, and 
amendments prioritized by the CHC over the years—that is, identifying the CHC’s 
legislative agendas—I code each of the results using the coding scheme of the 
Congressional Bills Project. Items are coded based on the area in which they have their 
primary effect, meaning that a bill that mentions immigration but focuses primarily on 
agricultural subsidies would be coded under agriculture. In cases where the CHC simply 
makes a statement indicating its commitment to do work in a specific issue area, the 
coding is straightforward and matches up well with the Congressional Bills codebook. 
Where the coding becomes tricky is when looking at specific bills, resolutions, and 
amendments. The Congressional Bills Project only focuses on bills introduced in the 
House and the Senate and does not include coding for resolutions or amendments. 
However, there are several cases where the CHC’s agenda focuses not on a bill but rather 
on a specific amendment to a bill, or else to a House, Senate, or joint resolution. In the 
case of resolutions, I code these based on the Congressional Bills coding scheme and the 
specific content of the resolution. In the case of amendments, I deviate slightly from the 
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Congressional Bills coding scheme in that I code the entry primarily based on the area 
affected by the amendment rather than the bill itself. For example, in the 109th Congress 
H.R. 3010 dealt with appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human 
Services, and Education for FY2006. In the sources mentioned above, there is no clear 
indication of the CHC’s position on H.R. 3010 itself. There is, however, an entry in the 
Congressional Record indicating the CHC’s support of Senate Amendment 2262—
offered by Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—to increase funding for education programs serving 
Hispanic students. The Congressional Bills Project would code H.R. 3010 as 
“government operations,” since the bill deals with appropriations for multiple 
departments. I code this as “education,” because the CHC’s agenda includes S. Amdt. 
2262 and its support for HSI funding. 
 Over the last forty years, the CHC has included on its agenda items in each of the 
issue areas covered in the Congressional Bills Project codebook—ranging from 
macroeconomics to public lands and water management—at least once. 
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Figure 4.1 Issue Areas on CHC Agendas, 95th-114th Congresses 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, in twenty sessions of Congress, only two issue areas were 
included on the CHC agenda in two or fewer sessions—energy and transportation. Some 
issues are clearly more important than others though. Several issue areas received steady 
attention: civil rights, health, labor and employment, education, immigration, and public 
lands and water management appeared on more than 15 out of 20 CHC agendas. Of 
these, education is the most prevalent issue and was included on the CHC agenda in 
every session of Congress.81 The prevalence of education on the CHC agenda comports 
with prior research that demonstrates the consistent focus of the Latinx community on 
education—specifically bilingual education issues—over the years (Sanchez 2006; 
                                               
81It is worth noting here that there is relatively little data to identify the CHC’s agenda in several sessions 
of Congress: the 95th, 96th, 97th, and 104th. Systematic analysis returned fewer than five results for each of 
these sessions. 
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Uhlaner and Garcia 2002; Uhlaner 1991). The next most common issues focused on by 
the CHC are health and immigration, which appeared on 18 out of 20 legislative agendas. 
That immigration is not on the CHC agenda in every session is surprising, as immigration 
is often seen as a quintessentially Latinx issue. However, immigration’s importance to the 
broader Latinx community is complicated, with evidence that many Latinxs are 
concerned that too many immigrants are coming to the US while at the same time being 
highly supportive of recent immigrants (Sanchez 2006; see also de la Garza et al. 1991). 
When asked about issues that potentially divide the Latinx community in interviews, 
though, interviewees never mentioned immigration as a possibility; one interviewee even 
mentioned the willingness of non-Mexicans to work with Mexicans and Mexican 
Americans on immigration because of the perception that the issue affected all Latinxs in 
some way.82 
Civil rights is the next most common agenda issue, showing up on 17 agendas. 
Within this issue area, much of the CHC’s focus and resources were dedicated to 
protecting advances embodied within the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This was manifest 
in the CHC’s efforts in the early 1990s to extend provisions of the VRA that necessitated 
voting materials and information be available in languages other than English, as well as 
more recent efforts by the CHC to attempt to influence judicial decisions such as Shelby 
County v. Holder. Labor and employment and public lands and water management each 
show up on 16 agendas. Both of these categories capture many issues that are important 
to the CHC, including protecting workers’ rights and ensuring equal access to 
                                               
82 Representative F, personal interview. 
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employment for all. The public lands category also encompasses any legislation targeting 
US territories such as Puerto Rico, which is represented in the CHC by multiple members 
including but not limited to the Resident Commissioner. 
 When looking only at legislative items that make it on to the CHC’s legislative 
agenda—i.e. bills, resolutions, and amendments—the core priorities of the CHC become 
clearer. Looking at all sessions of Congress in which the CHC has existed, the majority 
of the legislative items on the CHC’s agendas comprise four issue areas: health, 
education, immigration, and government operations. There are some years where the 
CHC does not prioritize any legislation in some of these issue areas, and there are some 
years where any one of these issue areas does not account for the majority of legislation 
prioritized by the CHC. When looking at the entire tenure of the CHC, though, it is clear 
that these are the issue areas that are most important to the CHC and might be taken to be 
what the CHC considers to be “Latinx interests.” 
  
 138 
Figure 4.2 Legislative Items on CHC Agendas by Issue Area, 95th-114th Congress 
 
Within these four issue areas, it most surprising that immigration does not account 
for the highest proportion of legislation on the CHC’s legislative agendas since 1977—
that distinction belongs to government operations with 15.07% of all legislation on CHC 
agendas. There are 65 unique legislative items dealing with immigration on the CHC’s 
agendas, or 13.80% of all legislation prioritized by the CHC. Ten of these items were 
introduced between the 98th and 101st Congresses, coinciding with the debates and votes 
on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Sen. Alan Simpson (R-WY) 
sponsored the legislation, which was strongly opposed by the CHC. An earlier version of 
the bill was introduced in the 98th Congress that did not receive time on the floor in the 
House, thanks in part to the CHC’s efforts to persuade Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) to 
block the legislation. The version of the bill introduced in the 99th Congress, though, 
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passed the House and Senate and was signed into law by President Reagan. In both the 
98th and 99th Congresses, Ed Roybal (D-CA) introduced immigration reform legislation 
on behalf of the CHC as counters to Simpson’s bills. These bills, H.R. 4909 in the 98th 
Congress and H.R. 2180 in the 99th Congress, received the full support of all members of 
the CHC. There were other legislative items dealing with immigration introduced in this 
span of time, but the IRCA received the bulk of the CHC’s attention because of its 
employer sanctions provisions that required employers to not hire undocumented 
immigrants. CHC members were concerned that such language in the bill would result in 
increased discrimination against anybody who might look like an immigrant, which in the 
debates over the IRCA was taken to mean any Latinx who might apply for a job. These 
concerns over the potential for anti-Latinx discrimination resulted in the CHC sending a 
Dear Colleague letter to be sent to all CHC members and associate members pushing for 
support of Ed Roybal’s House Joint Resolution 534. H. J. Res. 534 expressed approval of 
findings by the Comptroller General regarding patterns of employment discrimination as 
a result of the employer sanctions provisions of the IRCA, and consequently called for 
the repeal of those provisions.83 The resolution died in committee, but received the 
support of a majority of the Caucus; the only members who did not cosponsor the 
resolution were Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Ben Blaz (R-Guam), Ron 
de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands), and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX). 
 Immigration legislation has maintained a strong presence on the CHC’s agenda, 
especially in recent years as Republicans gained control of the presidency and the House, 
                                               
83 Memo to Chairman de la Garza Re: H.J. Resolution 534, April 5, 1990. Records of the CHC, Official 
Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 2, Folder 5. 
 140 
and made strong pushes on anti-immigrant legislation. Nearly half of the legislative items 
in immigration on the CHC’s agendas have been introduced in Congress since the 107th 
Congress (2001-2002). These items are not all House or Senate bills—these also include 
amendments that affect immigration but are attached to ostensibly non-immigration bills. 
One example is H. Amdt. 1199, introduced by Rep. Paul Gosar (R-AZ) in the 114th 
Congress. Gosar’s amendment proposed modifying H.R. 5293, Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act for FY2017, to prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds to 
enlist recipients of benefits under President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) Program in the military. While H.R. 5293 is at its core a defense bill, 
the CHC did not take a stand on the bill itself but on Gosar’s amendment and its focused 
attack on immigrants. The amendment narrowly failed on a roll call vote in the House, 
though it is difficult to ascribe that failure to the opposition of the CHC as thirty 
Republicans joined 181 Democrats in voting against the amendment. 
 Overall, the CHC has become more active in Congress and has constructed larger 
legislative agendas as its membership has grown. Agendas from the 105th to 114th 
Congresses account for nearly three quarters—73.04%—of all legislation considered by 
the CHC, even though this period marks the transition of the CHC from an LSO to a 
CMO with fewer resources. Before the 105th, the most explosive period of growth for the 
CHC was in the 103rd Congress, which had a legislative agenda larger than any prior 
session. However, the CHC’s agendas did not start being consistently large until the 109th 
Congress. A constant fact regardless of the session of Congress or the size of the agenda, 
though, is that the CHC has primarily focused on Latinx-interest bills rather than 
resolutions or amendments. Across all sessions of Congress, 85.84% of items on CHC 
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agendas are bills, compared to 6.98% and 7.19% for resolutions and amendments 
respectively. 
Figure 4.3 Number of Legislative Items on CHC Agendas by Type, 95th-114th 
Congress 
 
Even in the 110th Congress, the session with the largest CHC agenda—thus the agenda 
with the greatest chance of being diverse with regard to legislation type—83.33% of the 
agenda was comprised of bills while resolutions and amendments account for 11.67% 
and 5% respectively. There are also multiple sessions where the entirety of the agenda 
comprised only bills84. This focus on bills is not surprising, as bills carry the most 
substantive weight in Congress and if the CHC wants to achieve the most success with 
                                               
84 This is the case in the 95th, 98th, 99th, and 108th Congresses. Due to data limitations, the agenda for the 
95th Congress comprises only one bill. These same limitations produce a 96th Congress agenda that only 
one amendment and agendas in the 97th and 104th Congresses that contain fewer than five items total. 
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regard to realizing Latinx interests, it makes sense that their efforts would focus on 
legislation that has the chance of becoming law (unlike resolutions). This does not 
explain the lack of focus on amendments, though—the greatest focus given to 
amendments is in the 103rd and 109th Congresses, where the CHC placed five 
amendments on its agenda. 
 As noted earlier, the recent agendas of the CHC highlight the perpetual focus of 
the Caucus on health, immigration, and government operations. In all sessions since and 
including the 110th Congress, legislation in these three issue areas has accounted for 
about 50% of the CHC’s legislative agenda. What is notable here is not that these issues 
have necessarily gained in focus, but that other core issues have decreased in focus. 
Education was a lynchpin of the CHC’s legislative agendas in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
especially protecting bilingual education programs, but has not been as important to the 
CHC in the last decade compared to these other issue areas. 
This decline in focus on education legislation is also indicative of a larger trend in 
the CHC’s agenda-setting approach in recent years. For the majority of time since the 
110th Congress, the Democratic Party has been in the minority in the House. This means 
the CHC has been in the minority as well, as all CHC members since the 105th Congress 
have been Democrats. As a bloc of the minority party, the CHC is less able to pursue 
those legislative items that it wants, and instead must focus on reacting to legislation 
introduced by the Republican majority that the CHC needs to take a stand on, whether 
that stand is one of support or one of opposition. This delineation between proactive 
versus reactive agenda-setting is not a subconscious one that is lost on CHC members, 
and is in fact acknowledged as a factor that affects how the Caucus approaches 
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policymaking. When asked how the Caucus’s approach shifted between Democratic and 
Republican presidencies and congressional majorities, one member responded: 
Well I mean, you know obviously you have less sway because you don’t have a 
Democratic president, and it’s all been defense for the most part and making an 
appeal to the public to put pressure on the administration – sometimes it’s worked 
and sometimes it hasn’t.”85 
 
Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that the CHC’s legislative agendas have 
developed over the last decade to have a heavy focus on healthcare and immigration. 
With constant criticism by the Republican majority of the Affordable Care Act and 
making health services available to immigrants, and sharp polarization on how to 
approach immigration reform between the Democratic and Republican parties, it 
logically follows that the Caucus’s agenda has focused on these two highly salient issue 
areas and the specific Latinx interests they encompass. 
 Even with this shifting focus toward healthcare and immigration in recent years, 
though, the CHC’s legislative agendas overall reflect a commitment on the part of the 
CHC to representing all groups within the Latinx community. Recall from Figure 4.1 that 
each major issue area included in the Congressional Bills Project has appeared on at least 
one CHC agenda and more than half of those issue areas appear on at least 10 CHC 
agendas, indicating at least 20 years of attention from the CHC. If the CHC were 
exclusively focused on the interests of, for example, one national origin group over all 
others then the agendas would not demonstrate this level of diversity. In a given year, 
Latinxs of different national origin groups will prioritize different issue areas. For 
example, in the 2006 Latino National Survey—shown below in Figure 4.4—we see 
                                               
85 Representative C, personal interview. 
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marked differences between Latinxs of various national origins when they were asked to 
identify the most important problem of the day. 
Figure 4.4 2006 Latino National Survey, Most Important Problem Responses 
by National Origin 
 
Looking beyond the Iraq War, which was at the forefront of everyone’s minds in 2006, 
we see some interesting differences among Latinxs. Latinxs who claimed their nation of 
origin as the U.S. were significantly more concerned with unemployment and jobs than 
Latinxs of any other national origin group. Mexican respondents were more concerned 
about illegal immigration than any other Latinxs—in fact, among non-Mexican Latinxs 
there was never more than 10% of respondents who identified illegal immigration as the 
most important problem in 2006, despite the significant immigration rallies and protest 
that occurred at that time. In the 109th Congress (2005-2006), the CHC’s agenda reflected 
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this divergence within the Latinx community. The agenda comprised 15 distinct issue 
areas that included immigration and employment, but also civil rights, social welfare, 
foreign affairs, and energy issues. These latter issue areas are captured in the 2006 LNS 
data by the “other” response option, which was a popular response among Puerto Ricans 
and Cubans. 
This agenda diversity has only increased over time, coinciding with the 
diversification of the CHC’s membership discussed in Chapter 2—as the number of CHC 
members increases and comprises members from more national origins than Mexico and 
Puerto Rico, the average number of issue areas included on the agenda also increases. For 
the first two decades of the CHC’s existence, the agenda included an average of 7 issue 
areas. In the last decade, beginning with the 110th Congress (2007-2008), the CHC 
agenda on average includes 11 issue areas and in multiple instances surpasses that 
average. While this does not mean the CHC includes every issue of concern to each 
member of the Latinx community on its legislative agenda in a given session of 
Congress, the evidence presented here suggests the CHC still attempts to craft an agenda 
that reflects the diversity of views and experiences contained within the Latinx 
community.86 
 
Shared Agendas? The CHC’s Influence on the Democratic Agenda 
                                               
86 This attention to diversity, though, does not outweigh the CHC’s other concerns when it comes to 
crafting an agenda, i.e. presenting a unified Latinx voice to the public. Even if the CHC’s agenda includes 
issues that affect specific members of the Latinx community, this does not mean that the CHC’s members 
are unanimous on how or how strongly to push for some of these issues, thus minimizing the possibility of 
the CHC discussing the issue publicly for fear of presenting a divided rather than unified image to the 
public. 
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Knowing the content of the CHC’s legislative agendas, we can now determine 
how much those agendas affect the legislative agendas of the Democratic Caucus in the 
House. Functionally, the CHC behaves much like Bloch Rubin’s (2017) intraparty 
organizations insofar as the CHC has been closely aligned with the Democratic Party 
throughout its existence. However, since the CHC’s mission is not explicitly partisan, it is 
an open question as to whether the CHC wields the same power as other intraparty 
organizations and effectively leverages its own agenda against the Democratic Caucus’s 
agenda and causes the latter to come into closer resonance with the former, or else how 
these agendas diverge from each other. 
Given the perceived closeness between the CHC and the rest of the Democrats, 
there does not seem much reason to believe that the Hispanic Caucus’s legislative 
agendas will influence the agenda of House Democrats rather than the other way around. 
The CHC has been comprised of only Democrats since the 105th Congress. Democrats 
have become more homogeneously liberal over time, lessening the ideological distance 
between the CHC and the rest of the Democratic Caucus. The CHC also seems to have a 
very close relationship with the Democratic leadership in the House, especially as both 
groups realize that they often need each other—the CHC needs the Democratic Caucus 
on its side because the CHC is too small to attempt to make policy on its own, and the 
Democrats need the CHC because the group makes up a sizable proportion of votes in the 
Democratic Caucus.87 CHC members have also held leadership positions within the 
Democratic Caucus, with Rep. Xavier Becerra, D-CA, chairing the Democratic Caucus in 
                                               
87 Staffer D, personal interview. 
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the 113th and 114th Congresses and Rep. Linda Sánchez, D-CA, serving as the vice chair 
of the Democratic Caucus in the 115th Congress. Hispanic Caucus members have also 
served among the Democratic House leadership, with Rep. Ed Pastor, D-AZ, serving as a 
deputy whip from the 106th Congress until his retirement at the end of the 113th Congress, 
and Rep. Ben Ray Luján, D-NM, serving as Assistant Speaker in the 116th Congress after 
previously serving as chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. 
 The CHC does not, however, simply follow along with the Democratic agenda. In 
multiple interviews, members and staffers mentioned the willingness of Democratic 
leadership to actually defer to the Caucus on immigration because of the belief that the 
Caucus had the expertise on the issue and therefore ought to lead on immigration policy. 
In the words of one member, 
“On immigration issues Pelosi basically said we’re looking to the Caucus, we’re 
going to follow their lead. So that’s their issue, it’s our [Democrats’] issue. So we 
had to make sure that in dealing with the immigration issue that we were not only, 
not only was it going to be our own Caucus issue but we knew that then that was 
going to transfer and become a Democratic issue. Basically…on immigration they 
said ok, we’re going to follow [the Hispanic Caucus].”88 
 
Based on this information, as well as prior evidence from Wilson (2017) and Bloch 
Rubin’s finding that intraparty organizations represent “a unique source of institutional 
authority that does not first require members to control majoritarian institutions” (299) 
that can “fundamentally alter the ostensibly majoritarian character of our national 
legislature…by prioritizing the interests of vocal and agitated minority factions” (304), it 
is reasonable to infer that when it comes to legislation that primarily affects the Latinx 
community, the Hispanic Caucus may be able to use its position as the coalition 
                                               
88 Representative B, personal interview. 
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responsible for representing Latinx interests to persuade the rest of the Democratic 
Caucus in the House to adopt the CHC position on such legislation: 
H1: The inclusion of bills on the CHC agenda will increase the likelihood of those 
bills’ inclusion on the Democratic agenda. 
 
 Discussing agenda setting in the House without mentioning the influence of 
partisanship and majority status is impossible. As discussed earlier, various theories of 
agenda setting in Congress alternately highlight the high degree of agenda control exerted 
by power leaders or committee chairs. If we take party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 
2007) to be accurate, then we ought to expect that the CHC’s influence on the 
Democratic agenda is contingent on whether a majority of the Democratic Caucus 
supports the CHC’s legislative priorities. Party cartels not only control the distribution of 
positive and negative agenda powers, they also control committee assignments and by 
extension the gatekeeping function served by committees. Thus, the Democratic Caucus 
must be in the House majority to provide the greatest possibility of passing CHC—and by 
extension, Latinx—legislative priorities. If Democrats are in the minority in the House, 
then they do not have the same influence over agenda setting, both because they do not 
have as much control on the distribution of agenda powers and because none of the 
Democratic Caucus’s members can be committee chairs. These factors, combined with 
growing polarization in the House drawing the CHC and the rest of the Democratic 
Caucus closer together ideologically, indicate that the CHC’s priorities ought to appeal to 
a greater proportion of Democrats, satisfying the majority of the majority threshold set by 
party cartel theory. As such, there is a strong likelihood that the CHC’s influence on the 
Democratic agenda is contingent on the majority status of the Democratic Party: 
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H2: The effect of inclusion on the CHC agenda will be stronger when Democrats 
are in the majority in the House, and weaker when Democrats are in the minority. 
 
Data & Methods 
 The independent variable for this analysis is drawn from the final source used for 
the systematic analysis above. Using the Congressional Bills Project dataset, which 
includes all bills introduced in the House from the 95th to the 114th Congress 
(N=131,082), I construct a CHC agenda variable that is coded 1 for bills on the CHC’s 
agenda that are sponsored by a CHC member and cosponsored by a majority of the 
remaining members of the CHC. Having a CHC member sponsor a bill that has the 
support of a majority of the CHC provides a clear indication of support for legislation 
that is less likely to be clouded by the Democratic Caucus taking a stand on a bill—the 
decision to cosponsor is not tied solely to which party supports a bill, otherwise all 
Democrats would cosponsor all Democratic legislation. When it comes to press releases, 
statements in the Congressional Record, archival materials, and CQ Weekly articles, it is 
difficult to determine which came first—the CHC position on a bill, or the Democratic 
position on a bill. This sequencing issue complicates attempts to determine the causal 
relationship between the groups’ legislative agendas, and thus makes that data 
inappropriate for this analysis. Using this metric, there are 253 CHC bills introduced 
from the 95th to the 114th Congress. 
 The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of a bill’s inclusion on the 
Democratic agenda between the 95th and 114th Congresses. These bills are identified in 
two ways. First, I analyze CQ’s Key Vote tables for each session of Congress and 
identify those bills that received support from the majority of the Democratic Party. CQ’s 
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Key Vote tables are not a perfect indication of the Democratic Party’s legislative 
priorities in a given session of Congress; I rely on these tables, though, because there is 
not a source that lists all the specific bills prioritized by the Democratic Party—most 
sources simply list the issue areas the Democrats cared about in a particular session of 
Congress. Coding all bills in an issue area as a one on the Democratic agenda variable 
would heavily bias the results, making this an untenable option for identifying 
Democratic agendas89. 
The second way I identify Democratic priorities is more limited than CQ’s Key 
Vote tables in that this measure is only usable in recent sessions of Congress. Drawing on 
Curry (2015), I code as Democratic agenda items those bills numbered HR 1-10 when the 
Democrats were the majority party and bills numbered HR 11-20 when the Democrats 
were the minority party. According to Curry, this practice of reserving bills 1-10 for the 
Speaker to assign to bills as they see fit and reserving bills 11-20 for the Minority Leader 
did not become a House norm until the 106th Congress. Starting in 1999, then, bills 1-10 
and 11-20 can be taken to represent the respective legislative priorities of the majority 
and minority parties in the House. Overall, there are 168 bills that are considered part of 
the Democratic agenda from the 95th to 114th Congresses in my coding scheme. 
 I also include several variables to control for factors that may affect the 
composition of the Democratic agenda in core Latinx issue areas. Because of the noted 
                                               
89 Another issue with CQ’s Key Vote tables is that they do not provide much insight into the Democratic 
Party’s legislative priorities when the Democrats are the minority party in the House—many of the key 
votes in those sessions are Republican priorities roundly opposed by the Democrats. There are some key 
votes in these sessions with support from a majority of Democrats that I consider to be part of the 
Democratic agenda, though Democratic agendas in these sessions are markedly smaller than in those 
sessions where Democrats were the majority party. 
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effects of partisanship in Congress, especially in the House, I control for the party of a 
bill’s primary sponsor as well as the party of the president. I also control for the gender of 
a bill’s primary sponsor. Related to these is a binary variable indicating whether the 
Democratic Caucus is the majority party in a given session of Congress. I also control for 
the proportion of the Democratic Caucus comprised of Hispanic Caucus members, given 
critical mass theories that argue that when a group reaches a certain threshold, its 
influence will increase (Rouse 2013). This variable is interacted with the CHC agenda 
variable, to ensure the relationship tested is between the CHC’s proportion of the 
Democratic Caucus and CHC bills rather than all bills introduced in the House. I control 
for the average ideology of the CHC in each session of Congress, as well as the average 
ideology of the Democratic Caucus in each session of Congress. Lastly, I control for 
rising polarization in the House with a measure of the absolute distance between the 
ideological means of Democrats and Republicans in each session of Congress. 
 I estimate several models using these variables. First, I estimate the effects for all 
years the CHC has existed, covering the 95th through 114th Congress. I also estimate 
separate models for different time periods that allow me to test Hypothesis 2: Era 1 
covers the 95th to 103rd Congress, when Democrats were in the majority; Era 2 covers the 
104th-109th Congress, with Republican majorities; Era 3 covers the 110th-111th Congress 
when control of the House shifted back to the Democrats; and Era 4 covers the 112th-
114th Congress when Republicans regained control of the House. These eras also allow 
me to assess the effect of polarization on the Democratic agenda—the distance between 
the two parties becomes more pronounced in each subsequent era. Because there are 
relatively few bills included on Democratic agendas out of 131,000 total bills introduced, 
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even when looking at specific time periods, using a standard logistic regression does not 
make sense. Using standard logit would introduce bias into the estimates given the low 
variance in, and small sample size of, the dependent variable, thus producing inaccurate 
estimates of the effect of the CHC’s agenda on the Democratic agenda. To correct for 
this, I utilize a penalized likelihood logit model. Like King and Zeng’s (2001) rare events 
logit model, the penalized likelihood model accounts for the low number of positive 
events in the dependent variable and reduces small sample bias in likelihood estimation. I 
specifically use the BRGLM package in Stata, as opposed to firthlogit, because BRGLM 
is designed especially for use with a binary dependent variable, as is the case here. 
 
Results 
 Looking at all time periods when the CHC has existed, regardless of whether 
Democrats were in the majority or the minority, the inclusion of bills on the CHC’s 
agenda appears to have no effect on the content of the Democratic agenda. This is 
surprising, given that more than half of the bills in the dataset were introduced during 
periods of Democratic control of the House. The interaction term between inclusion on 
the CHC’s agenda and the CHC’s proportion of the Democratic Caucus is also 
insignificant, indicating that the CHC’s proportion of the Democratic Caucus does not 
affect the chances of a CHC bill being included on the Democratic agenda. Even though 
the CHC’s share of the Democratic Caucus has been steadily increasing over the last few 
decades, the CHC does not appear to wield sufficient influence to shape the most 
important items on the Democrats’ agenda when looking at the last forty years as a 
whole. The Democrats’ agenda is similarly unaffected by the increasing proportions of 
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Latinxs (and African Americans) serving in the House over time. The coefficient for the 
proportion of Latinxs serving in the House is significant but incorrectly signed, indicating 
that more Latinxs in the House drives down the chances of CHC agenda items being 
included on the Democrats’ agenda. 
 Consistent with prior research on agenda setting in the House, the effects of 
partisanship and committee membership do have significant effects on the content of the 
Democratic agenda. Bills that are sponsored by Republicans are less likely to be included 
on the Democratic agenda, a finding that is consistent with increased polarization in the 
House that has severely diminished the number of bipartisan bills considered in the 
House. The polarization measure itself is insignificant, though the positive coefficient is 
reassuring: increased polarization ought to make Democrats more likely to include CHC 
priorities on their own agenda, which makes sense as the ideological distance between the 
CHC and the rest of the Democrats continues to shrink as the Democrats as a whole 
become more liberal. 
Table 4.1 Effect of CHC Agenda on Democratic Agenda, All Eras 
 All Eras 
 95th-114th 
Inclusion on -3.154 
CHC Agenda (3.223) 
  
Mean CHC -2.563 
DW-Nominate (2.474) 
  
chc_agenda* 0.431 
chc_pct (0.307) 
  
Important 3.325*** 
Bill (1.053) 
  
% Latinx -0.374** 
In House (0.184) 
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% Black 0.155 
In House (0.108) 
  
House 2.192 
Polarization (2.148) 
  
Republican -0.436*** 
President (0.124) 
  
Republican -0.014*** 
Sponsor (0.002) 
  
Woman -1.541*** 
Sponsor (0.412) 
  
Number of 0.013*** 
Cosponsors (0.001) 
  
Ref. Cmte 1.390*** 
Chair (0.293) 
  
Ranking 1.902*** 
Ref. Cmte (0.657) 
  
Member 0.946*** 
Ref. Cmte (0.170) 
  
Chair any 0.857*** 
Committee (0.280) 
  
Ranking any -0.863 
Committee (0.626) 
  
Constant -11.075*** 
 (1.378) 
N 131082 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The Democratic agenda is also significantly affected by the party affiliation of the 
president—having a Republican president decreases the chances of a bill being included 
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on the Democratic agenda, perhaps indicating an unwillingness of the Democratic Caucus 
to consider bills that the leadership fears will not receive support from the president. 
Having the bill’s sponsor be the chair or ranking member of the committee of referral has 
a significant and positive effect on a bill’s chances of being placed on the Democratic 
agenda. This is consistent with theories that portray congressional committees as 
gatekeepers that control which legislation makes it to the floor of the House, a 
consideration that must be taken into account prior to other aspects of the legislative 
process such as roll call votes. Whether a bill is substantively important also matters 
greatly—Democrats are far more likely to incorporate bills that contain major substantive 
provisions rather than bills that are symbolic or commemorative in nature. 
 A disturbing finding concerns the effect of a bill sponsor’s gender on the content 
of the Democratic agenda. The coefficient for gender is negative and significant, 
indicating that bills sponsored by women are less likely to be included on the Democratic 
agenda. Even though the Democratic Party as a whole portrays itself as the party most 
concerned with women’s issues and rights, this concern does not apparently extend to 
heeding the legislative efforts of Democratic women serving in the House. This does not 
mean that no part of the agenda responds to women’s interests—it is possible that 
women’s interests are just as likely to be included in bills sponsored by men, though that 
is unclear from the data and analysis used here. 
 Looking at specific time periods—shown below in Table 4.2—there is also no 
support for Hypothesis 2. Out of the four time periods analyzed, inclusion on the CHC’s 
agenda is never a significant predictor of a bill’s inclusion on the Democratic agenda. An 
interesting result is that during Era 2, when Republicans controlled the House and banned 
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legislative service organizations, the effect of inclusion on the CHC agenda on the 
Democratic agenda is actually negative. While this result is not significant, the fact that 
the CHC’s prioritization of a bill could actually cause the Democratic Party to 
deprioritize the same bill indicates that the relationship between the two groups is 
perhaps not as strong as CHC members and staffers think. 
 The interaction term for inclusion on the CHC agenda and the CHC’s proportion 
of the Democratic Caucus is also insignificant in Era 1. This was a lengthy period of 
Democratic control of the House spanning almost 20 years, but it is also an era when the 
membership of the CHC was often very small relative to the number of Democrats in the 
House (see Chapter 2). Era 1 is also characterized by an internally divided Democratic 
Party—for most of the era, southern Democrats had not yet officially switched to the 
Republican party. The interaction term was omitted from the models for Eras 2, 3, and 4 
due to collinearity issues. 
Table 4.2 Effect of CHC Agenda on Democratic Agenda, by Era 
 Era 1 Era 2 Era 3 Era 4 
 95th-
103rd 
104th-
109th 
110th-111th 112th-
114th 
On CHC 3.801 -3.756 8.482 5.906 
Agenda (4.294) (5.988) (13.844) (5.772) 
     
Mean CHC -5.037 2.117 214.652 8.407 
DW-Nominate (9.362) (6.479) (667.062) (20.423) 
     
chc_agenda* -0.252 –– –– –– 
chc_pct (0.972)    
     
Important 2.125** 2.071** 1.601** 3.383*** 
Bill (0.917) (0.897) 0.764 (1.159) 
     
% Latinx -0.746 1.062 –– -1.021 
In House (1.079) (0.748)  (1.011) 
     
% Black 0.123 -0.172 –– –– 
In House (0.309) (0.841)   
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House 5.232 -4.031 –– –– 
Polarization (9.117) (12.575)   
     
Republican -0.390 0.023 –– –– 
President (0.327) (0.494)   
     
Republican -0.037*** -0.003 -0.024*** -0.024*** 
Sponsor (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
     
Woman -0.013 -2.283** -0.575 -1.514*** 
Sponsor (0.946) (0.939) (0.377) (0.505) 
     
Number of 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 
Cosponsors (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Ref. Cmte 0.867** 1.816*** 1.831*** 1.556*** 
Chair (0.351) (0.633) (0.539) (0.471) 
     
Ranking -0.700 2.808*** -0.029 0.604 
Ref. Cmte (1.279) (1.008) (1.198) (0.629) 
     
Member 1.648 -0.063 0.403 1.125*** 
Ref. Cmte (0.254) (0.271) (0.306) (0.329) 
     
Chair any 0.999 0.221 0.549 2.059*** 
Committee (0.342) (0.595) (0.505) (0.631) 
     
Ranking any 2.706 -0.486 2.316** -0.186 
Committee (1.240) (0.984 (1.160) (0.531) 
     
Constant -9.893 -2.628 63.923 -1.013 
 (6.996) (13.252) (226.286) (8.366) 
N 65575 32525 13897 19085 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Demonstrating the strength of partisanship in the House over time, the party of a 
bill’s sponsor is a significant predictor of that bill’s inclusion on the Democratic agenda. 
While the party variable is insignificant in Era 2, it is highly significant and negative in 
Eras 1, 3, and 4, indicating that those bills sponsored by Republicans are less likely to be 
included on the Democratic agenda whether polarization in the House is low (Era 1) or 
high (Eras 3 and 4). Other common predictors of agenda inclusion are also significant in 
all time periods, speaking to the already demonstrated power of committees in 
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gatekeeping and controlling the content of the agenda. In all eras, having a bill sponsor 
who is also the chair of the committee to which a bill is referred is highly significant and 
positive. That is, bills sponsored by chairs of the committee of referral are more likely 
than other bills to be included on the Democratic agenda. This result is slightly confusing 
when looking at periods of Republican control, since it is impossible for Democrats to be 
committee chairs when their party is the minority. There are, however, a handful of bills 
on the Democratic agenda sponsored by Republicans, which may explain why this 
variable matters in Eras 2 and 4. As in the overall model, important bills are more likely 
to be included on Democrats’ agenda than symbolic or commemorative measures in 
every era. This raises questions about the importance the Democratic Caucus attaches to 
Latinx interest legislation, especially as Democrats become more liberal and Latinxs (and 
other minorities) comprise a larger proportion of the party and also likely Democratic 
voters. 
 While the results reported here do not show support for Hypothesis 2, they do 
demonstrate the steady influence of parties and committees on the Democratic agenda 
over the last 40 years. Thus, while it is difficult to conclude that the CHC wields as much 
power as Bloch Rubin (2017) attributes to intraparty organizations such as the House 
Freedom Caucus or the Republican Study Committee, it is no stretch to conclude that the 
agenda process within the Democratic Caucus is controlled by party leaders, committee 
chairs and ranking members, or both. Even though the CHC does not often deviate from 
the party line on core issues, and in fact receives some degree of perceived deference on 
core Latinx issues such as immigration, the interests of the CHC are not likely to be 
integrated into the Democratic agenda. 
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Conclusion 
 When it comes to agenda setting in Congress, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
does not exert influence on the legislative agenda of the broader Democratic Caucus. 
Whether Democrats are in the majority or the minority in the House, the CHC’s decision 
to include a bill on its own agenda does not improve the chances of that same bill being 
included on the Democratic agenda. The interests of Latinxs, then, are not guaranteed the 
attention of the rest of the Democratic Caucus, significantly decreasing the opportunity 
for these interests to be realized through legislation. The Democratic agenda instead is 
more likely to comprise bills sponsored by Democrats who chair or are the ranking 
member of the committee to which bills are referred, and also have a larger number of 
cosponsors. The CHC’s proportion of the Democratic Caucus is also insignificant. Even 
though the number of Latinxs serving in Congress has steadily increased during the 
existence of the CHC, they still do not appear to have a significant amount of influence 
on the legislative priorities of the Democratic Caucus. This is true even when Latinx 
members of Congress form a coalition such as the CHC in order to maximize their power 
and resources in the House. 
 The apparent lack of incorporation of Latinx interests on the part of the 
Democratic Caucus complicates prior scholarship that argues Latinx interests are well-
represented by liberal Democratic members of Congress (Hero and Tolbert 1995; 
Wallace 2014b). If Latinx interests—as defined by the CHC through the agendas it 
creates and bills it sponsors—are not incorporated into the Democratic agenda, then it is 
difficult to argue that non-Latinx Democrats are just as aware of Latinx interests as are 
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CHC members. More likely here is that the Democratic Caucus assumes that pursuing 
any kind of legislation deemed important by Democratic leadership in the House will 
benefit Latinxs, resting on the belief that Latinxs are a captured constituency that will 
always vote for Democrats in elections because of the perception that Republicans are not 
likely to ever respond positively to Latinx interests (Frymer 1999). If this is the case, then 
the coalitional representation offered by the CHC is even more important, as the CHC is 
able to introduce legislation that reflects Latinx interests and highlights the ways in which 
Latinx interests may align with or diverge from the interests of the broader Democratic 
Caucus. The question remains though, how effective the CHC is in pushing this 
legislation through the legislative process without the apparent backing of the Democratic 
leadership. 
 Equally important here is the way in which the Hispanic Caucus’s agenda reflects 
the efforts of members of the CHC to grapple with the complexities of Latinidad and 
pursue a legislative agenda that embraces rather than effaces the diverse interests of 
Latinx ethnic groups. Latinidad incorporates Latinxs from a wide variety of national 
origins—Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and others—who have distinct interests and 
preferences that are not always in agreement with each other. CHC members are 
cognizant of these differences and incorporate this awareness into their agenda-setting 
practices, though they also realize that the racial narrative in the U.S. has evolved in such 
a way that the fates of these Latinx ethnic groups, regardless of their differences, are 
inextricably linked and thus must be pursued together rather than separately. The basis of 
the Hispanic Caucus as a coalition, then, is the recognition and incorporation of Latinxs 
across a wide variety of social and political experiences. This coalition then works on 
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behalf of Latinxs by constructing a panethnic narrative that melds the interests of these 
groups together, but at the same time maintains the nuances and complexities that define 
Latinidad. The effects of this coalitional representation might not be seen when it comes 
to the agenda setting process, but it at the very least provides the groundwork for CHC 
members to build upon when attempting to realize Latinx interests at other stages of the 
legislative process.  
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5| Taking Care of Business: The Legislative Effectiveness of the 
CHC 
 
In September of 1994, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus issued a press release 
celebrating the passage in the House of an education bill—H.R. 6—that included several 
measures proposed by the Caucus. The press release enumerated the changes the Caucus-
backed reforms made to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. These proposed 
changes were originally part of a separate bill proposed by the Caucus that did not pass 
the House—H.R. 3229, the Equal Access to Education Act of 1993—sponsored by then-
Caucus chair Jose Sérrano (D-NY) and cosponsored by a majority of the remaining 
members of the Caucus. Thus, even though the original vehicle for the Caucus’s 
education priorities in the 103rd Congress did not survive the legislative process, the 
Caucus was ultimately effective in securing the legal recognition of measures addressing 
what Sérrano described in the press release as “the most important issue facing the 
Hispanic community.”90. Throughout its forty-year existence in the House of 
Representatives, the Hispanic Caucus has pushed a diverse agenda focused on passing or 
blocking many bills and resolutions. While the agenda-setting stage is important in 
determining which issues the Caucus will focus on in a given session of Congress, more 
important is whether the Caucus is effective at passing or blocking those bills or 
                                               
90 Press Release, “House passes Hispanic Caucus education proposals,” September 30, 1994. Records of 
the CHC, Audio-Visual Records 1982-1994, Box 1, Folder 11. 
 163 
resolutions the Caucus considers most impactful to the Latinx community and its 
interests.  
 Understanding the conditions under which members of Congress enjoy legislative 
success—especially when discussing passing legislation—is important for a variety of 
reasons. In part, legislative success matters because without success for which members 
can claim credit, it is difficult for members to secure reelection. According to Mayhew 
(1974), securing reelection is the preeminent concern of all members of Congress. Even 
if members have particular policy interests that they wish to advance, such actions cannot 
take place if the member no longer holds elected office. Even for those members who are 
truly focused on making good public policy rather than securing reelection (Fenno 1973; 
Fenno 1978), legislative success is paramount—one cannot claim to have made good 
public policy if they are unable to point to legislation that codifies that member’s specific 
policy positions (Volden and Wiseman 2014). 
 Based on its stated mission, the Hispanic Caucus is primarily concerned with 
making good public policy to represent Latinx Americans, i.e. passing legislation that 
realizes or protects the interests of Latinx communities. How effective, though, is the 
Caucus when it comes to passing legislation in the House of Representatives? What 
factors increase the legislative effectiveness of the members of the Hispanic Caucus? I 
attempt to answer these questions in the rest of this chapter. I focus only on the House of 
Representatives because congressional caucuses have a much stronger impact in the 
House than in the Senate, and the Caucus has at most only ever had one member from the 
Senate among its ranks. Using an original index to measure CHC support for specific 
bills or resolutions throughout the Caucus’s existence in Congress, I examine CHC 
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effectiveness in the House from 1977 to 2016. I find some evidence that the intensity of 
CHC support for legislation can help push that legislation further in the legislative 
process though other factors such as which party controls the House and a bill’s 
perceived importance attenuate this effect. More importantly, I demonstrate the limits of 
measuring legislative effectiveness and congressional representation purely in terms of 
passing legislation, drawing on what might be considered “non-traditional” measure of 
effectiveness, including but not limited to the CHC’s efforts to shape the composition of 
Democratic House leadership, congressional committees, and executive appointments, as 
well as generally providing a public voice for the Latinx community and its interests. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I first discuss the prior research on legislative 
effectiveness and explore how the findings in this research may be expected to bear on 
the legislative effectiveness of the Hispanic Caucus. I then lay out the data and methods 
used for my analyses and report the results of these analyses. I then explore non-
traditional forms of legislative effectiveness, drawing primarily on evidence from the 
National Archives and the CHC’s own press releases from the last decade, highlighting 
the efforts of the CHC to boost Latinx representation by creating more opportunities for 
Latinx individuals not only within Congress but also the executive branch and the federal 
judiciary. I conclude with a discussion of the quantitative results alongside the non-
traditional forms of effectiveness, and what these two bodies of evidence indicate about 
the Hispanic Caucus’s ability to adequately represent the Latinx community. 
 
Legislative Effectiveness in the House 
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 In prior studies of legislative effectiveness, there is little direct reference to groups 
of legislators working together, with focus instead given to the effectiveness of individual 
legislators and the factors that affect the prospects of effectiveness for those individuals 
(Anderson et al. 2003; Volden and Wiseman 2014). This is true both for studies that 
analyze legislative effectiveness in the Senate (Moore and Thomas 1991) and those 
studies that focus on the House (Frantzich 1979; Volden and Wiseman 2014). 
 Majority party membership, membership in party leadership, seniority, electoral 
security, and ideological moderation have all been found to affect a legislator’s chances 
of getting legislation passed in the House. Volden and Wiseman (2014), calculate a 
Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) for each member of the House based on how far 
every bill each member has ever introduced in the House makes it in the legislative 
process. They find that LES’s are higher for members of the majority party, especially 
when examining which bills receive action in committees. However, when it comes to 
bills that are reported by committees and receive action on the floor of the House, 
majority and minority party members are equally effective (69). Volden and Wiseman 
also find that majority and minority status affect the legislative effectiveness of women 
and African Americans in the House. Women in the minority party are more effective 
than men in the minority party, while men and women are equally effective when in the 
majority; African Americans are no more or less effective than other Democrats when in 
the minority, but when Democrats are the majority party African Americans are markedly 
less effective than other Democrats when the party is in the majority (116). Frantzich 
(1979) found that majority party membership is a key factor in determining the legislative 
effectiveness of an individual member. Other factors that matter for Frantzich include 
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whether a bill’s sponsor is a member of the party leadership, the seniority of the member, 
the member’s electoral security, and ideological moderation. For Frantzich, the influence 
of electoral security is especially important: those members who are less electorally 
secure will introduce less legislation and will also be less successful in passing that 
legislation. This comports well with Mayhew’s (1974) argument that members of 
Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection. Given this concern with attaining and 
keeping office, it makes sense that members whose reelection prospects are less than 
certain will not take the risk of sponsoring legislation that could potentially form the basis 
of an opposition campaign. 
 Other studies highlight Frantzich’s finding regarding the effectiveness of 
ideological moderates in the House. Anderson et al. (2003) argue that legislators who are 
at the ideological extreme of either party are less likely to enjoy legislative success, while 
ideological moderates in both parties are more likely to see their bills survive the 
legislative process. Anderson et al. also find that this need for moderation extends to the 
behaviors in which members engage to ensure their bills pass the House. Those members 
who do not sponsor too many bills or do not speak too often on the floor of the House are 
more likely to see their bills pass than those members who speak either too much or too 
little, and who sponsor too many or too few bills (177). Attaining legislative success, 
then, is a delicate balancing act for all members of Congress regardless of which party 
they belong to or how long they have served in Congress. 
 Other research deepens the discussion of the effect of partisanship on the 
legislative effectiveness of individual legislators. Kim (2006) argues that majority status 
is a key resource in the House that predicts legislative success, while Miquel and Snyder, 
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Jr. (2006) find that members of the majority party are more effective than members of the 
minority party. Cox and Terry (2008) agree with Anderson et al.’s findings in that Cox 
and Terry conclude the majority party enjoys greater legislative success. Cox and Terry 
differ, however, in their attribution of the majority advantage to the greater resources 
available to members of the majority party, rather than simply the fact that a legislator is 
a member of the majority party. Hasecke and Mycoff (2007) further drive home the 
influence of partisanship on legislative success with their study on the effects of party 
loyalty in the House. According to Hasecke and Mycoff, membership in the majority 
party does not guarantee access to its resources and higher chances of legislative success. 
Rather, legislative success is a selective benefit that is primarily afforded to those 
members who demonstrate high levels of party loyalty. In this case, party loyalty refers 
both to voting in line with the party’s wishes on given issues, or contributing money to 
party reelection efforts. This makes sense when considered alongside other research that 
demonstrates the strong desire of the majority to maintain its majority status, a desire that 
dictates many of the behaviors exhibited by the majority party in the House (Jacobson 
2001; Curry 2015; Lee 2016). 
 Aside from Volden and Wiseman (2014), there is little consideration of the role 
played by race in determining which legislators are able to get bills through the 
legislative process. At the state level, Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that black 
legislators are more likely to introduce black interest bills than non-Black people and that 
women are more likely to introduce women’s interest bills than men. The findings with 
regard to women are echoed in Bratton (2005). In this study, again at the state level, 
Bratton finds that women more likely to focus on women’s interests than men. She also 
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finds that “women are generally at least as likely as men to pass legislation even when 
they make up a very small minority of the institution” (121). That is, even when women 
legislators only have token status in a given legislature, i.e. less than 15% of the 
legislature’s members, women are still able to enjoy legislative success. Because both of 
these studies are conducted at the state level though, it is difficult to conclude that the 
findings necessarily apply to Congress. 
To be sure, there are studies that have demonstrated the important role played in 
securing some degree of substantive Latinx representation by having more Latinx 
legislators serving in Congress. Minta (2011) focuses on committee oversight hearings, 
and finds that Latinx members of congressional committees push those committees to pay 
more attention to Latinx interests by holding oversight hearings on certain issues. That is, 
Latinx members of Congress are more likely to push Latinx interests than white non-
Latinx members of Congress, echoing Bratton and Haynie’s (1999) findings with regard 
to black legislators. While Minta does not discuss this explicitly in terms of legislative 
effectiveness, his findings do indicate that Latinx members of Congress are able to 
articulate and advocate for Latinx interests in Congress. Rouse (2013) finds that 
committees are equally important for Latinx representation at the state level, especially 
when it comes to participation in vital committee activities such as markups. Not only 
does descriptive representation mean that more Latinxs are serving in legislatures, these 
Latinx legislators are more active in committee activities when dealing with legislation 
that is highly salient to the Latinx community. This increased participation by Latinx 
legislators, Rouse argues, occurs because these Latinx legislators “believe that committee 
participation is a crucial part of the legislative process” that “makes a difference for the 
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descriptive representation of their constituents and the broader Latino community” (87). 
The question remains, though, whether these efforts translate to the ultimate passage of 
Latinx-interest legislation, especially at the national level. 
 In this vein, several studies focus on the outcomes of roll call votes as a 
determinant of Latinx substantive representation. Several scholars indicate that increased 
descriptive representation of Latinxs does not translate to what is more traditionally 
thought of as legislative effectiveness or success, i.e. getting bills to pass the House and 
ultimately become law. According to Casellas (2011), the “presence of Latino 
representatives makes no difference in voting patterns for any of the legislative bodies” 
(137), whether considering the U.S. Congress or one of several state legislatures he 
analyzes. Ultimately, Casellas concludes, “Latino citizens apparently do not experience 
greater degrees of direct substantive representation when they elect Latino representatives 
as opposed to non-Latino representatives” (137). This echoes other studies that reach the 
same conclusion with regard to the outcomes of roll call votes (Hero and Tolbert 1995; 
Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014b). Again, it is necessary to note that these studies, like those 
focused on committee activity by Latinx legislators, focus on the legislative efforts of 
individual Latinx members of Congress rather than on a coalition of Latinx legislators. 
Furthermore, these previous studies of Latinx descriptive representation do not examine 
the legislative effectiveness of Latinx members of Congress as a measure of bills 
passed91. Rather, they focus on whether Latinx representatives’ voting behavior lines up 
                                               
91 Some of these studies, most notably Hero and Tolbert (1995), do focus on collective partisan 
representation as a possible substitute for Latinx descriptive representation—that is, they argue that Latinx 
interests are just as well-represented by liberal Democrats as by Latinxs, obviating the need for Latinx 
descriptive representation. This collective partisan representation, though, does not mirror the kind of 
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with Latinx interests in broad issue areas, which does not test the ability of Latinx 
legislators to push desired legislation through the different stages of the legislative 
process. 
 More recent scholarship on Latinx representation and the effectiveness of Latinx 
legislators does offer some insight on the role of the Hispanic Caucus. Wilson (2017) 
argues that in the 110th and 111th Congresses, “Latino representatives acted strategically 
to extract limited policy accommodations and achieved real if limited legislative 
influence” (235). Note that Wilson’s version of legislative effectiveness does pay 
attention to the fact that bill passage is not the only possible indicator of effectiveness: 
Wilson argues that much of the influence of Latinx lawmakers and the Hispanic Caucus 
is wielded behind the scenes in an effort to sway the legislative decision making of other 
members of the House. Thus for Wilson, legislative effectiveness for Latinx legislators 
refers to Latino representation in legislative decision making, which Wilson defines as 
“the extent to which legislative decisions appear to comport with the preferences of a 
majority of Latino representatives and to which the efforts of those Latino representatives 
appear to have been pivotal to a particular outcome” (209). Through this 
conceptualization of Latinx legislators’ effectiveness, Wilson does more to highlight the 
importance of all stages in the legislative process rather than just final passage votes. 
Wilson’s account still does not, however, empirically test the effectiveness of the 
Hispanic Caucus—Wilson’s account relies on a case study of the Caucus’s involvement 
in immigration issues in only the 110th and 111th Congresses. While immigration has 
                                               
conscious effort made to represent the interests of the Latinx community that defines coalitional 
representation vis-à-vis the CHC. 
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always been an important aspect of the Caucus agenda for the last forty years, it is far 
from the only issue the Caucus cares about (see Chapter 4). Focusing only on the 110th 
and 111th Congresses also does not account for the efforts of the Caucus to influence 
legislative decision making when Republicans control the House, an important factor to 
consider since the Caucus does not stop working toward Latinx interests when Democrats 
are the minority party. 
 What, then, are we to expect of the Hispanic Caucus? Is the Caucus successful in 
pushing its desired legislation through the House? I argue that despite the noted influence 
of partisanship and ideology on legislative effectiveness in previous studies, the role of 
Latinx legislators banding together in a coalition such as the Hispanic Caucus cannot be 
ignored. The demonstrated linkage between descriptive and substantive representation for 
Latinxs provides some hope that coalitional representation will be just as effective, with 
the Caucus effectively ushering Latinx-interest legislation through the House. This 
relationship is likely attenuated, though, by how much support the Caucus throws behind 
a particular issue. If the issue is of minimal importance and does not receive much 
support from the Caucus other than being on the Caucus’s agenda, then it is logical to 
expect that such a bill is unlikely to advance far in the legislative process. 
H1: The Hispanic Caucus will enjoy more legislative effectiveness at later stages 
of the legislative process with legislation that receives a higher degree of support 
from the Hispanic Caucus. 
 
 The role of partisanship in shaping legislative effectiveness cannot be ignored. 
Based on prior studies, it makes sense to expect the legislative effectiveness of the 
Hispanic Caucus to be affected by which party controls the House. Aside from the fact 
that the agenda of the Democratic Party appears to more often reflect Latinx interests 
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than the Republican agenda—so much so that some accounts consider Latinxs to be a 
captured constituency for the Democratic Party (Frymer 1999)—the trends among 
Caucus members also point to a strong linkage between the Caucus and the Democratic 
Party. Since the inception of the Caucus in 1976, the membership of the Caucus has 
always been majority-Democrat. In fact, there have been no Republican members of the 
Hispanic Caucus since a disagreement over the CHC’s position on Cuba in the 105th 
Congress. Even when Republicans participated in the Caucus, the highest number of 
Republican members of the Caucus was three in both the 103rd and 104th Congresses. 
Given this trend, and interviewees’ belief that the CHC and the Democratic Party are best 
served when the two groups work together (see Chapter 4), it makes sense that the 
Hispanic Caucus would be most effective when Democrats control the House and 
ostensibly the majority of the Democratic Party is amenable to passing Latinx interest 
legislation. 
H2: The legislative effectiveness of the Hispanic Caucus will be higher when the 
Democratic Party is the majority party in the House. 
 
 Finally, while studies such as Wilson’s focus on the role of the Caucus in pushing 
immigration legislation, there is reason to believe that the Caucus is just as active in other 
issue areas. While immigration is certainly an issue area that receives significant Caucus 
attention in any session of Congress, there are some years where other issue areas receive 
more focus, e.g. in the 110th Congress when the Caucus prioritized health and education 
legislation. Even when looking at Caucus-sponsored bills, i.e. bills sponsored by a 
Caucus member and cosponsored by a majority of the Caucus, immigration accounts for 
a lower percentage of such bills than health, education, government operations, and 
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public lands (which includes bills affecting Puerto Rico). Thus, it does not make sense to 
condense the Hispanic Caucus’s legislative effectiveness to only immigration legislation. 
Rather, the Hispanic Caucus is likely to be most effective in all issue areas that comprise 
the bulk of its agenda over time, as legislation in those issue areas is likely to receive high 
levels of Caucus support when compared to legislation in issue areas that comprise a 
smaller proportion of the Caucus agendas. 
H3: The Hispanic Caucus will be more legislatively effective in the core Latinx 
issue areas of health, education, public lands, and immigration92 than on 
legislation in other issue areas. 
 
Data & Methods 
 In order to test the legislative effectiveness of the Hispanic Caucus, it is first 
necessary to determine the best way to measure legislative effectiveness. There are two 
primary methods to measure effectiveness in prior research. One method calculates a 
legislator’s effectiveness as their “hit rate,” or the percentage of bills sponsored by that 
legislator that pass the House or Senate. Another method calculates effectiveness as 
simply a count of the number of a member’s sponsored bills that pass. The latter strategy 
is preferred in recent scholarship, on the basis that relying on the hit rate measure 
produces biased or inefficient estimates of legislative effectiveness because the measure 
does not account for the total number of bills introduced by an individual member of 
Congress. A member with a hit rate of 100% who only sponsors one bill should not 
                                               
92 I do not include government operations legislation in this hypothesis, despite the fact that many CHC 
bills are coded as government operations, because relatively few of these bills are explicitly Latinx-
focused. Government operations, as a broad issue area, includes many appropriation measures and related 
bills that are often considered legislative necessities and which do not necessarily affect one demographic 
group more than others. 
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necessarily be considered more effective than a member with a hit rate of 50% on thirty 
sponsored bills, i.e. passing 15 bills (Anderson et al. 2003, 362). The majority of prior 
studies of legislative effectiveness rely on one or the other of these measurements, though 
others rely on surveys of legislators and staffers to construct a reputation-based measure 
of legislative success (Miquel and Snyder, Jr. 2006). 
Volden and Wiseman (2014) utilize yet another measure—the Legislative 
Effectiveness Score—to assess the effectiveness of individual legislators. For each 
member of the House from the 93rd to the 110th Congress, they code each bill introduced 
by a member as commemorative, substantive, or substantive and significant. Each bill’s 
progress through the legislative process is recorded, based on completing certain steps: 
introduced in the House, received action in committee, received action beyond 
committee, passed the House, and became law (19). These 15 measures are then 
combined and normalized, with greater weight given to receiving action in or beyond 
committee, passing the House and becoming law. Thus, a sponsor whose legislation 
receives a floor vote or passes the House is considered more effective than a sponsor 
whose legislation dies in committee, and accordingly has a higher LES. 
Another issue that arises when studying is legislative effectiveness is the term 
“legislative effectiveness” itself. Most studies of legislative effectiveness treat the term as 
interchangeable with “legislative success”. However, other studies take issue with this 
conflation of the two terms. According to Hasecke and Mycoff (2007), legislative 
effectiveness refers to a situation where “a member has been able to get a policy 
objective, consistent with his or her own preferences enacted into law,” while legislative 
success is taken to mean “sponsoring a bill that is chosen as the legislative vehicle” for 
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enacting a particular policy objective. An individual member can thus be effective 
without necessarily being successful (609; see also Adler et al. 2003). 
Here, I refer to legislative effectiveness as defined by Hasecke and Mycoff, rather 
than legislative success, because I am looking at the effectiveness of the Hispanic Caucus 
when it comes to any legislation that targets Latinx interests regardless of whether the 
legislative vehicle is an item sponsored by a member of the Caucus. I opt against 
measuring the effectiveness of the Caucus as either its hit rate or as a count of the number 
of bills supported by the Caucus that pass the House, because such measurement ignores 
the fact that the vast majority of bills do not get out of committee, much less receive a 
final passage vote on the floor of the House. Legislative effectiveness, then, must be 
considered at other stages of the legislative process, such as whether bills or resolutions 
get reported out of committee or pass the House. 
Using a limited version of the Congressional Bills Project dataset (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012), I construct for my dependent variable an additive index that indicates 
how far a bill or resolution advances in the legislative process. The index ranges from 0 
to 3, with items receiving a point for each successful step in the legislative process: being 
reported out of committee, passing the House, and becoming law93. I limit the dataset to 
only those bills that were included on the CHC’s legislative agenda from 1977 to 2016, 
rather than all bills introduced in the time period, to ensure that all estimated effects are 
with regard to the ability of the CHC to push its desired legislation through the legislative 
                                               
93 Every item in the Congressional Bills Project dataset has already been introduced in the House, so giving 
items a point for introduction is unnecessary. 
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process rather than all legislation, as this would severely bias the results94. This method is 
similar to how Volden and Wiseman (2014) calculate their Legislative Effectiveness 
Score for individual legislators, giving more weight to legislation that becomes law than 
legislation that dies in committee. Where I differ from Volden and Wiseman is that I do 
not use this information to calculate an LES for the CHC as a whole or each of its 
individual members, and then test which factors push the LES higher or lower—of 
primary interest here is what factors affect the probability that a piece of legislation will 
be successful at these different stages of the legislative process. 
My main independent variable is also an additive index, measuring the degree of 
Hispanic Caucus support for a particular legislative item. This index ranges from 0 to 3, 
with items receiving a point for each of the following: being sponsored by a CHC 
member and cosponsored by a majority of the Caucus (see Chapter 4), being the subject 
of a CHC press release, and whether a Caucus member gave a speech in support of the 
bill when it was introduced in the House. I expect that items with higher levels of Caucus 
support will be more likely to advance further in the legislative process even when 
controlling for other factors that typically affect legislative effectiveness. These factors 
include the party affiliation of a bill’s sponsor and which party is in the majority in the 
House (Volden and Wiseman 2014; Cox and Terry 2008; Miquel and Snyder, Jr. 2006; 
Anderson et al. 2003), as well as the gender of a bill’s sponsor, the percent of Latinx 
                                               
94 The CHC agenda is typically significantly much smaller than the universe of bills introduced in the 
House in a given session of Congress, meaning there would be an overabundance of zeros in the dataset if I 
included all bills introduced in the House over the last forty years. 
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legislators in the House, and the position of an item’s sponsor of the committee to which 
the item is referred. 
Because the dependent variable is ordinal, I use ordered logistic regression to test 
the effect of Caucus support on how far items advance in the legislative process. I run 
several models that test this relationship under various conditions. First, I estimate the 
effect for all years in the dataset, 1977 to 2016. I then separate the bills into four separate 
eras that reflect shifts in party control of the House: Era 1 (Democratic control, 1977-
1994), Era 2 (Republican control, 1995-2006), Era 3 (Democratic control, 2007-2010), 
and Era 4 (Republican control, 2011-2016). These eras also have the benefit of capturing 
different levels of polarization in the House, with polarization becoming more 
pronounced in the later eras. With regard to Era 1 and Era 2—the periods of Democratic 
control—the eras also capture a shift in leadership styles from the vote-focused styles of 
Tip O’Neill (D-MA), Jim Wright (D-TX), and Tom Foley (D-WA) in Era 1 to the 
coalition-minded Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) in Era 2. 
 
Results 
 Over the last forty years, the CHC has placed 365 unique bills and resolutions on 
its agenda. Each of these pieces of legislation has received varying levels of support from 
the Caucus. 228 of the 365 pieces of legislation scored a 1 on the CHC support measure, 
meaning those items were the subject of a CHC press release, a floor speech at the item’s 
introduction, or were sponsored by a majority of the CHC’s membership. 61 of the items 
scored a 2, indicating stronger support by the CHC. Only four pieces of legislation scored 
a 3, indicating the highest level of CHC support. These items were the subject of a CHC 
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press release, a floor speech by a CHC member upon the item’s introduction in the 
House, and were cosponsored by a majority of the CHC’s membership. There is also 
significant variation in how far each of these pieces of legislation advanced through the 
legislative process. By virtue of being included in the Congressional Bills Project dataset, 
each of these items cleared the first step of being introduced in the House. The next step 
in the process, at least in the legislative effectiveness index created here, concerns 
whether the items get reported out of the committees in the House to which they were 
referred. Only 58, or 15.89%, of the legislative items supported by the CHC in the last 
forty years were successfully reported out of their respective committee of referral. 87 
legislative items, or 23.84 %, managed to pass the House. Only 32 of the legislative items 
on the CHC agenda in the last forty years—8.77% of the total and 36.78% of those items 
that passed in the House—survived all the way through the legislative process to pass the 
Senate, be signed by the president, and thus be enacted into law. Notably, none of the 
legislation that scored a 3 on the CHC support index, i.e. legislation that received the 
most intense CHC support, became law. In fact, 40.63% of the CHC agenda items that 
became law did not receive any CHC support beyond inclusion on the agenda while 
another 43.75% only scored 1 on the support index. The remaining five items on the 
CHC agenda that became law scored a 2 on the support index.95 This small percentage of 
                                               
95 All of these items were bills. Three were symbolic measures that renamed a post office in California 
(H.R. 4053 in the 109th Congress), awarded a congressional gold medal to the 65th Infantry Regiment of the 
US Army, known as the Borinqueneers (H.R. 1726 in the 113th Congress), and authorized the construction 
of a monument commemorating American forces that liberated Guam in World War II in the Pacific 
National Historical Park in Guam (H.R. 1944 in the 103rd Congress). The other two bills were substantive: 
H.R. 4312 in the 102nd Congress, a CHC priority mentioned multiple times in archival documents, extended 
bilingual election requirements in the Voting Rights Act; and H.R. 1281 in the 113th Congress reauthorized 
a grant program for the detection of heritable disorders in newborns. 
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CHC priorities becoming law might indicate, to some, that the Caucus is not very 
effective at pushing its desired legislation through the legislative process. However, when 
considered alongside the fact that only about 16% of the thousands of bills introduced in 
each session of Congress on average are reported out of committee (Krutz 2005, 315), 
the CHC actually appears to be slightly more effective than Congress as a whole. 
 What factors make some bills or resolutions more or less likely to survive through 
the legislative process, though? Why is it that some legislation is able to pass the House 
and the Senate before being signed by the president while some legislation languishes in 
committees or is defeated in roll call votes on the floor of the House? Looking at Table 
5.1 below, the degree of the CHC’s support for a specific piece of legislation has a 
significant effect on how far legislation gets in the legislative process. This effect, 
though, goes in the opposite direction of what I expect—increased CHC support for a 
piece of legislation decreases the chances of that legislation scoring a 3 on the success 
index and becoming law. As noted earlier, not one of the four bills that received the 
highest level of CHC support became law. Higher levels of CHC support for legislation, 
i.e. the CHC engages in multiple activities that signals its support for the legislation in 
question, actually makes it harder for legislation to get out of committee, pass the House, 
and ultimately become law. Thus, the CHC does not appear to be all that effective at 
ushering Latinx interests through the House. The steady increase in the proportion of 
Latinxs serving in the House between 1977 and 2016 also does not seem to matter, as the 
interaction term between the percent of Latinxs in the House and the CHC support 
measure is insignificant. 
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Table 5.1 Effect of Level of CHC Support on Legislative Success96 
 
 All Eras 
 1977-2016 
  
CHC Support -1.231* 
Index (0.630) 
  
% Latinx * 0.065 
CHC Support (0.104) 
  
Republican -0.533* 
President (0.274) 
  
Republican 0.009** 
Sponsor (0.004) 
  
No. of 0.001 
Cosponsors (0.002) 
  
Chair of 2.308*** 
Referral Cmte (0.414) 
  
Member of 0.566** 
Referral Cmte (0.288) 
  
Cut 1 0.930 
 (0.729) 
  
Cut 2 1.884** 
 (0.738) 
  
Cut 3 3.279*** 
 (0.773) 
N 365 
Pseudo R2 0.1636 
Log likelihood -265.112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Having a Republican president also decreases the chances of items on the CHC 
agenda making it very far in the House. Having the legislation’s primary sponsor being a 
                                               
96 The control for gender is not shown here, due to statistical insignificance in all specifications of the 
model. 
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Republican, though, does not decrease the chances of the legislation. The effect of a 
Republican sponsor is positive and significant, though the coefficient is so small as to be 
indistinguishable from zero, indicating a negligible substantive effect. In accordance with 
theories on the power of committees in Congress acting as gatekeepers that significantly 
affect what bills survive beyond committees, having a sponsor who is either the chair of 
the committee of referral or a member of the committee of referral both have significant 
and positive effects on whether a bill advances through the legislative process. In more 
recent sessions of Congress, this power of committees is perhaps indistinguishable from 
the power of party leaders in the House; in this model, though, committees appear to be 
more powerful than party leaders. Thus, it is possible that even though explicit support 
for legislation by the CHC might harm a bill or resolution’s prospects of passing the 
House and becoming law, individual members of the Caucus may make up for this by 
exerting their influence on committees—whether as chairs or rank and file members—to 
push the legislation to the House floor. 
 
Changes in Party Control 
When I analyze discrete eras in congressional history separately, important 
differences emerge. In Era 1, a lengthy period of Democratic control of the House from 
the 95th to 103rd Congresses (1977-1994), the level of CHC support is not a significant 
predictor of legislation going further in the legislative process. Even if the effect of CHC 
support were significant, the coefficient is negatively signed, indicating again that 
stronger CHC support for a bill or resolution would actually harm that item’s chances of 
being reported out of committee, passing the House, or becoming law. In fact, in Era 1 
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there is only one significant predictor of success for bills or resolutions: whether the bill’s 
sponsor is a member of the committee of referral. Having the sponsor of a bill or 
resolution as a member of the committee of referral has a strong positive effect on how 
much success is enjoyed by that legislation (and its sponsor). Again, there is the chance 
here that individual CHC members may make up for the lack of collective CHC influence 
on the outcomes of the legislative process by virtue of their positions on committees, but 
only if the legislation in question is referred to those committees with CHC members. 
These results are also not unexpected, given the more moderate nature of the 
Democratic Caucus, relatively low partisan polarization in the House, and the styles of 
the Speakers from this era. The CHC’s positions on key legislation, while certainly in line 
with the rest of today’s Democrats, were notably more liberal than those of their 
Democratic colleagues throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. This divergence is 
epitomized by legislation such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (see 
Chapter 4), a conservative immigration reform measure sponsored and voted for by many 
Democrats in the House. The styles of Speakers Tip O’Neill, Jim Wright, and Tom Foley 
also did not help the CHC in this era. Each of these Speakers was primarily focused on 
making sure they had the necessary votes to pass legislation, including votes from the 
more moderate and conservative wing of the party (Rohde 1991). This concern with 
whipping votes translated to a willingness among these Speakers to ignore the voice of 
the CHC, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, because the CHC did not comprise a 
sufficiently large number of potential votes that their exclusion would jeopardize 
Democratic priorities in the House. Thus, even with less polarization between the two 
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parties, the CHC was often on the outside looking in, in no small part because of the 
dearth of Latinxs serving in Congress. 
Era 2 spans the 104th through 109th Congresses, from 1995 to 2009. This era 
began with the Republican Party taking back control of the House, accompanied by Rep. 
Newt Gingrich’s (R-GA) ascension to the position of Speaker of the House. Especially 
notable in this time period is the successful move by Gingrich and the Republican Party 
to ban legislative service organizations (LSOs). According to members of the CHC and 
the CBC, as well as other critics, Gingrich and other Republicans intended the ban as a 
way of weakening racial minorities precisely when African Americans, Latinxs, and 
women were gaining power and influence in the House. In the words of Rep. Jose 
Sérrano, the CHC “got a little too uppity” when fighting with Republicans over 
immigration issues (Cooper 1994). The ban was implemented early in the 104th Congress, 
severely limiting the resources available to the CHC and other congressional caucuses. 
The CHC did reorganize later in the 104th Congress as a congressional member 
organization (CMO), though this reorganization left the CHC with fewer dedicated 
staffers than before and without its own office space on the Hill. 
Given these developments, it is not all that surprising that the CHC’s support for 
legislation has a significant negative effect on how far that legislation goes in the House. 
The Republican Party under Gingrich was diametrically opposed to the CHC on core 
Latinx issues such as immigration, meaning any Latinx interest legislation would face 
serious hurdles in even getting referred to a committee (especially when taking into 
account Gingrich’s shuffling of committee chairs). One positive and significant effect on 
legislative success comes from the partisan affiliation of a bill or resolution’s sponsor. 
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Bills sponsored by Republicans were more likely to make it further in the legislative 
process than bills sponsored by Democrats. Thus, the 14 items on the CHC agenda that 
were sponsored by Republicans were more likely to advance further in the House than the 
remaining 126 items on the CHC’s agenda. Furthermore, having a bill’s sponsor be the 
chair of the committee of referral strongly increases the chances of the bill making it 
further in the legislative process; given this was an era of Republican control of the 
House, this benefit could not be enjoyed by any CHC members as all CHC members 
from the 105th Congress onward have been Democrats. 
Table 5.2 Effect of Level of CHC Support on Legislative Success in Different Eras 
 
 Era 1 Era 2 Era 3 Era 4 
 1977-1994 1995-2006 2007-2010 2011-2016 
     
CHC Support -1.223 -8.561** 29.245** 1.301 
Index (1.898) (3.536) (13.406) (7.264) 
     
% Latinx * 0.164 1.482** -4.636** -0.249 
CHC Support (0.495) (0.610) (2.065) (0.952) 
     
Republican -1.194 -1.416* -2.599** ––97 
President (0.798) (0.726) (1.033)  
     
Republican -0.140 0.030*** 0.001 0.024 
Sponsor (11.050) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) 
     
No. of 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.009 
Cosponsors (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
     
Chair of 0.479 3.430** 3.712*** 2.938 
Referral Cmte (0.661) (1.435) (0.808) (2.708) 
     
Member of 1.795*** -1.127 0.538 -1.934 
Referral Cmte (0.685) (0.774) (0.555) (1.409) 
     
Cut 1 -14.345 2.053 -3.595 4.033** 
                                               
97 The control for the president’s party affiliation is not included in Era 4 due to a lack of variation—
Barack Obama was president for the entirety of this era. As with the full model, the control variable for 
gender was excluded due to consistent insignificance. 
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 (1104.991) (1.993) (2.446) (1.960) 
     
Cut 2 -13.773 3.008 -1.509 4.774** 
 (1104.991) (2.022) (2.415) (2.040) 
     
Cut 3 -12.475 4.644** 0.523 5.930*** 
 (1104.991
) 
(2.119) (2.429) (2.179) 
N 98 140 86 41 
Pseudo R2 0.1979 0.2905 0.2596 0.1491 
Log likelihood -69.464 -62.075 -72.840 -24.586 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Democrats regained control of the House in the 110th and 111th Congresses (2007 
to 2010). For the first time, stronger CHC support for a particular piece of legislation has 
a positive and significant effect on how well that legislation fares in the legislative 
process. That is, legislation that receives more attention from the CHC in the form of 
speeches, press releases, and cosponsorship is more likely to pass the House and become 
law than legislation that receives little or no support from the CHC. Part of this newfound 
legislative success for the CHC can be explained by Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) ascension to 
the role of Speaker of the House. Unlike Democratic Speakers O’Neill, Wright, and 
Foley in Era 1, Pelosi’s goal as speaker was not only to ensure sufficient votes to pass 
Democratic priorities in the House but also to ensure that all groups within the 
Democratic Caucus felt included and represented by the Democratic leadership and its 
agenda (Peters, Jr. and Simon Rosenthal 2010; Pearson 2015). This is in no small part 
because in the 110th and 111th Congresses, Latinxs and other minority groups were much 
better represented in the House than in Congresses past. Thus, these groups represented a 
larger proportion of the votes required by the Democrats to ensure the passage of their 
own legislative priorities. This era is also marked by increased partisan polarization and a 
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leftward ideological shift in the Democratic Party, bringing the ideological means of the 
Democrats and the CHC much closer together. 
The effect of a bill’s sponsor being chair of the committee of referral is again 
positive and significant, speaking to the power of committee chairs in shaping 
discussions on the floor of the House. However, at this point in time committee chairs are 
less independent of the party leadership, and thus the results here speak more to the 
overarching power of parties and party leaders in the House than the independent power 
of committees in the House. A potential counter to this effect, though, is the significant 
negative effect of having a Republican president in office. Even with Democratic control 
of the House, having George W. Bush as president for the first two years of this era 
diminished the chances of CHC priorities ultimately becoming law; this effect might be 
exaggerated, however, because more of the CHC’s priorities in Era 3 happened to be 
introduced in the last two years of Bush’s presidency. 53 out of the 86 items on the 
CHC’s agenda in this era were introduced in the 110th Congress, compared to only 33 in 
the 111th Congress; in the 111th Congress, though, proportionally more of the CHC’s 
priorities advanced beyond the committee stage than in the 110th Congress. 
 Finally, Era 4 represents the Republican Party regaining control of the House in 
the 2010 midterms through the end of the 114th Congress in 2016. Once again the 
variable for the CHC support index is insignificant, but positive. If the effect of increased 
CHC support for legislation were significant, it would increase that legislation’s chances 
of surviving the legislative process. In fact, all variables fail to meet standard levels of 
significance in Era 4. This is not too surprising for variables such as whether a bill’s 
sponsor is chair of the committee of referral or a member of the majority party, as 
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Republicans control the House in this era of high polarization and nearly all CHC agenda 
items are Democrat-sponsored bills that would likely be blocked at the committee stage 
on principle. Given the high degree of partisan polarization and gridlock in these most 
recent sessions of Congress, it is not all that surprising that legislation sponsored by 
members of the minority party is less likely to survive in Republican-controlled 
committees and in roll call votes where they require significant Republican support in 
order to pass. 
 
Latinx Issue Areas 
 Determining the relationship between CHC support and legislation’s passage by 
issue area is more difficult. Because there are too few bills or resolutions on the CHC 
agenda in a given issue area—the lowest number of items in any one issue area is two, 
while the highest is only 58—it is not possible to conduct reliable statistical analyses. 
Thus, there isn’t a way to test the causal relationship between intensity of CHC support 
and how far an item advances in the legislative process. 
 It is, however, possible to look at how many items on the CHC’s support agenda 
in the core issue areas identified in Hypothesis 3 end up passing the House as a 
descriptive measure that does shed some light on the legislative effectiveness of the CHC. 
Table 5.3 shows the effectiveness rate of the CHC for legislative items in the health, 
education, immigration, and public lands issue areas. 
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Table 5.3 CHC Legislative Effectiveness by Issue Area 
 
 Number of Items # Pass House % Pass House 
Health 
 
58 12 20.69% 
Education 
 
47 11 23.40% 
Immigration 
 
26 0 0.00% 
Public Lands 
(Territories) 
28 7 25.00% 
 
In three of the issue areas—health, education, and public lands—the CHC enjoys 
moderate success. At least 20% of the CHC’s priorities in each of these issue areas end 
up passing the House, a remarkable statistic given the relatively low number of bills that 
manage to pass in either chamber of Congress, let alone receive a floor vote, in a given 
session of Congress. A potential explanation is that many of the bills or resolutions in 
these issue areas are also favored by a majority of the Democratic Party, providing these 
items with a higher chance of surviving throughout the legislative process. This does not 
mean, however, that the CHC played no role in pushing these items through the House. 
While the power of partisanship may have played a significant role in protecting these 
items as they advanced through the House, the efforts of a unified coalition of 
Democratic members certainly cannot be overlooked. This is especially true with 
controversial legislation in these issue areas that was considered in the most recent 
sessions of Congress. For example, the Affordable Care Act would not have passed in the 
110th Congress if any Democrats chose to vote no on the landmark legislation. The 
decision of the CHC to fully support the legislation, then, was vital to the bill’s survival. 
Even though the passage of the ACA was a largely Democratic priority, the CHC saw the 
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bill as a win for the Latinx community despite the lack of a public option provision and 
acted accordingly to ensure the CHC’s favored outcome. 
 However, despite this example there is also clear evidence that partisan 
polarization seriously mitigates the effectiveness of the CHC. Not one of the immigration 
measures supported by the CHC passed the House. This includes the CHC’s alternative 
immigration reform bill that was introduced to challenge the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 and the most recent bipartisan attempts at immigration reform in the 
113th Congress. Immigration has always been a divisive issue, with the CHC and the 
Democratic Party aligning to the left of the ideological spectrum and supporting increases 
in immigration while lessening the burden on immigrants who wish to live in the U.S. 
Such positions are diametrically opposed by the Republican Party, which exerts 
significant effort to block liberal immigration legislation or push through strongly 
conservative legislation to curb immigration or cut the benefits made available to 
immigrants. This stark partisan disagreement on immigration means that as control of the 
House shifts, so too does the viability of immigration legislation that aids immigrants in 
their quest to come to the U.S. When Democrats are in the majority, such legislation is 
more likely to pass, though paradoxically the CHC is less likely to wield much influence 
on the provisions of such bills. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, for 
example, was sponsored by Democrats and passed in a Democrat-controlled House over 
the strong opposition of the CHC. While the Democratic Party has become more 
receptive to the desires of the CHC on immigration since the 1980’s, the fact remains that 
Democratic control does not guarantee perfect synchronicity between the CHC and 
Democratic Caucus agendas. For the CHC, though, this situation is preferable to a 
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Republican-controlled House determined to crack down on all immigration, whether 
legal or illegal. At least with regard to immigration, then, it is difficult to argue that the 
CHC is effective, though this is not for a lack of effort on the part of the CHC. 
Immigration as an issue area is simply too polarized for the CHC to tilt the scales one 
way or another. 
 
Blocking Legislation 
 While legislative effectiveness to this point has been operationalized as the 
passage of legislation that promotes or protects Latinx interests, just as much attention 
must be paid to the CHC’s efforts to block legislation that actively attempts to harm 
Latinxs and their interests. As mentioned earlier, Democrats have always comprised a 
majority of CHC members; in fact, the CHC has been comprised entirely of Democrats 
since the 105th Congress. As a consequence, whenever Democrats are the House 
minority, the CHC is hard-pressed to find opportunities to pass Latinx-friendly 
legislation. Rather, the CHC must focus on blocking Republican-sponsored legislation 
that aims to reduce Latinx eligibility for government benefits, curtail immigration, or 
diminish support for programs supported by the CHC such as bilingual education 
programs. This reality is captured succinctly in interviews. When asked what one of the 
biggest challenges has been for the Caucus, one representative replied: 
“Well I mean, well obviously—most of us, or all of us, being Democrats and 
being in the minority party in Congress, obviously we’re hopeful for a period 
soon that we can be in the majority and actually, you know, move on many of 
these issues and many of the bills we support. Right now, like I said, it’s mostly 
defense – so I would say being buried in the minority party has been difficult.”98 
                                               
98 Representative C, personal interview. 
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When the Democratic Party is in the minority the CHC is relatively powerless to move on 
the bills that CHC members support and would like to see pass the House. Legislative 
effectiveness as measured above, then, does not make as much sense when the Caucus is 
in the minority. 
 This does not mean that the efforts of the CHC to block legislation are only 
relevant when Democrats are in the minority. There have been multiple instances in the 
past when the CHC has opposed Democratic legislation because of the belief that such 
legislation in fact harms Latinx interests, or because the CHC feels that the legislation in 
question represents a compromise in which Latinxs lose more than they gain. Regardless 
of Democratic majority status, then, it is not possible to tell the entire story of legislative 
effectiveness vis-à-vis the Hispanic Caucus without also delving more deeply into how 
effective the CHC is at preventing legislation the Caucus deems unfavorable from 
advancing very far through the legislative process. 
 Using the same sources for bill identification discussed in the previous chapter 
and earlier in this chapter, there are a total of 54 legislative items that were included on 
the CHC’s legislative agendas over the last forty years by virtue of the CHC’s opposition 
to the items. Opposition was gleaned from systematic analysis of CHC press releases, 
archival documents, and statements in both the Congressional Record and CQ Weekly. 
Because opposition is not easily recorded through an activity such as cosponsorship, I did 
not use the cosponsorship standard described in Chapter 4. Without a source similar to 
cosponsorship, it is difficult to disentangle CHC and Democratic opposition to any given 
piece of legislation, complicating attempts to make causal claims with regard to CHC 
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efforts at blocking legislation. There are also simply too few items on the CHC’s 
opposition agenda to carry out any kind of regression analysis. Looking at the descriptive 
statistics, though, does paint an interesting portrait of the CHC and its oppositional efforts 
in the House. 
Table 5.4 Content of CHC Opposition Agenda by Type of Legislative Item 
 
 Number of Items Percentage of Items 
Amendments 9 16.67% 
Resolutions 8 14.8% 
Bills 37 68.52% 
 
Of the 54 items opposed by the CHC, the clear majority are bills. A full two thirds of the 
CHC’s opposition agenda—68.52%—is comprised of bills, which is not surprising given 
that anti-Latinx bills are the most significant threat to Latinx interests. In this vein, it 
makes sense that amendments constitute the next-largest segment of the opposition 
agenda at 16.67%. Resolutions make up the smallest proportion of the CHC’s opposition 
agenda at 14.8%. 
 Another relevant distinction to make here is between appropriations and budget 
measures versus other types of legislation. Oftentimes appropriations and budget 
measures are highly partisan, especially in recent sessions of Congress, and so the CHC’s 
opposition to these measures may be more closely tied to Democratic partisan identity 
rather than concern for the Latinx community and its interests. Thus, it is no surprise that 
the CHC has opposed such House resolutions as those aimed at the passage of the GOP 
budget in the 109th Congress. There is a common thread among the appropriations-based 
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amendments and bills opposed by the CHC: of the four amendments and six bills, in the 
majority of cases CHC opposition was driven by the belief that either the amendments 
themselves or certain provisions of the bills were explicitly designed to harm Latinx 
immigrants and/or Latinx interests in other issue areas. For example, in the 96th Congress 
the CHC opposed Rep. William Ashbrook’s (R-OH) amendment on H.R. 7998—the 
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1981—that would have reduced funding for bilingual education 
programs championed by the CHC. In other instances, the issue in question was 
immigration, such as in the 110th Congress when the CHC opposed two Democratic 
appropriations measures, H.R. 3093 and H.R. 2764, because of the inclusion of what the 
CHC saw as anti-immigrant provisions or in the 114th Congress when the CHC opposed 
H. Amdt. 1199 on H.R. 5293, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2017, 
which would prohibit the use of funds to enlist in the military immigrants with deferred 
status through President Obama’s DACA program. 
Table 5.5 CHC Blocking Effectiveness on Appropriations/Budget Measures 
 
 Number of Items Failed/Did Not Pass 
House 
Agreed To/Pass 
House 
Amendments 4 2 2 
Resolutions 4 1 3 
Bills 6 0 6 
 
 Table 5.5 shows the overall effectiveness of the CHC when it comes to blocking 
appropriations or budget related amendments, resolutions, and bills. Of the 9 amendments 
opposed by the CHC, 4 were attached to appropriations bills. The CHC broke even with 
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these amendments: two were agreed to—one by voice vote and one by recorded vote—
while two failed, again one by voice vote and the other by recorded vote. The CHC was 
less successful at blocking budget resolutions, such as H.Con.Res. 95 and H.Con.Res. 
376 in the 109th Congress, introducing the GOP budget for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 
respectively. Three of the four budget resolutions—notably, all introducing a GOP 
budget plan during periods of GOP control of the House—passed the House. The one 
remaining budget resolution, H.J.Res. 99 in the 114th Congress making continuing 
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, died in committee. Thus, the CHC was only 25% 
effective at blocking resolutions it chose to oppose. The CHC is least effective, though, 
when it comes to blocking appropriations bills. The CHC has opposed six such bills over 
the last four decades, and all six of these bills passed the House. Four of these bills went 
on to become law, signaling a clear loss for the CHC. Overall, out of 14 appropriations or 
budget related items opposed by the CHC, 11 were agreed to or passed the House while 
only three failed to get as far in the legislative process. Given that these are 
appropriations or budget measures, though, it is possible that CHC opposition was never 
going to be sufficient to overcome 1) the perception that such measures are considered by 
necessary by nearly all members of Congress and are thus nearly assured to pass, and 2) 
the intense support of the majority party, which will endeavor to make sure that measures 
funding the government will always pass lest the failure to pass be used against the 
majority in future elections. 
 Focusing only on non-appropriations measures, we see similar trends. Of the five 
non-appropriations amendments, three failed in the House on recorded votes. One 
amendment, H. Amdt. 534 on H.R. 2 the Student Results Act of 1999 in the 106th 
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Congress, was agreed to in the House. One amendment, which aimed to designate 
English as the official language of the federal government, was agreed to in the House 
but only after the amendment itself had been amended to minimize the part of the 
amendment opposed by the CHC99. The blocking effectiveness rate of the CHC on 
amendments, then, is a respectable 60%. 
Table 5.6 CHC Blocking Effectiveness – Non-Appropriations Measures 
 
 Number of Items Failed/Did Not Pass 
House 
Agreed To/Passed 
House 
Amendments 5 3 2 
Resolutions 4 2 2 
Bills 31 6 25 
 
When it comes to blocking non-budgetary resolutions, though, the CHC is not as 
effective. The CHC is not necessarily inept when it comes to blocking resolutions either, 
though. Of the four resolutions, one died in committee—H.J.Res. 171 in the 103rd 
Congress, which proposed a constitutional amendment to make English the official 
language of the United States. One resolution—H.J.Res. 499 in the 100th Congress, 
calling on the President to decertify Mexico as an anti-drug partner—was reported out of 
committee but failed to pass the House. The other two resolutions—H.J.Res. 58 in the 
105th Congress and H.Res. 639 in the 114th Congress—both managed to pass the House. 
Even though a resolution passing the House does not carry any force of law, their passage 
                                               
99 Even though the amendment was amended in a way that would appear to make the original more 
amenable to the CHC, there is no record of the CHC updating its stance on the amendment. I treat the 
agreement on this amendment, then, as a loss for the CHC, especially since the revised version of the 
amendment still allowed for the possibility of making English the official language for all federal 
government business at some point in the future. 
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still represents an inability on the part of the CHC to convince a majority of the House to 
side with the Latinx community on issues considered important enough to be the subjects 
of House resolutions. On non-budget resolutions, though, the CHC essentially broke 
even—half of the resolutions failed to pass the House while the other half did pass. 
 The CHC is least effective when it comes to blocking bills. Of 31 bills, only two 
bills died in committee while four were reported out of committee but either did not 
receive a floor vote or failed to pass in their respective floor vote. 25 of the bills opposed 
by the CHC, though, managed to pass the House. Only seven of these bills ultimately 
became law, though, representing something of a win for the CHC100. However, since 
these bills still passed the House it is difficult to argue that this should not count against 
the CHC’s efforts at blocking legislation with which it does not agree. Thus, the blocking 
effectiveness rate of the CHC with regard to bills is only 19.35%, demonstrating the 
relative weakness of the CHC as a force of legislative opposition. This does not mean that 
the CHC’s opposition to certain legislation is wholly meaningless—even when 
unsuccessful at blocking legislation, the CHC’s vocal opposition to a bill through 
publicly accessible forms as press releases and floor speeches can raise awareness of that 
legislation, and signal to Latinx communities that the CHC is still committed to 
representing their interests despite the best efforts of unfriendly legislators. 
 Because the CHC approaches its role in Congress differently depending on if the 
Democratic Party is in the minority or the majority in the House, it makes sense to also 
                                               
100 Since bills becoming law is also contingent on the approval of both the Senate and the President, it is 
difficult to say that the CHC is directly responsible for these 18 bills not becoming law. At best, it might be 
possible to say that the two bills that failed in conference committee were affected by CHC opposition in 
some way. 
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analyze the CHC’s blocking effectiveness during periods of differing partisan control. 
Table 5.7 shows the blockage rates for the CHC during periods of Democratic control, 
i.e. from 1977 to 1994 and from 2007 to 2010. Only 16 out of the 54 items opposed by 
the CHC were opposed during periods of Democratic control: five amendments, two 
resolutions, and 9 bills. Out of these 16 items, four were appropriations-related. All three 
of the non-appropriations amendments failed, as did both of the resolutions, indicating 
five clear wins for the CHC. Keeping with the overall trend, the CHC lost more on bills: 
of seven non-appropriations bills, one bill died in committee, one bill was reported out of 
committee and subsequently failed, and five bills passed the House with two of these five 
becoming law. Thus, the CHC was only effective at blocking 28.57% of the bills it 
opposed during Democratic control of the House. 
Table 5.7 CHC Blocking Effectiveness During Democratic Control 
 
 Number of Items Failed/Did Not Pass 
House 
Agreed To/Passed 
House 
Amendments 
(General) 
 
3 3 0 
Resolutions 
(General) 
 
2 2 0 
Bills (General) 
 
7 2 5 
Amendments 
(Appropriations) 
 
2 1 1 
Resolutions 
(Appropriations) 
 
0 – – 
Bills 
(Appropriations) 
2 0 2 
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The CHC was equally ineffective when looking at appropriations-related amendments 
and bills. Of two such amendments, one was agreed to and one failed, while both of the 
opposed appropriation bills passed. While only one of these appropriations bills became 
law, the fact that both passed the House still demonstrates a lack of effectiveness on the 
part of the CHC. 
 Just because the CHC has always been primarily comprised of Democrats does 
not mean that the CHC only opposed GOP-backed legislation. During the periods of 
Democratic control of the House, the CHC opposed eight Democrat-sponsored bills—
including two appropriations measures—and one resolution, compared to one GOP-
sponsored bill, one GOP resolution, and five GOP-sponsored amendments. However, 
despite this imbalance the effectiveness of the CHC appears to be directly related to the 
majority status of the Democratic Party and the strength of partisanship in the House. Out 
of the seven GOP-backed items opposed by the CHC, the bill and resolution both died in 
committee while four of the amendments failed, leaving only one amendment that was 
agreed to by voice vote in the 96th Congress. In contrast, seven of the eight Democratic 
bills opposed by the CHC passed the House with three of those seven becoming law. The 
Democratic resolution was reported by committee but did not pass the House. The 
effectiveness of the CHC at blocking GOP-sponsored legislation is significantly boosted 
by Democratic control of the House, especially in later sessions of Congress, as the 
Democratic majority is unlikely to let through any Republican measure that is not 
supported by a majority of the Democratic Party. This same dynamic works against the 
CHC when it comes to Democratic measures—even though the CHC is comprised mostly 
of Democrats, it is still too small and does not control enough votes to force the 
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Democratic leadership to heed the CHC’s wishes when it comes to legislation that is 
ostensibly seen as favorable by a majority of Democrats in the House. 
Table 5.8 CHC Blocking Effectiveness During Republican Control 
 
 Number of Items Failed/Did Not Pass 
House 
Agreed To/Passed 
House 
Amendments 
(General) 
 
2 0 2 
Resolutions 
(General) 
 
2 0 2 
Bills (General) 
 
24 4 20 
Amendments 
(Appropriations) 
 
2 1 1 
Resolutions 
(Appropriations) 
 
4 1 3 
Bills 
(Appropriations) 
 
4 0 4 
 
 The effect of partisanship is even more clearly seen during periods of Republican 
control of the House, i.e. 1995 to 2006 and 2011 to 2016. A Republican sponsored every 
amendment, resolution, or bill on the CHC’s opposition agenda during these time 
periods, demonstrating the general antipathy of the Republican Party toward Latinx 
interests (at least in the eyes of the CHC). 10 items were focused on appropriations or the 
budget, leaving 28 non-appropriations or budget items. Of these non-appropriations or 
budget items, two of two amendments were agreed to, two of two resolutions passed the 
House, and 20 bills passed the House with five becoming law. Thus, the CHC only won 
on four non-appropriations measures, with one bill dying in committee and three bills 
reported out of committee but failing to subsequently pass the House. The CHC did not 
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do any better on appropriations or budget focused legislation during periods of 
Republican control. Of two amendments, one passed and one failed; of four resolutions, 
three passed while one died in committee; and of four bills, all four passed the House 
while three became law. Thus, while the CHC is relatively weak when it comes to 
blocking legislation during periods of Democratic control it is downright powerless when 
it comes to attempting to block legislation during periods of Republican control. 
 This disparity between periods of Democratic and Republican control, as well as 
the overall trends in the CHC’s blocking effectiveness, together highlight the continuing 
power of partisanship and polarization in the House. Even though the CHC is a de facto 
faction of the Democratic Party, the power of the party apparatus is difficult to overcome 
even when CHC members strongly disagree with the legislation offered by their 
Democratic colleagues. The priority for the Democratic Party is passing legislation 
preferred by a majority of the Democratic Party, a mindset that will continue to 
disadvantage the CHC so long as it comprises less than a majority of the Democratic 
Caucus’s membership. The fact that the CHC only opposes Republican measures during 
periods of Republican control does indicate, though, that the rest of the Democratic Party 
is willing to work with the Caucus—or at least not work against it—when the Democratic 
Party is in the minority. Where the power of partisanship and polarization comes into 
play, though, is in the inability of the CHC to prevent legislation of any type from 
advancing through the legislative process. 
 
Non-Traditional Forms of Effectiveness 
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 Despite the fact the CHC appears relatively ineffective in terms of passing 
legislation, this is not the only form of legislative effectiveness that ought to be 
considered here. Prior scholarship highlights at least one way of measuring effectiveness 
that does not rely on the passage of legislation—Miquel and Snyder, Jr. (2006) and Hall 
(1996) both rely on a reputational measure of legislative effectiveness. To construct this 
measure, members of Congress and congressional staffers respond to survey questions 
asking them to assess the legislative acumen of other members of Congress, based on 
whatever factors the respondents consider integral to being an effective lawmaker. Such a 
measure, though, does not necessarily capture the efforts of legislators who choose to 
work together as in the CHC—this survey-based measure focuses on the reputation of an 
individual legislator, rather than a group of legislators. Thus, when discussing the 
effectiveness of the CHC beyond the ability to pass bills, resolutions, or amendments, we 
must choose a standard that applies to the CHC as a whole. 
In the course of analyzing the archival materials of the CHC and conducting 
interviews with CHC members and staffers, it became clear that the CHC did not focus 
the entirety of its resources and efforts in the House on passing or blocking legislation. 
Just as much attention was given to activities that receive little attention among the public 
but are no less important in affecting the activities of Congress in the long term. These 
include the CHC advocating for its members’ appointments to powerful and influential 
committees in the House; the CHC attempting to influence a wide variety of executive 
nominations, including for cabinet secretaries and seats within the federal judiciary; the 
CHC acting as a training ground for members with aspirations to Democratic House 
leadership; and the CHC publicly voicing the interests of Latinxs and sending letters to 
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other legislators to garner support for CHC positions. The legislative effectiveness of the 
CHC then, and by extension coalitional representation of the Latinx community, can be 
measured by paying attention to instances where the CHC successfully engaged in one or 
more of these activities.101 
 
Congressional Committees 
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, congressional committees traditionally have a 
significant amount of power. Even today, with tremendous increases in polarization and 
centralization of power in the hands of party leaders (Curry 2015; Lee 2016), being the 
chair of a congressional committee or subcommittee still imbues a member with a 
significant amount of influence in the issue areas that fall within the committee’s 
jurisdiction. It makes sense, then, that the CHC would attempt to get as many of its 
members as possible seats on powerful House committees such as Appropriations, Ways 
and Means, or Rules. 
Within the archives, there are three such instances of the CHC working behind the 
scenes to influence committee assignments within the Democratic Caucus. The earliest 
example was in September of 1984. The CHC drafted a letter to Speaker Tip O’Neill, 
requesting that Rep. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands), be appointed to the immensely 
powerful Appropriations Committee. In the letter, the CHC emphasized de Lugo’s 
willingness to be a team player and to support the goals of the Democratic Caucus. There 
                                               
101 I do not count instances of failure against the CHC here. The simple act of making present the interests 
of the Latinx community by, say, promoting a Latinx nominee for a federal judgeship, thrusts Latinx 
interests into the spotlight regardless of the outcome of a nomination process that the CHC has exceedingly 
little ability to alter, given there are only two Senators currently among the CHC’s members. 
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was no explicit mention of de Lugo’s presence on Appropriations as a potential boon for 
Latinx representation, though the CHC’s letter did indicate a belief that de Lugo’s 
inclusion “would enhance the configuration of the Committee” without counting against 
the restriction on how many Democrats could serve on the committee given that de Lugo 
was a non-voting delegate.102 This request ultimately failed, and de Lugo was not 
appointed to Appropriations. 
Later in 1984, the CHC again tried to influence committee assignments, though 
this attempt was in a way much more significant than attempting to get a CHC member 
assigned to Appropriations. Writing again to Speaker O’Neill, the CHC urged the 
appointment of the Chair of the CHC—Robert García (D-NY), at the time—to the 
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. While Appropriations is a powerful 
committee because it is the committee of jurisdiction for all appropriations bills that 
control government spending and thus significant portions of funding for other 
legislation, Steering and Policy is in a sense more powerful in that members of this 
committee both advise party leaders on policy (though perhaps less so in the 
contemporary Congress) and determine committee assignments for the Democratic 
Caucus. Even without a seat on Appropriations, the CHC could theoretically influence 
the actions of Appropriations and other congressional committees by having a say in 
which other members were assigned to those committees. Contrasted to the letter sent on 
behalf of de Lugo, this letter specifically emphasized the growing political role of the 
Latinx population in the United States. The CHC argued that because of this growing 
                                               
102 Letter to Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., September 26, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 1, Folder 1. 
 204 
Latinx presence and influence, “to have Hispanic members serving on this body would 
give a unique perspective to the decision-making role that this committee serves in 
Congress”. The presence of the CHC Chair on Steering and Policy would also “contribute 
to a broader-based consensus for Democratic policy”.103 However, as with the request for 
de Lugo to receive a seat on Appropriations, the CHC was also unsuccessful here and 
García was not appointed to Steering and Policy.104 
The last archival example again concerns the Appropriations Committee. In April 
of 1992, the CHC sent a letter to Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) requesting that not one but 
two CHC members—José Serrano (D-NY), and Esteban Torres (D-CA)—be assigned to 
Appropriations for the 103rd Congress, beginning in January of 1993. Similar to the letter 
sent to Speaker O’Neill regarding Steering and Policy, this letter also emphasized the 
representational benefit of having Latinx members on the Appropriations committee. The 
situation here was slightly different—Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA), a founding member of the 
CHC, announced his intention to retire from Congress at the end of the 102nd Congress. 
At the time, Roybal was the only Latinx member serving on Appropriations. According 
to the CHC, Roybal’s departure from the committee would “leave the nation’s 24 million 
Hispanics without an effective voice in the federal appropriations process”, a lack that 
would be “even more noticeable with the anticipated addition of several new Democratic 
                                               
103 Letter to Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., October 10, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments, Box 1, Folder 1. The phrasing here also demonstrates the possibility of some divides between 
the CHC and the rest of the Democratic Caucus in the mid-1980s, which makes the perceived closeness of 
the two groups on the part of the CHC discussed in Chapter 4 all the more confusing. If the CHC believed 
the Democratic Caucus needed to appeal more to Latinx interests, then why did the CHC not put more 
pressure on Democrats when presented with those opportunities? 
104 Ultimately, the CHC did end up with some representation on Steering and Policy when Rep. Ed 
Pastor (D-AZ) was assigned to the committee in the early 2000s. 
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Members” to the CHC in the 103rd Congress.105 On face, it may appear the CHC over-
reached with this request for two seats on Appropriations to make up for the loss of one. 
However, the CHC’s argument appeared to be persuasive to Speaker Foley and Serrano 
and Torres were both assigned to Appropriations for the 103rd Congress, giving the CHC 
significant influence on one of the most powerful committees in the House. 
 While there are no archives to draw on for the most recent sessions of Congress, 
CHC press releases celebrating members’ assignments to committees and subcommittees 
provide some insight to areas where the CHC has focused its attention and its efforts to 
gain a foothold within the House in the contemporary Congress. These include instances 
such as José Serrano and Lucille Roybal-Allard being named chairs of different 
Appropriations subcommittees. The continued focus of the CHC on gaining a foothold 
through committees is also on display in the 116th Congress (2019-2020). In this session, 
the CHC most notably has five members serving on Appropriations: Lucille Roybal-
Allard, as Chair of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security; José Serrano, as Chair of 
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies; Henry Cuellar 
(D-TX), Pete Aguilar (D-CA), and Norma Torres (D-CA). Torres is also the lone CHC 
member on the Rules Committee. The CHC also has two members on the Ways and 
Means Committee—Linda Sánchez (D-CA) and Jimmy Gomez (D-CA)—as well as four 
members on the Judiciary Committee: Lou Correa (D-CA), Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (D-
FL), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), and Veronica Escobar (D-TX). Finally, the CHC has two 
committee chairs: Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) chairs the Committee on Natural Resources, 
                                               
105 Letter to Thomas Foley, April 7, 1992. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 1984-
1994, Box 2, Folder 8. 
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while Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) chairs the Small Business Committee. The increased 
presence of CHC members among committee leadership in this most recent session of 
Congress is in part a result of the increasing size of the CHC over time (see Chapter 2) 
but also a testament to the historical efforts of the CHC to push Democratic leadership to 
be more open to including CHC members in their considerations for committee 
assignments precisely because of their CHC membership and their connections to the 
Latinx community. 
 
Executive Appointments 
 The CHC has also been very active in attempting to shape executive nominations 
and appointments, most notably within the federal judiciary. Because the CHC is 
primarily a House caucus, and confirmation votes for executive nominations are only 
held in the Senate, the CHC’s tangible influence on this process is inherently limited. 
This has not stopped the CHC from sending letters to Senators or issuing numerous press 
releases stating the CHC’s position on a given nominee and trying to persuade others to 
vote in line with the CHC’s interests. In 1984 the CHC sent a letter to Senator Strom 
Thurmond (R-SC)—Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee—expressing the CHC’s 
support of Juan Torruella’s nomination for a seat on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit. The letter to Thurmond emphasized the fact that Torruella was the 
first Puerto Rican nominated for a leadership position at the First Circuit, in addition to 
recounting Torruella’s qualifications to serve as a Circuit Court judge.106 The CHC’s 
                                               
106 Letter to Sen. Strom Thurmond, September 5, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 1, Folder 2. 
 207 
efforts were successful—Torruella was confirmed to as a judge for the First Circuit, 
providing Latinxs with a voice within the federal judiciary. 
 In Ronald Reagan’s second term, the CHC again promoted a Latinx individual for 
a judgeship at the federal district court level. Rather than write to the Chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, though, this time the CHC wrote directly to President Reagan to 
express its support of Nelson Diaz for the nomination. In this letter, though, the CHC 
only focused on Diaz’s qualifications for the judgeship, with no mention of Diaz’s Latinx 
identity or the importance of his potential nomination for the Latinx community. The 
decision not to mention the importance of nominating Diaz for the Latinx community is 
certainly interesting, though not necessarily causal in President Reagan’s decision not to 
nominate Diaz for the judgeship.107The CHC continued to attempt to influence executive 
judicial nominations under President Clinton as well, sending Clinton a letter exhorting 
the President to nominate a Hispanic judge to replace Byron White on the Supreme 
Court.108 As with Nelson Diaz, this appeal to the chief executive was unsuccessful—
Clinton did not nominate a Latinx judge to replace Justice White. However, this did not 
dissuade the CHC from attempting to shape the membership of the federal judiciary. 
Press releases of the CHC show the group actively supporting Sonia Sotomayor’s 
nomination to the Supreme Court in 2009, but also opposing the nominations of John 
Roberts for Chief Justice in 2005 and Samuel Alito as an Associate Justice in 2006. The 
CHC also opposed the circuit court nomination of Leslie Southwick in 2007, while 
                                               
107 Letter to President Reagan, 1987. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 1984-1994, 
Box 2, Folder 2. 
108 Letter to President Clinton, March 23, 1993. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 
1984-1994, Box 3, Folder 1. 
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supporting the circuit court nomination of Goodwin Liu in 2011. Perhaps one of the more 
notable examples of the CHC attempting to wield influence on judicial nominations came 
in 2001, though, when the CHC refused to endorse Miguel Estrada’s nomination by 
George W. Bush for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
Despite Estrada being Latinx, the CHC opposed his nomination based on its belief that 
Estrada’s positions were antithetical to the interests of the Latinx community. The CHC 
was not willing to support just any Latinx for a position within the federal judiciary—
potential Latinx nominees were still expected to represent the Latinx community and its 
interests as defined by the CHC and its members. 
 Aside from judicial nominations, the CHC has also attempted to influence 
executive nominations to the Cabinet, ambassadorships, and executive agencies in an 
effort to introduce Latinx voices throughout the executive branch. Based on press 
releases issued by the CHC in the last decade, the group has been active in trying to 
influence Cabinet-level nominations for Secretaries of Labor, Housing and Urban 
Development, Health and Human Services, and Interior; Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
Security; Deputy Secretary of Transportation; and Under Secretary of Commerce. 
Notably, not all of these nominees were Latinx—the CHC chose to support individuals 
for these Cabinet positions based on the CHC’s own judgment about the extent to which 
the CHC felt it could work with these individuals on behalf of the Latinx community. The 
CHC also actively—and successfully—pushed for a Latinx to be confirmed as Director 
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, providing a Latinx voice within the 
executive agency that deals with many issues often taken up by the CHC in its focus on 
immigration issues. 
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The (Democratic) Leaders of Tomorrow 
 Another avenue for the CHC to boost Latinx representation without necessarily 
passing legislation is in preparing its members for potential leadership positions within 
the House Democratic Caucus. These positions allow the CHC to exert more control over 
the legislative agenda of the Democratic Caucus, and—contrary to the findings in the 
previous chapter—bring that agenda closer to the CHC’s own. Of course, CHC members’ 
experiences within the group are no guarantee of a position within the Democratic 
leadership. Until very recently the Democratic Caucus has heavily relied on seniority to 
determine not just committee assignments but also positions within the Democratic 
Caucus. Even as new members of the Democratic Caucus push back against the seniority 
norm, it still determines which members occupy many of these positions. 
 With that being said, the CHC has a good track record of placing its members 
within Democratic leadership, especially those members who also served in leadership in 
the CHC itself. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) served as Chair of the CHC in the 105th Congress 
(1997-1998) and continued to be an active member of the CHC on his way to becoming 
Vice Chair of the Democratic Caucus from 2009 to 2013. Becerra then served as Chair of 
the Democratic Caucus from 2013 until he retired from Congress at the end of 2016 to 
successfully run for Attorney General of California. Similarly, Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
served as Chair of the CHC in the 114th Congress (2015-2016). Immediately afterward, 
Sánchez became Vice Chair of the Democratic Caucus. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) served as CHC 
Chair in the 104th Congress (1995-1996)—overseeing the CHC’s transition from 
legislative service organization to congressional member organization—before he was 
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appointed as a deputy whip in 1999. Pastor held his position as a deputy whip until he 
retired from Congress in 2014, at the end of the 113th Congress. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
never served as Chair of the CHC, but he was an active member within the group and its 
taskforces before he was appointed Chief Deputy Whip in the 113th Congress. Luján then 
served as Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, responsible for 
overseeing and coordinating efforts to get Democrats elected to the House. As a reward 
for his efforts helping Democrats retake the House majority in the 2018 midterm election, 
Luján was selected for the position of Assistant House Speaker in the 116th Congress. 
 Having a member in any one of these positions does not guarantee the 
representation of Latinx interests, whether by the CHC or by any individual member of 
Congress. However, the simple fact that within the last 20 years CHC members have 
consistently gone from being influential within the CHC to being influential within the 
Democratic Caucus points to the ability of the CHC to provide a voice for the Latinx 
community that carries weight among the other Democratic members of the House. This 
is especially so when considered alongside the fact that, prior to the late 1990s, the CHC 
had few or no members who were simultaneously influential within both the CHC and 
the Democratic Caucus. Add to this the fact that when a CHC member is considered for 
one of these leadership positions the remaining members of the CHC support their 
candidacy, and the continued growth of the CHC underscores the growing benefit of 
coalitional representation for both CHC members and the Latinx community as a whole. 
 
Making Latinx Voices Present 
 211 
 Perhaps the hardest type of effectiveness to measure, but also the one that most 
directly speaks to the coalitional representation provided by the CHC, is embodied by the 
efforts of the group to raise awareness of Latinx interests in Congress through letters sent 
to colleagues and otherwise giving a voice to the Latinx community, i.e. making the 
Latinx community present in the House. The most direct example of this kind of effort on 
the part of the CHC is found in Dear Colleague letters. These letters are sent by members 
of Congress to other members, often to solicit support for legislation authored by the 
letter writer. In its history, the CHC has circulated several Dear Colleague letters to the 
rest of the House. These include a letter sent in May 1984 urging support for H.R. 5231, 
the Academic Equity and Excellence through Bilingual Education Act of 1984, which 
was included in the broader bill H.R. 11, an omnibus bill for reauthorizing several 
education programs. Members of the CHC were original sponsors of H.R. 5231, and 
wanted to ensure that other members were both aware of and on board with keeping the 
provisions of H.R. 5231 that were incorporated into H.R. 11.109 The CHC was so 
determined, they sent a second Dear Colleague two months later, once again exhorting 
other members to vote for H.R. 11 and, by extension, for H.R. 5231 and its funding for 
bilingual education programs.110 
 In 1984, the CHC circulated another Dear Colleague letter concerning the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1984, which the group strongly opposed. The 
purpose of this letter was to persuade other members of the House to vote against the 
                                               
109 Dear Colleague, May 18, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 1984-1994, 
Series 2, Box 1, Folder 3. 
110 Dear Colleague, July 23, 1984. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 8, Folder 13. 
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proposed rule for debate on the bill. According to the CHC, the process under which the 
rule was developed was “unjust” with an amendment preparation process that was too 
restrictive in that only amendments proposed during a meeting of the Rules Committee 
were allowed without notifying members that amendments needed to be submitted to the 
Rules Committee. The CHC also argued that the Rules Committee failed to fully consider 
Rep. Ed Roybal’s alternative immigration bill, supported by the CHC as a sensible 
substitute for the IRCA.111 Other Dear Colleagues focused on a wide variety of issues, 
including the United Farm Workers movement’s grape boycott112, support for the 
Minority Small Business Development Act113, support for H.R. 1561 Hispanic-Serving 
Institutions of Higher Education Act of 1989114, and support for H.R. 4312 Voting Rights 
Language Assistance Act of 1992.115 
 While Dear Colleague letters are effective in some instances, they are not the only 
tool of the CHC to influence other members of Congress to pay attention to Latinx 
interests. The CHC also sends letters directly to Representatives and Senators to express 
the view of the CHC and to persuade the recipient to vote in accordance with the CHC 
position. In one instance, the CHC sent a letter to Rep. Paul Simon (D-IL)—Chair of the 
Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education—requesting an invitation for the Chair of the 
CHC to testify in support of provisions within the reauthorization of the Higher 
                                               
111 Dear Colleague, 1984. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with Attachments 1984-1994, Box 1, 
Folder 2. 
112 Dear Colleague, July 25, 1985. Records of the CHC, Official Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 1, Folder 
1. 
113 Dear Colleague July 15, 1987. Records of the CHC, Official Memorandums 1985-1992, Box 1, Folder 
7. 
114 Dear Colleague April 12, 1989. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 11, Folder 3. 
115 Dear Colleague June 29, 1992. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 1, Folder 2. 
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Education Act that ensured access to higher education for Latinxs and other minority 
groups.116 At another point, the CHC sent a letter to Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-AR)—Chair 
of the Committee on Small Business—in regard to S. 1993 Minority Business 
Development Programs Reform Act of 1987 and changes the CHC felt would more 
greatly benefit the Latinx community were they incorporated into the final version of the 
bill.117 The CHC also sent letters to Democratic leadership urging them to bring to the 
House floor legislation supported by the CHC. The most notable example here is with 
regard to H.R. 4312, the Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992. The CHC first 
contacted Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX), Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, urging 
Brooks to advance the bill out of committee so that it might receive a vote on the floor of 
the House.118 Once this strategy proved successful and the Judiciary Committee reported 
favorably on H.R. 4312, the CHC sent a letter to Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-
MO) urging him to bring the bill to the House floor for a final passage vote.119 On the 
same day, the CHC sent the same letter to Speaker Tom Foley, urging him to bring H.R. 
4312 to the floor of the House for a vote.120 These attempts by the CHC proved 
successful—within a month, H.R. 4312 passed in the House before going on to pass the 
                                               
116 Letter to Rep. Paul Simon, March 5, 1984. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 9, 
Folder 5. 
117 Letter to Sen. Dale Bumpers, February 18, 1988. Records of the CHC, Meeting Minutes with 
Attachments 1984-1994, Box 2, Folder 4. 
118 Letter to Rep. Jack Brooks, May 14, 1992. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 1, 
Folder 2. 
119 Letter to Rep. Richard Gephardt, June 29, 1992. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 1, 
Folder 2. 
120 Letter to Speaker Tom Foley, June 29, 1992. Records of the CHC, Subject Files 1982-1994, Box 1, 
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Senate, and was ultimately signed into law by President Clinton by the end of August 
1992. 
 Even if the CHC’s concerted effort at sending letters to powerful members of the 
Democratic Caucus to push H.R. 4312 during the 102nd Congress had not been effective, 
the simple fact the CHC felt it had enough clout to send those letters with the possibility 
of a credible response by the recipients speaks to the power of the CHC in raising 
awareness of the Latinx community and its interests, as defined by the CHC and its 
members. Had the Judiciary Committee not reported the bill to the House, or Democratic 
leadership not scheduled a final passage vote, the CHC still provided critical information 
to a powerful committee chair, the House Majority Leader, and the Speaker of the House 
on an issue deemed critical to the Latinx community and increasing the chances that these 
legislators would recall that information when considering future legislation that might 
affect the Latinx community. The same can be said for the Dear Colleague letters sent by 
the CHC throughout the years—even if the recipients did not vote for the position 
entailed in the letters, the simple act of sending the letters served as an declaration of the 
CHC’s position and by extension a statement of what position other legislators ought to 
take if they wanted to be perceived by the CHC as allies of the CHC and the Latinx 
community. 
 
Conclusion 
 Thinking about effectiveness in terms of simply passing legislation, we see that 
the Caucus is relatively effective at passing its priorities in Congress – of the 365 bills 
and resolutions that comprise the CHC’s support agenda over the last forty years, 32 bills 
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(8.77%) became law. This number is actually high compared to the yearly average for 
Congress as a whole; even the fact that 87 of the items supported by the CHC, or 23.84%, 
managed to pass the House is outside the norm for Congress as a whole. 
 However, as the analyses in this chapter show, these descriptive facts only tell 
part of the story. While having the CHC in Congress certainly has some benefit for the 
representation of Latinx interests, the decision of the Caucus to support specific pieces of 
legislation does not directly translate to increased chances of that legislation passing the 
House and thus having a chance to be signed into law. The low effectiveness of the CHC 
is on display even when examining variations in how intensely the CHC supports 
particular bills or resolutions. Even when the effect of more intense CHC support for 
legislation is statistically significant, the relationship is the opposite of expectations: more 
intense CHC support for legislation actually drives down the odds of that legislation 
advancing further in the legislative process, though the matter might be more that the 
CHC puts more energy into bills that already have a lesser chance of passing due to other 
factors. 
When looking at specific eras in the history of Congress, though, we see that the 
CHC’s effectiveness is heavily affected by party control and polarization in the House. 
The level of CHC support is positive and significant only in an era of high polarization 
and Democratic control of the House, at a time when the ideological gap between the 
CHC and the rest of the Democratic Party is smaller than in years past. In periods of 
Republican control, regardless of polarization, the effect of CHC support on the outcomes 
of the legislative process is either negative and significant or insignificant. When it comes 
to blocking legislation that the CHC opposes on the basis of that legislation 
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disproportionately harming the Latinx community, on the whole the Caucus is relatively 
ineffective regardless of which party controls the House. 
Given the steady growth of the CHC over time, which has translated to a much 
larger coalition agitating in Congress on behalf of the Latinx community, this overall lack 
of effectiveness is troubling as well as sobering. While the benefits of coalitional 
representation may be seen in terms of how well the diversity of the Latinx community is 
represented in the CHC’s internal deliberations and the perspective the CHC shares with 
the rest of the Democratic Caucus, there seems to be little substantive benefit to this 
particular kind of coalitional representation. However, the results of these analyses do not 
mean that CHC members think their efforts are meaningless. To some, the issue is not 
that the CHC is bound to be ineffective; rather, it is simply a question of how cohesive 
the Caucus is on a particular issue. The more cohesive the CHC is, then the more likely 
the CHC is to be successful both when supporting and opposing legislation.121 This need 
for cohesion is echoed by another staffer, who described effectiveness in Congress as 
being closely tied to having more votes in the House: 
“With a lot of members and a lot of votes, I think [the CHC] becomes stronger all 
the time…The [Latinx] community’s gaining in political strength and so is [the 
Caucus]. You know 20 years ago? Yeah, they were representing them but [the 
Caucus’s] voice was smaller just like the community’s voice was smaller.”122 
 
That is, the effectiveness of the CHC is not only to be found in the passage of legislation. 
Simply having more Latinx members of Congress who are also members of the CHC, in 
a reflection of the growing size and influence of the diverse Latinx community, is in and 
                                               
121 Staffer A, personal interview; and Staffer H, personal interview. 
122 Staffer B, personal interview. 
 217 
of itself a mark of the effectiveness and also the necessity of a coalitional representative 
such as the CHC. 
 Others affiliated with the Caucus do believe, though, that the Caucus has been 
effective in the legislative sense outlined earlier. Over the decades, the CHC has 
increased the amount of attention paid to immigration as a core Latinx issue, to the point 
that the Democratic Caucus tends to defer to the CHC on many issues associated with 
immigration.123 Combined with this focus on immigration is the CHC’s concerted effort 
to increase its own profile within the Latinx community and in Washington, D.C., a 
strategy that one representative feels has translated to significant success for the CHC: 
“I think the Latinos, the Latino Caucus has been effective in kind of nudging 
leadership in the past. I think the leadership we have now learned from those 
experiences when they were members coming up the ladder, I think we played a 
major role. Also I think through our internship program and through our…even 
our annual gala and conference where we invite so many people, thousands of 
people, to show up in Washington…I think we’ve made the Caucus better known 
in the community. Certainly, extremely well known in the media—you know, 
very often you’ll hear, ‘And the Hispanic Caucus, they said they will not…’. You 
know, that was something we didn’t hear in the past, so it’s changed quite a bit in 
that sense. Either the real power or the perception of power—both can be very 
powerful.”124 
 
The relationship between the CHC and the Democratic Party also has an effect on how 
members and staffers rate the effectiveness of the CHC. For one member, the 
effectiveness of the CHC is not necessarily tied to how many members or votes the 
Caucus represents. Rather, the question is how closely the CHC agenda fits within the 
Democratic agenda. When asked to rate how effective the CHC has been, the member 
responded: 
                                               
123 Representative C, personal interview. 
124 Representative E, personal interview. 
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“Well I think within—well within the Democratic agenda, effective because we 
were able to you know, to keep that agenda and I think, uh, in the agenda with the 
Republicans we were able to either defeat bad legislation or we were able to 
invoke where we could legislation that would, that was beneficial to the Hispanic 
community.”125 
 
The comments of this member demonstrate the belief that the legislative effectiveness of 
the Caucus is closely tied to the prospects of the Democratic Party, especially when 
considered alongside the belief of other members and staffers that one indicator of CHC 
effectiveness has been increasing Democratic awareness of and support for the CHC’s 
priorities on immigration. This response also underscores the earlier observation that, in 
periods of Republican control, the CHC has only opposed Republican-backed legislation 
and no Democratic legislation. There is a clear belief by this member that the Republican 
Party is unlikely to sponsor legislation beneficial to the Latinx community, indicating that 
the CHC’s effectiveness in periods of Republican control is highly contingent on the 
power of the CHC to obstruct the Republican majority rather than pass legislation, a 
tough prospect when the CHC is a minority faction within the minority party in the 
House. 
 Even though the statistical evidence indicates the CHC has only limited 
effectiveness in the House of Representatives, this does not mean that members of the 
CHC necessarily think that their efforts are for naught. While the CHC may not get bills 
or resolutions that recognize Latinx interests to pass the House, members of the CHC still 
see the Caucus as effective because of the CHC’s ability to increase awareness of Latinx 
priorities within the broader Democratic Caucus and subsequently shape the positions of 
                                               
125 Representative B, personal interview. 
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the Democratic Caucus on these issues. While these efforts are most often seen with 
regard to immigration, the CHC also works to boost awareness of Latinx interests in 
other issue areas. Evidence from the CHC’s own archives highlight efforts to influence 
assignments to the powerful Appropriations Committee in the House, as well as pushing 
presidents to nominate Latinxs for federal judicial appointments. When it comes to 
committee assignments, the CHC is again constrained by partisanship insofar as party 
leaders—especially in the contemporary Congress—exercise tight control over 
committee assignments, and due to its lack of Senate members the CHC cannot feasibly 
alter a confirmation vote. Despite these constraints, the group is not dissuaded and is in 
fact successful at getting CHC member seats on powerful committees, and in some 
instances backing someone who gets confirmed by the Senate as was the case with Sonia 
Sotomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court or Hilda Solis’s nomination as Secretary 
of Labor.126 
The CHC has also demonstrated its success in training its members for leadership 
positions in the Democratic Caucus in the House, bolstering Hammond’s claim that 
“caucus training has become a legitimate route to formal positions of power” (1991, 286). 
Having CHC members serve within Democratic leadership is arguably a greater sign of 
the effectiveness of the CHC than getting members on committees or Latinx nominees 
confirmed by the Senate—CHC members who are also Chair or Vice Chair of the 
Democratic Caucus, or who serve on the whip team, are well-positioned to champion the 
interests of the Latinx community throughout the broader Democratic Caucus, thus 
                                               
126 There are also examples of the CHC successfully participating in efforts to block executive nominees, 
e.g. Miguel Estrada in 2001. 
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bolstering Latinx representation. Absent this voice within Democratic leadership, though, 
the CHC also demonstrates its effectiveness in the House and as the coalitional 
representative for the Latinx community in a much more simple and direct way: by 
issuing public press releases stating the positions of the CHC, in conjunction with 
sending letters to other legislators persuading them to support the position of the CHC 
and by extension that of the Latinx community. Through the use of Dear Colleague 
letters and letters to Democratic leadership urging favorable committee reports or the 
scheduling of floor votes, the CHC broadcasts the interests of the Latinx community for 
all members of Congress to hear regardless of the final outcomes of the legislative 
process. 
 Thus, some might argue that coalitional representation is more similar to 
descriptive or surrogate representation than substantive representation. The benefits of 
descriptive representation are often more symbolic in nature and have to do with the 
ability of descriptive representatives to crystallize the interests of underrepresented 
minority groups (Mansbridge 1999), while substantive representation entails passing 
legislation that aligns with a group’s interests. Certainly this is the case if only looking 
purely at the statistical analyses presented here. However, the fact that CHC members 
themselves see their coalition as effective by virtue of their work to bring Latinx interests 
into the spotlight on Capitol Hill demonstrates the necessity of reconceptualizing 
substantive representation in a way that accounts for this critical step in the legislative 
process. While the ultimate goal of members of Congress and the clearest indicator of 
legislative effectiveness is getting favorable legislation through the legislative process to 
pass the House, the prospects of legislation passing are significantly boosted when 
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members of Congress are first made aware of the community in whose interest legislation 
is being proposed and precisely why this legislation matters for that community. As a 
coalitional representative, the CHC and its members do this crucial work for the Latinx 
community through a variety of methods that are not limited to simply passing or 
defeating legislation. While the data do not show a coalition that is entirely effective at all 
stages of the legislative process, they do show a group that is laying the groundwork for a 
more responsive and representative institution of government, and a strong argument for 
treating Latinx representation as an issue that spans American political institutions.  
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6| Conclusion 
 
The story of Latinx representation in Congress is complicated. Some evidence 
indicates the presence of individual Latinx legislators in Congress directly contributes to 
the substantive representation of Latinx interests through various legislative activities, 
including committee markups and bill sponsorship (Minta 2011; Rouse 2013). These 
findings push the desirability of descriptive representation, arguing that the increased 
presence of legislators from underrepresented groups is critical to the representation of 
those groups’ interests and their equitable inclusion in American politics (Mansbridge 
1999). However, other studies demonstrate the possibility that Latinx interests can be 
substantively represented even when there are few or no Latinx members of Congress. In 
such a situation, what matters is legislators’ partisan and ideological identifications, i.e. 
they are liberal Democrats (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Wallace 2014b). 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that this debate on the linkage 
between descriptive and substantive representation for Latinxs in the US is incomplete. 
Where studies of descriptive and substantive representation fall short is in their focus on 
individual legislators and the actions they take as individuals who are focused on 
representing their own districts rather than a national constituency. Because Latinx 
identity is complex and encompasses a wide variety of views and experiences, it is not 
useful to treat one legislator as a stand-in for the entire Latinx community. Rather, we 
must treat Latinx representation in Congress as a coalitional endeavor—several Latinx 
legislators joining together and navigating the nuances within the Latinx community to 
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form a coalition that is focused on effectively representing all Latinxs living in the United 
States. 
Coalitional representation, in this sense, deepens the proposed link between 
descriptive and substantive representation. Coalitional representation is by necessity more 
aware of and responsive to the diversity of the Latinx community. From the beginning, 
members of the coalition must decide whom they are representing, on what grounds, and 
in what manner. Without this awareness of Latinx diversity, the coalition would be 
woefully inadequate at representing the entirety of the Latinx community. 
For Latinxs, the CHC is the successful manifestation of this coalitional 
imperative. The CHC was formed in 1976 with the goal of trying to “reverse the national 
pattern of neglect, exclusion and indifference suffered for decades by Spanish-speaking 
citizens of the U.S.” (Vigil 1989, 23). While there were other motivations that pushed the 
foundation of the CHC, the most consistent desire among the CHC’s members over the 
last 40 years is the desire to represent the entirety of the Latinx community. Members 
relied on the representational mission of the CHC as the primary reason to keep the group 
in operation after Republicans moved to end congressional caucuses in the 1990s, and 
current members still view the primary role of the CHC as representing Latinxs and their 
interests in Congress. 
As explored in Chapter 2, the CHC underwent many changes that altered the 
boundaries of the coalition and influenced the CHC’s actions as a representative for 
Latinxs. The group became more diverse in terms of both national origin and gender, 
while simultaneously becoming more partisan and ideologically liberal since the late 
1990s. As the CHC became a de facto intraparty caucus within the Democratic Caucus 
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after Republican Latinxs left the group due to policy disagreements, the CHC also saw 
shifts in its relative position within the broader Democratic Caucus. In earlier periods of 
Democratic control of the House, the Caucus had relatively little influence, owing in 
large part to the preference of Democratic Speakers O’Neill, Wright, and Foley to 
prioritize the desires of the Democratic Caucus as a whole over the interests of any one 
faction within the group, especially if that faction was too small to threaten the 
Democratic majority. This changed in 2007 with Nancy Pelosi’s election as Speaker 
when Democrats regained control of the House—Pelosi’s leadership style relied more on 
fostering strong relationships between the Democratic Caucus and its subgroups (Peters, 
Jr. and Simon Rosenthal 2010; Pearson 2015). Thus, Pelosi was more willing than her 
predecessors to give the CHC a seat at the table when it came to setting Democratic 
priorities in the House. Aside from these shifts in Democratic leadership, the CHC also 
had to navigate the difficulties associated with being the minority party in the House 
when Democrats lost their advantage in 1995 and again in 2011. Despite these shifting 
dynamics both within and outside the Caucus, though, the group still functioned as a 
coalition determined to represent the Latinx community as a whole. 
However, in order to carry out this primary coalitional function the CHC first had 
to define the terms of the coalition: who was part of it, who was covered and why, and 
what issues the Caucus would focus on. Thus, the CHC had to decide what it means when 
members referred to “the Latinx community”—was this a misbegotten attempt at 
homogenizing Latinxs and their experiences (Beltrán 2010), or a strategic usage of 
panethnicity designed to help the CHC act effectively on behalf of Latinxs of divergent 
backgrounds with intersectional identities (Mora 2014)? 
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Chapter 3 points toward the latter. The CHC and its members are deeply aware of 
the diversity of the Latinx community and how this implicates the CHC’s attempts at 
coalitional representation, both in terms of the internal dynamics of the coalition and how 
the CHC views the Latinx community. The Caucus operates with a notion of Latinidad 
that incorporates this awareness at a high level. In Caucus meetings, members do not 
speak about issues in generalities—as evidenced by Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart’s position 
during a discussion on a judicial nomination mentioned in Chapter 3—members speak 
about how issues affect specific segments of the Latinx community and try to pay 
attention to the differences that exist within the community. 
Membership in the Caucus is also not limited to only those members who view 
Latinidad in a particular way—the Caucus is open to any legislator who identifies as 
Latinx or Hispanic, provided they are able to trace their heritage or ancestry to a Spanish-
speaking country or a country with close ties to the Spanish language. This does not 
mean, though, that speaking Spanish is a prerequisite for CHC membership—
demonstrating one’s heritage is sufficient grounds to request to join the coalition. Thus, 
while the CHC has set boundaries on what it means to be a member of the group, the 
members themselves do not directly police the identities of potential members.127 As a 
result, the CHC is able to present its membership in broad terms, comprising Latinxs 
from a wide variety of backgrounds and experiences of Latinidad. Presenting both the 
CHC and the Latinx community in broad terms helps boost the political appeal of 
                                               
127 While the CHC does not police members’ identities in terms of heritage or Spanish-speaking ability, the 
recent drama surrounding Republican Carlos Curbelo’s request to join the group—discussed in Chapter 3—
points to the possibility of an informal partisan and ideological condition for CHC membership. Even if a 
legislator identifies as Latinx and can point to Latinx heritage, aligning with the Republican Party and its 
policy positions appears to disqualify them from CHC membership. 
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working with the CHC, as its activities seem to affect more people rather than a small 
subset of a minority group; this perception allows non-Latinx legislators to believe they 
are currying favor with even more voters, a significant concern in a world where 
members of Congress are constantly focused on securing re-election. 
This spills over into the legislative activities of the CHC. In Chapter 4 I found that 
when constructing its legislative agenda in a given session of Congress, the CHC focuses 
on a wide variety of issue areas, reflecting the diverse priorities of Latinxs. This results in 
larger agendas filled with both specific legislation the Caucus supports (or opposes), as 
well as broad statements by the CHC affirming its commitment to address a particular 
issue area in a given session of Congress. These agendas are constrained in an important 
way, though. There is a strong norm in which the CHC does not take a public position on 
an issue unless there is unanimous agreement among members on what that position 
ought to be. As a result, the CHC does not have a stated position on issues such as the 
Cuba embargo, Puerto Rico’s status or potential statehood, or legislation that divides the 
group such as NAFTA in the early 1990s. Even so, the CHC’s legislative agenda from 
year to year encompasses a broad array of issue areas, with issues like education, 
immigration, and healthcare especially prominent. The broad scope of the CHC’s 
agendas reflects the variety of perspectives and preferences present in the Latinx 
community, with the diversity of the CHC’s agendas increasing alongside the national 
origin diversity within the group. 
When it comes to the substantive impact of the CHC’s particular brand of 
coalitional representation, though, the Caucus appears in a less than favorable light. The 
CHC’s agenda in a given session of Congress has little to no significant effect on the 
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agenda of the Democratic Caucus. Controlling for a host of factors that typically 
influence agenda setting in the House—including partisan identity of the legislation’s 
sponsor, polarization in the House, the committee memberships of the sponsor, and the 
gender of the sponsor—the inclusion of legislation on the CHC’s agenda does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood that same legislation is included on the 
agenda of the Democratic Caucus. The partisan identity and status in the committee 
system of the legislation’s sponsor are significant predictors of whether that legislation is 
included on the Democratic agenda. The apparent lack of agenda influence for the CHC 
is even present when looking at periods of shifting party control in the House. Whether 
Democrats are in the majority—the case from 1976-1994 and 2007-2010—or in the 
minority—the case from 1995-2006 and 2011-2016—the legislation on the CHC’s 
agenda is not significantly more likely to end up on the Democratic Caucus’s agenda. 
This is true both in years where the CHC was too small to garner attention from House 
Democratic leadership and in more recent sessions of Congress with a Democratic House 
leadership team that is ostensibly more open to the concerns of minority groups within 
the Democratic Caucus. This is even more surprising given the Democratic Caucus’s 
trend toward being more homogeneously liberal while simultaneously moving closer to 
the average ideology of the CHC, lessening the space for potential disagreement between 
the two groups. We see agreement on legislation such as the Affordable Care Act, 
included on the agendas of both the Democratic and Hispanic Caucuses. As a faction of 
the Democratic Caucus, this implies the CHC’s concerns are not incorporated by the 
other House Democrats. As Congress becomes more polarized and the ideological gap 
between the CHC and the Democratic Caucus lessens, this agenda synergy is observed 
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more often and the CHC pursues much of the same legislation as the rest of the 
Democratic Caucus. However, there is no evidence to indicate a causal relationship 
between the CHC and Democratic agendas—agreement between the two groups on 
legislation such as the ACA or even the DREAM Act thus might owe more to the groups’ 
shared partisan affiliation rather than direct influence one way or the other. 
Similarly, the CHC’s decision on how strongly to support a particular bill or 
resolution on its agenda does not positively affect legislative outcomes in the House, as 
shown in Chapter 5. Legislation that receives high levels of support from the CHC, while 
more likely to advance out of committees, is not significantly more likely than other 
legislation to pass the House or become law. In fact, the overall effect of increased CHC 
support on the chances of legislation passing in the House is negative—increased CHC 
support decreases the chances of that legislation becoming law. Even in periods of 
Democratic control of the House, the CHC throwing its weight behind a bill or resolution 
does not much improve that legislation’s prospects. This lack of legislative effectiveness 
is even more readily apparent when the Democrats are the minority party in the House, 
and the CHC is more focused on blocking Republican legislation rather than passing its 
own bills or resolutions. In these time periods, the CHC has very limited opportunities—
if any—to introduce legislation and attempt to push it through the House. In those rare 
instances, the effect of CHC support on likelihood of passing the House is again 
significant and negative, which is to be expected. Even when closely analyzing the 
CHC’s efforts to block GOP-sponsored legislation as part of a more reactionary agenda, 
the CHC is ineffective at blocking bills and only somewhat effective at blocking 
amendments and resolutions that the CHC deems harmful to Latinx interests. Even in 
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those instances of blocking effectiveness, the activities that contribute to successfully 
blocking legislation occur behind the scenes and are not easily measured, making it 
difficult to determine whether the CHC’s efforts are integral to legislation failing to pass 
the House regardless of which party is in the majority at the time. 
Passing legislation ought not be the only measure of legislative effectiveness, 
though, by which we evaluate the CHC and coalitional representation. The CHC engages 
in other behaviors designed to increase the voice of Latinxs within American political 
institutions—affecting committee assignments, influencing executive nominations, and 
changing the makeup of the House Democratic leadership are but a few examples. 
Previous Caucus Chairs such as Xavier Becerra and Linda Sánchez translated their 
leadership experience in the CHC into powerful positions within the Democratic Caucus, 
with Becerra serving as Caucus Chair and Sánchez serving as Vice Chair. Several CHC 
members have used their experience within the CHC as leverage to gain appointments to 
the whip team. Ben Ray Luján, though never Chair of the CHC, served as Chair of the 
DCCC before being elevated to the position of Assistant Speaker in the 116th Congress 
(2019-2020). The CHC has also been successful in getting its members seats on powerful 
House committees. At one point, Ed Roybal (D-CA)—the lone CHC member on 
Appropriations—was retiring and the CHC wrote a letter to the Speaker requesting that 
José Serrano (D-NY) and Esteban Torres (D-CA) be appointed to Appropriations to 
ensure continued Latinx representation on the committee. Ultimately, the CHC was 
successful and ended up with more influence on the Appropriations Committee than 
before, marking a significant win for the representation of Latinx interests. The CHC also 
flexed its muscle by helping to torpedo Miguel Estrada’s federal circuit court nomination. 
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While the CHC’s refusal to support Estrada was not the only factor that contributed to his 
failed nomination, it certainly did not help Estrada’s case that the coalition perceived to 
speak for the Latinx community viewed him as a poor choice for a federal judgeship. 
More importantly, the CHC has gone to great lengths to both recognize and 
publicly advocate for the varied interests of the Latinx community. This is demonstrated 
through various public press conferences, statements, and press releases issued by the 
Caucus. While these might be considered secondary measures of legislative effectiveness, 
they nevertheless point to the unique benefit coalitional representation confers upon the 
Latinx community. As a coalition of Latinx legislators spanning a wide variety of 
national origins and experiences, coupled with increasing gender diversity, the CHC 
provides the Latinx community with a group of advocates in Congress who are intimately 
and deeply aware of the complexities and nuances that exist within the Latinx community 
and that seriously complicate attempts to define a singular Latinx identity. Caucus 
members must navigate these issues both among themselves and in their decisions about 
which issues to prioritize and how to pursue their legislative goals, while at the same time 
making other members of Congress more aware of these differences within the Latinx 
community and of the necessity of acknowledging these differences rather than ignoring 
them. As individual legislators, the members of the CHC are not immediately confronted 
with these difficult discussions about identity and thus do not always bring them to bear 
on their legislative activities. 
Participating in these discussions is a necessary first step in constructing and 
maintaining the coalition that is the CHC, laying the groundwork for a more expansive 
conception of political representation that goes beyond the simple descriptive type that 
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simply requires Latinxs be elected to Congress. This coalitional representation confers 
benefits upon the Latinx community that affect all Latinxs and facilitate the substantive 
representation of Latinx interests, even though the empirical evidence is found in non-
traditional measures of legislative influence such as influencing committee assignments 
or raising awareness through public appeals. More importantly, the reliance of the CHC 
on these alternative avenues for engaging in representation point to the need for political 
scientists to treat representation as more expansive than the passage of legislation—
legislation is but one way members of Congress make present the voices of their 
constituents, though legislation is perhaps the most visible and one of the easier facets of 
representation to measure.  
 
Coalitional Representation and Representative Democracy 
 Discussing Latinx representation in Congress in terms of coalitional 
representation provided by the CHC has significant tangible and normative implications. 
Tangibly, these findings speak to the power of a congressional caucus to circumvent 
partisan polarization and structural constraints to empower its members and represent its 
constituents, going beyond a simple informational or symbolic role. Normatively, the 
presence of the CHC speaks to the nature of American representative democracy. More 
specifically, these findings affect the extent to which we can claim American political 
institutions such as Congress are both representative and democratic. 
 
The Power of Caucuses 
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 Much has been made of the ability of intraparty partisan factions to influence the 
activities of the party caucuses in Congress (Bloch Rubin 2017). What my findings 
demonstrate is that the CHC—a national constituency caucus that is technically 
bipartisan—is also able to exert influence in the House, though in a slightly different 
manner than the Blue Dog Coalition or the House Freedom Caucus. 
 The influence of the CHC goes beyond the roles typically assigned to caucuses, 
i.e. that they provide information to members to complement the committee system 
(Ainsworth and Akins 1997) or provide an opportunity for members to send a signal to 
their constituents concerning what issues the member is prioritizing during their time in 
office (Miler 2011). The CHC does engage in these activities with regard to the Latinx 
interests that the CHC defines, but it also goes further by virtue of its active engagement 
in coalitional representation. The CHC creates a legislative agenda focused on the Latinx 
community and issues the CHC members deem important to that community. The CHC 
then engages in a variety of activities to implement that agenda throughout the legislative 
process. Some of these activities are not very successful—unlike Bloch Rubin’s (2017) 
intraparty factions, the CHC is not adept at pushing the Democratic Caucus’s agenda into 
closer alignment with the CHC’s own agenda. Even with a more open Democratic 
Caucus and Democratic leadership (Peters, Jr. and Simon Rosenthal 2010), the CHC is 
unable to take advantage. This is also the case when assessing the legislative 
effectiveness of the CHC. The CHC does not have much to show for their efforts, often 
losing out to partisan polarization or as a consequence of controlling too few votes in the 
House. 
 233 
 But the CHC is far from useless when it comes to Latinx representation. Working 
as a unified coalition, the CHC’s members engage in a series of concerted efforts to raise 
awareness of Latinx interests in Congress. CHC members actively push for the 
nomination of Latinxs for executive appointments, try to get each other into favorable 
committee assignments and party leadership positions, and engage in outreach efforts—
such as Dear Colleague letters and public press conferences—designed to inform other 
legislators of Latinx priorities, and subsequently pressure these legislators to work with 
the CHC. Whether this results in the passage of legislation is immaterial—providing a 
voice for the wide variety of interests held within a significantly diverse Latinx 
community that are often ignored in Congress is itself a victory for the CHC. This 
ensures other legislators will always be aware of Latinxs, and perhaps be more attentive 
to their interests. Without the CHC acting as a coalition that draws the Latinx community 
together while maintaining the political complexity of that community, the representation 
of the Latinx community would suffer as “legislative responsiveness to marginalized 
group concerns is most likely when that experience can be fully expressed and 
thoughtfully considered” (Williams 1998, 13). The full expression and subsequent 
thoughtful consideration of the concerns of marginalized Latinxs is facilitated by the 
actions of the CHC who work together to craft a legislative approach that actively 
integrates these concerns based on CHC members’ own experiences as members of the 
Latinx community, an approach that cannot be mimicked by non-Latinx legislators who 
do not share those same experiences. 
 Without coalitional representation, the CHC cannot push us to expand our view of 
what a caucus can do, or what we ought to consider as an indicator of adequate 
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representation. It is through coalitional representation that we are presented with a caucus 
in the CHC that is highly attuned to diversity within the national Latinx constituency—
without the formation of the CHC in 1976, Latinx members would be left to work as 
individuals who are comparatively weak actors because an individual member of 
Congress does not have access to the same resources as a group of legislators working 
together toward a common goal. But this is not simply a caucus working toward an 
assumed common goal, as “sharing an identity can mean sharing a stake in something 
beyond oneself that includes those who also share that identity but who still experience it 
differently” (Hames-García 2011, 11). That is, a national constituency caucus such as the 
CHC is not representing a monolithic Latinx constituency—the CHC provides 
representation to people who share Latinidad but who have different experiences based 
on their inclusion within Latinidad. In this sense, the CHC and its actions push us to think 
of other national constituency caucuses as coalitional representatives, necessarily 
navigating the internal diversity of their own constituencies to ensure representation that 
is more responsive to a wider variety of people. Combined with a more expansive 
interpretation of what constitutes representation, i.e. including actions that are not passing 
bills, we are thus presented with the possibility that coalitional representation can change 
how we think not just of congressional caucuses but also the prospects for the 
representation of marginalized groups within the U.S. Congress. 
 
How Representative is Our Democracy? 
 The ways in which the CHC pushes us to reconsider the nature of caucuses and 
congressional representation of marginalized groups also has significant normative 
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implications that extend to American politics more broadly speaking. The fact that the 
recognition of Latinx diversity and the active representation of the Latinx community 
requires the presence of the CHC in the first place does not instill confidence when 
evaluating either the representative or the democratic of component of what we call 
American representative democracy. How can we call Congress, or American political 
institutions in general, representation when under regular circumstances the Latinx 
community does not have a voice? How can we call democratic a system where not all 
people have an equal say in the system’s daily operation or its outcomes? 
 The fact that the CHC is necessary in the first place, with members motivated by 
indifference to the Latinx community, underscores prior claims that the very concept of 
democracy in America is “premised on various forms of exclusion” (Balfour 2011, 98). 
The exclusion of Latinxs, as well as other minority groups, is treated as the price to pay 
in order to preserve representative democracy for a specific class of citizens, i.e. white 
males. Exacerbating this is the concept of liberal representation, wherein “fair 
representation for marginalized groups…is guaranteed by the principle of ‘one person, 
one vote’” (Williams 1998, 10). Liberal representation presumes that the ability to vote in 
democratic elections is a sufficient condition to ensure fair outcomes, despite the fact that 
the standing of citizen embodied in the right to vote is “derived primarily from its denial 
to slaves, to some white men, and to all white women” (Shklar 1991, 16). Tying fairness 
in representation to the “one person, one vote” maxim also presumes that the processes 
which produce the items to be voted upon, e.g. the legislative process producing 
legislation for legislators to vote on in the House, is itself inherently fair if only because 
everyone is able to vote through the proxy that is their elected representative. This 
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ignores the various ways in which the legislative process is biased against the 
representation of minority interests, and the very conditions that produce the indifference 
to Latinxs and their interests that prompted the foundation of the CHC. Thus, we might 
expand the exclusion Shklar describes as fundamental to citizenship as standing to 
include Latinxs—even when afforded the right to vote, exclusion and discrimination are 
still both possible and likely because of the lack of Latinx voices within institutions of 
power—especially Latinx voices that speak for all members of the community rather than 
a select subset. 
 In this sense, Latinxs in America experience what Iris Marion Young (1990) 
refers to as oppression: 
“systematic institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and 
using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or 
institutionalized social processes which inhibit people’s ability to play and 
communicate with others or to express their feelings and perspective on social life 
in contexts where others can listen” (38) 
 
More specifically, underrepresented Latinxs experience marginalization, where “a whole 
category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life” (Young 1990, 53) 
and which involves “the deprivation of…institutionalized conditions for exercising 
capacities in a context of recognition and interaction” (55), when they do not have a voice 
in Congress that can make the Latinx community present and advocate for the 
community within those institutions that are tasked with setting the conditions for a 
society that is ostensibly open to people of all backgrounds and walks of life. This 
oppression is especially troubling when “the capacity of the distinctive voices of 
marginalized groups to inform policy decisions depends heavily on the deliberative 
qualities of legislative decision making” (Williams 1998, 13). 
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Having the CHC in Congress, providing a voice for the Latinx community as a 
coalition that is aware of and embodies the diversity within the Latinx community, offers 
the beginnings of a way to end—or at least lessen—this oppression. Through their letters, 
press releases, agendas, and attempts to influence various aspects of American politics, 
CHC members push back against the oppression and marginalization of the Latinx 
community. They do so by engaging fully in the deliberative qualities of congressional 
activity and ensuring that every action the CHC takes is geared toward making the voice 
of the Latinx community both loud and clear. To be sure, this does not guarantee 
success—legislation that is detrimental to the Latinx community still becomes law, and 
the CHC is not always able to pass its preferred legislation or get Latinxs confirmed to 
the federal judiciary or added to powerful committees in the House. Even with the 
increasingly close relationship between the CHC and the rest of the Democratic Caucus, 
there are instances of the Democratic Caucus pursuing legislation with which the CHC 
disagrees—such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act in the 1980s or Obama’s 
increased immigration raids and deportations—but which the CHC is powerless to stop. 
Nevertheless, the CHC’s presence and activities represent the first step toward some 
measure of justice within American political institutions, insofar as justice requires 
“institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without 
oppression” (Young 1990, 47). While the empirical findings presented here do indicate 
significant constraints on the CHC’s ability to fully realize this kind of justice, there is 
room for future improvement as the CHC continues to grow both in size and influence in 
the House. 
 
 238 
Looking to the Future: The Trump Era and Beyond 
 What are the chances that the CHC and its practice of coalitional representation 
will increasingly affect the outcomes of the legislative process, particularly as the share 
of the Latinx population grows? That is, how will the CHC’s continued presence in the 
House push Congress to promote and respect Latinx interests without oppression? The 
question is difficult to answer definitively, owing at least in part to the slow growth of the 
CHC relative to the growing Latinx share of the population. Recent research estimates the 
Latinx share of the U.S. population at around 18% (Flores 2017), with predicted growth 
to 29% by the year 2050 (Passel and Cohn 2008). In contrast, the current share of the 
CHC in Congress is around 9% while the group accounted for about 1% of Congress 
when it was founded 40 years ago. It is highly unlikely there will be the necessary 150 
CHC members to match the estimated Latinx population share in 2050. The effects of 
this disparity are exacerbated by the fact that the average CHC district is majority-Latinx, 
while there are few non-Latinx legislators who represent majority-Latinx districts. In 
order for the CHC to experience the necessary growth to lessen the disparity between its 
own share of Congress and the Latinx share of the population, the CHC needs more 
members who represent majority-white districts. By adding these members, the CHC can 
present its activities as appealing to Latinx and non-Latinx constituents alike, prompting 
other Democrats to perceive the CHC as more influential and thus more deserving of 
attention. 
 The CHC is also, as mentioned earlier, constrained by partisan polarization and, at 
times, Democrats’ minority party status in the House. Even when Democrats are in the 
majority, the CHC comprises a minority of the party. In the 116th Congress (2019-2020), 
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the CHC has a record-high 38 members. If CHC members defect from a party vote, 
majority party Democrats would only have a two vote margin.128 However, the 
Republican Party controls the Senate and the presidency. Thus, even with Democrats 
regaining control of the House after the 2018 midterm elections the CHC has largely been 
on the defensive, reacting to President Donald Trump and the GOP’s aggressive pursuit 
of an agenda focused on curbing undocumented immigration through a combination of a 
proposed border wall on the U.S.-Mexico border, forcible separation of migrant families, 
and increased raids and deportations by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). As a result, the CHC’s agenda throughout the 116th Congress—and also for the 
entirety of the 115th Congress (2017-2018)—has almost exclusively focused on 
preventing the implementation of these strategies by the Trump administration, or else 
trying to curtail their continued use. Even in instances where the CHC has been proactive 
in its legislative behaviors, the focus is primarily on protecting immigrants. For example, 
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) introduced H.R. 6, the American Dream and Promise Act 
of 2019, canceling removal proceedings against certain immigrants and providing them 
with a path toward permanent resident status. Bills such as H.R. 6 are more symbolic than 
substantive though, signaling the CHC’s commitment to protecting immigrants but 
without a significant chance of becoming law. H.R. 6 passed in the Democrat-controlled 
House by a 237-187 margin, but it has not received a vote in the Senate and even if the 
bill passed the Senate, it would not survive a likely presidential veto. 
                                               
128 The numerical congruence here is somewhat misleading. Of those 38 CHC members, only 36 are voting 
members of the House. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (Northern Mariana Islands) and Michael San 
Nicolas (Guam) are Delegates, and thus unable to vote in the House despite their full membership in the 
CHC. 
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 However, the CHC has also seen its profile grow as a result of its perceived 
importance in combating the Republican immigration agenda. When Trump declared a 
national emergency to gain access to funds for constructing his proposed border wall, 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) tapped CHC Chair Joaquin Castro (D-TX) to write the 
privileged resolution to terminate the national emergency declaration. In the past the 
CHC Chair might not have been assigned to write such an important resolution; that 
Pelosi selected Castro speaks to the CHC’s growing clout within the Democratic Caucus 
in the 116th Congress.129  
 Going forward, though, the CHC must deal with internal divisions, even on issues 
such as immigration. In a press release, the CHC condemned the recent passage of H.R. 
3410—the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Humanitarian Assistance and 
Security at the Southern Border Act, 2019—as “a betrayal of our American values” 
because of its failure to adequately address “the rampant human rights abuses” against 
immigrants held in government custody (Congressional Hispanic Caucus 2019). In a 
break from the norm discussed in Chapter 4—where the CHC avoids taking stances on 
internally divisive issues for fear of presenting a divided message from a coalition that is 
ostensibly united in its representation of the Latinx community—the CHC issued this 
statement even though nine CHC members voted for H.R. 3401. Henry Cuellar, a Texan 
like Castro, voted yes because as a representative of a border district encompassing 
Laredo he considers as his top priority “to provide the necessary funding and resources to 
                                               
129 House Joint Resolution 46 passed the House and Senate by comfortable margins—245-182 in the 
House and 59-41 in the Senate. However, Trump vetoed the legislation and the subsequent House vote to 
override the veto failed to garner the necessary two-thirds majority, 248-181. 234 Democrats voted yes, 
while 14 Republicans crossed party lines; one Democrat and two Republicans did not vote. 
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help the children, families, and communities that are suffering at the southern border” 
(Taylor 2019). Divides over incremental versus holistic approaches to immigration 
reform are not new to the CHC; what portends uncertainty for the future of the group is 
the public statement despite disunity within the group, with even some of the more liberal 
members of the CHC voting yes on the legislation.130 
In a similar vein, the CHC is also grappling with the growing progressive push 
within the Democratic Caucus, owing in part to CHC member Alexandria Ocasio 
Cortez’s (D-NY) activism and fame. Ocasio-Cortez is treated by many media outlets—
and her Twitter followers—as one of the faces of the progressive movement, and the 
CHC gladly welcomed her into the fold. However, there appeared to be some 
reservations among incumbent CHC members regarding Ocasio-Cortez’s campaign call 
to abolish ICE (Carrasquillo 2018). However, the demographics within the CHC continue 
to change in a way that may obviate this potential disagreement—younger, more liberal 
members are starting to comprise a larger proportion of the CHC’s membership. They are 
balanced out by older, comparatively more moderate members, but as those older 
members retire from Congress—e.g. José Serrano, the longest-tenured member of the 
CHC, when his term ends in 2020—the CHC must decide what the group will look like 
going forward, especially as younger Latinxs’ come of age politically and begin to 
participate more fully in American politics. 
                                               
130 The CHC members who voted yes on H.R. 3401, in addition to Cuellar, are: Salud Carbajal (CA), Jim 
Costa (CA), Vicente Gonzalez (TX), Mike Levin (CA), Xochitl Torres Small (NM), Raul Ruiz (CA), José 
Serrano (NY), and Albio Sires (NJ). 
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 Another possible issue for the CHC in the future concerns the relationship 
between the CHC and the Latinx community. Here, I have focused on the ways in which 
the CHC and its members define Latinidad, the interests of the Latinx community, and 
how they pursue those interests in Congress. However, in doing so I narrowly focus on 
the perspectives and actions of Latinx political elites with little mention of how Latinx 
constituents think about their own identity or what issues they think are most important 
for their community. Thus there is the distinct possibility that while the CHC pays 
attention to Latinx diversity and incorporates this into its very character and actions in 
Congress, the CHC may still act counter to the interests of many of the Latinxs it 
represents. The risk here is underscored sizable numbers of Latinx votes going to 
Republican candidates in key races in the 2018 midterms for the U.S. Senate and 
governorships in Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas. 
Table 6.1 Latinx Vote Choice in 2018 Senate and Governor Races 
 GOP 
Candidate 
(Gov.) 
 
Dem. 
Candidate 
(Gov.) 
GOP 
Candidate 
(Senate) 
Dem. 
Candidate 
(Senate) 
AZ 
 
27% 70% 31% 69% 
CA 
 
19% 77% N/A N/A 
FL 
 
36% 61% 45% 54% 
NV 
 
26% 69% 30% 67% 
TX 42% 53% 35% 64% 
 
Since Republican members left the CHC in the late 1990s, the CHC membership has 
been entirely composed of congressional Democrats (see Chapter 2). But Latinxs do not 
uniformly vote for Democratic candidates for national or statewide office. In Florida, a 
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significant number of Latinxs voted for Republican Rick Scott in the Senate election over 
incumbent Democrat Bill Nelson despite Scott’s support for many of the Trump 
administration’s immigration policies. A similar trend is present in Texas, where over 
40% of Latinxs voted for Republican Greg Abbott in the gubernatorial election despite 
his strong support for the national GOP’s presumably anti-Latinx agenda. A public 
opinion survey fielded in 2019 by Latino Decisions also indicated Latinxs’ willingness to 
vote for Republican candidates in future elections if the voters feel the candidates share 
their values and policy priorities (Schaller 2019). The demonstrated willingness of 
Latinxs to vote for Republican candidates in past and future elections, coupled with the 
CHC’s strongly Democratic leanings since the late 1990s, raise questions about how in 
touch the CHC is with the political leanings and preferences of the Latinx community as 
a whole. Investigating this relationship also speaks to the agenda setting process of the 
CHC and the desirability of coalitional representation—given that the CHC’s agenda 
largely consists of positions that are congruent with those of the Democratic Caucus and 
that the CHC frequently castigates Republicans as anti-Latinx, it is unlikely that 
Republican Latinxs in the mass public feel represented by this coalition, let alone 
individual Democratic Latinx legislators.131 
                                               
131 A logical outgrowth of this research concerns the role of state equivalents of the CHC. The CHC’s 
decision to take Democratic positions and interpolate these onto the Latinx community is possibly a 
reaction to the perception that most Latinxs identify as Democrats, and thus the CHC chooses to focus on 
the majority of the national constituency. At the state level, though, legislators must pay attention to 
distinctions at a much smaller level—e.g. by county or by city—that expose legislators to significantly 
more diversity among their Latinx constituents. These state caucuses, then, may exhibit a form of 
coalitional representation that is even more attuned to Latinx diversity than that of the CHC. State caucuses 
are also likely to have different legislative agendas than the CHC, given the inability of states to legislate 
on certain issues such as immigration, but also the ability of states to engage in more targeted legislative 
activity on other issues, e.g. education. 
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 Ultimately, future research has significant potential to qualify or bolster the 
findings presented here. We now have a firm grasp of how Latinx political elites in 
Congress navigate the diversity of the Latinx community in their efforts to form a 
coalition that provides a voice in Congress for as many Latinxs as possible. What we do 
not know is how these efforts and the CHC’s active recognition and incorporation of 
Latinx diversity is actually perceived—if at all—by Latinx constituents or if the CHC’s 
elite perspective leans more toward issues that are considered insignificant by the Latinx 
community. Even if there is a disconnect between the CHC and Latinxs in the mass 
public though, the evidence here provides reason to believe that the CHC and its 
members will continue to do what they believe is best for the Latinx community out of a 
legitimate desire to bolster Latinx representation rather than cynically courting votes for 
reelection. In this sense, the CHC and its practice of coalitional representation push 
American political institutions in the direction of justice and towards being more fully 
representative and democratic. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
 The membership of the CHC for each session of Congress from the 95th Congress 
(1977-1978) through the 116th Congress (2019-2020) is listed below. 
 
** denotes CHC Chair. Prior to the 101st Congress, the CHC’s officer elections coincided 
with Hispanic Heritage Month in September rather than the ending of the current 
congressional session. As a result, there were technically two Chairs in the 98th, 99th, 
100th, and 101st Congresses, though their terms never overlapped. 
 
+ denotes a non-voting member of the House. 
 
95th (1977-1978) 
1. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA)** 
2. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
3. Rep. Herman Badillo (D-NY) – until December 31, 1977 
4. Rep. Robert García (D-NY) – from February 14, 1978 
5. Resident Commissioner Baltasar Corrada del Río (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
6. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
7. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
 
96th (1979-1980) 
1. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA)** 
2. 2. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
3. Rep. Robert García (D-NY) 
4. Resident Commissioner Baltasar Corrada del Río (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
5. Rep. E “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
6. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
 
97th (1981-1982) 
1. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
2. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
4. Rep. Robert García (D-NY)** 
5. Resident Commissioner Baltasar Corrada del Río (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
6. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
7. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
8. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
98th (1983-1984) 
1. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
2. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
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3. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
5. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM)** 
6. Rep. Robert García (D-NY)** 
7. Resident Commissioner Baltasar Corrada del Río (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
8. Rep. E “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
9. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
10. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
11. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
99th (1985-1986) 
1. Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA) 
2. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA)** 
3. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
5. Del. Ben Blaz (R-Guam)+ 
6. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
7. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM)** 
8. Rep. Robert García (D-NY) 
9. Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
10. Rep. Albert Bustamante (D-TX) 
11. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
12. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
13. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
14. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
100th (1987-1988) 
1. Rep. Tony Coelho (D-CA) 
2. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA)** 
5. Del. Ben Blaz (R-Guam)+ 
6. Rep. Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-NM) 
7. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) 
8. Rep. Robert García (D-NY) 
9. Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster (D-Puerto Rico)+** 
10. Rep. Albert Bustamante (D-TX)** 
11. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
12. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
13. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
101st (1989-1990) 
1. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
2. Rep. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
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4. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 
5. Del. Ben Blaz (R-Guam)+ 
6. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) 
7. Rep. Robert García (D-NY) 
8. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
9. Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster (D-Puerto Rico)+** 
10. Rep. Albert Bustamante (D-TX) 
11. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX)** 
12. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
13. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
102nd (1991-1992) 
1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
3. Red. Ed Roybal (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 
6. Del. Ben Blaz (R-Guam)+ 
7. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) 
8. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
9. Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster (D-Puerto Rico)+ - until March 4, 1992 
10. Resident Commissioner Antonio Colorado (D-Puerto Rico)+ - from March 4, 
1992 
11. Rep. Albert Bustamante (D-TX) 
12. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
13. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX)** 
14. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
103rd (1993-1994) 
1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart (R-FL) 
7. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 
8. Del. Robert Underwood (D-Guam)+ 
9. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
10. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
11. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) 
12. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY)** 
13. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
14. Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
15. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) 
16. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
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17. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
18. Rep. Frank Tejeda (D-TX) 
19. Del. Ron de Lugo (D-Virgin Islands)+ 
 
104th (1995-1996) 
1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ)** 
2. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Lincoln Díaz-Balart (R-FL) 
7. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 
8. Del. Robert Underwood (D-Guam)+ 
9. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
10. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
11. Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) 
12. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
13. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
14. Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
15. Rep. Henry Bonilla (R-TX) 
16. Rep. E. “Kika” de la Garza (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
18. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
19. Rep. Frank Tejeda (D-TX) 
 
105th (1997-1998) 
1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA)** 
3. Rep. Matthew Martínez (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Esteban Torres (D-CA) 
7. Del. Robert Underwood (D-Guam)+ 
8. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
9. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
10. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
11. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
12. Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
13. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX) 
14. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
15. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
16. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) 
 
106th (1999-2000) 
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1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA)** 
6. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
7. Del. Robert Underwood (D-Guam)+ 
8. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
9. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
10. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
11. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
12. Resident Commissioner Carlos Romero Barceló (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
13. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
14. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
15. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
16. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) 
 
107th (2001-2002) 
1. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
3. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Hilda Solis (D-CA) 
8. Del. Robert Underwood (D-Guam)+ 
9. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
10. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
11. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
12. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
13. Resident Commissioner Aníbal Acevedo Vilá (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
14. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
15. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
16. Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)** 
18. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) 
 
108th (2003-2004) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Dennis Cardoza (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
 262 
7. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Hilda Solis (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
12. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
13. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
14. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
15. Resident Commissioner Aníbal Acevedo Vilá (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
16. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
18. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
19. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
20. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX)** 
 
109th (2005-2006) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Dennis Cardoza (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA)** 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Hilda Solis (D-CA) 
12. Rep. John Salazar (D-CO) 
13. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
14. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) – Senator after January 16, 2006 
15. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
16. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
17. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
18. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
19. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
20. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
21. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
22. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
 
110th (2007-2008) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA)** 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Dennis Cardoza (D-CA) 
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6. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Hilda Solis (D-CA) 
10. Rep. John Salazar (D-CO) 
11. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
12. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
13. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
14. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
15. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
16. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
17. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
18. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
19. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
20. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
21. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) 
 
111th (2009-2010) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Dennis Cardoza (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. John Salazar (D-CO) 
12. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
13. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
14. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
15. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
16. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
17. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
18. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY)** 
19. Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
20. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
21. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX) 
22. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
23. Rep. Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) 
24. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
25. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX) 
 
112th (2011-2012) 
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1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Joe Baca (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Dennis Cardoza (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
12. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
13. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
14. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
15. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
16. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
17. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
18. Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
19. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
20. Rep. Charlie Gonzalez (D-TX)** 
21. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
22. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) 
 
113th (2013-2014) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ed Pastor (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Gloria Negrete McLeod (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
12. Rep. Juan Vargas (D-CA) 
13. Rep. Joe Garcia (D-FL) 
14. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
15. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
16. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
17. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
18. Rep. Michelle Lujan Grisham (D-NM) 
19. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
20. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
21. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
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22. Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
23. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX) 
24. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
25. Rep. Pete Gallego (D-TX) 
26. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX)** 
 
114th (2015-2016) 
1. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Pete Aguilar (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA)** 
12. Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA) 
13. Rep. Juan Vargas (D-CA) 
14. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
15. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
16. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
17. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
18. Rep. Michelle Lujan Grisham (D-NM) 
19. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
20. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
21. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
22. Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi (D-Puerto Rico)+ 
23. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX) 
24. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
25. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-TX) 
26. Rep. Filemon Vela (D-TX) 
 
115th (2017-2018) 
1. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Jim Costa (CA) 
4. Rep. Salud Carbajal (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Pete Aguilar (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Jimmy Gomez (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA) 
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11. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
12. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
13. Rep. Nanette Diaz Barragán (D-CA) 
14. Rep. Lou Correa (D-CA) 
15. Rep. Juan Vargas (D-CA) 
16. Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL) 
17. Rep. Luis Gutiérrez (D-IL) 
18. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
19. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
20. Rep. Michelle Lujan Grisham (D-NM)** 
21. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
22. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
23. Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) 
24. Rep. Ruben Kihuen (D-NV) 
25. Rep. Adriano Espaillat (D-NY) 
26. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
27. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
28. Rep. Vicente Gonzalez (D-TX) 
29. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX) 
30. Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
31. Rep. Filemon Vela (D-TX) 
 
116th (2019-2020) 
1. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) 
2. Rep. Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ) 
3. Rep. Pete Aguilar (D-CA) 
4. Rep. Nanette Diaz Barragán (D-CA) 
5. Rep. Salud Carbajal (D-CA) 
6. Rep. Tony Cárdenas (D-CA) 
7. Rep. Gil Cisneros (D-CA) 
8. Rep. Lou Correa (D-CA) 
9. Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA) 
10. Rep. Jimmy Gomez (D-CA) 
11. Rep. Mike Levin (D-CA) 
12. Rep. Grace Napolitano (D-CA) 
13. Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) 
14. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA) 
15. Rep. Linda Sánchez (D-CA) 
16. Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA) 
17. Rep. Juan Vargas (D-CA) 
18. Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (D-FL) 
19. Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL) 
20. Del. Michael San Nicolas (D-Guam)+ 
21. Rep. Jesús “Chuy” García (D-IL) 
22. Rep. Lori Trahan (D-MA) 
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23. Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) 
24. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
25. Rep. Albio Sires (D-NJ) 
26. Rep. Ben Ray Luján (D-NM) 
27. Rep. Xochitl Torres Small (D-NM) 
28. Rep. Adriano Espaillat (D-NY) 
29. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) 
30. Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) 
31. Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY) 
32. Del. Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands)+ 
33. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)** 
34. Rep Henry Cuellar (D-TX) 
35. Rep. Veronica Escobar (D-TX) 
36. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX) 
37. Rep. Vicente Gonzalez (D-TX) 
38. Rep. Filemon Vela (D-TX) 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Interviews 
 
 Included below are the original interview questions asked of CHC members and 
staffers during the interviews. Due to time constraints not all questions were asked in 
every interview, and in many instances the responses of the interviewees prompted 
unscripted follow-up questions. Congressional staffers were asked the same questions 
with modified wordings commensurate with their role. 18 interviews were conducted, 
either via phone or in person: 7 Democratic CHC members (all of whom served as Chair 
at one point) and 11 Democratic staffers who either worked for or alongside the CHC. 
Several attempts to secure interviews with Republican CHC members and staffers proved 
unsuccessful. 
 
I. Initial experiences with CHC 
1. How did you decide to run for Congress? 
2. What were some of the issues you were most interested in when you first got to 
Congress? 
3. How much of what you cared about was affected by representing a majority-
Latino district? 
4. How did you go about joining the CHC – did they approach you, or did you know 
you wanted to join as soon as you made it to Congress? 
5. How did joining the CHC affect your ability to legislate on the issues you cared 
about? 
6. What was your initial impression of the CHC? 
7. Did you think of the CHC as an independent organization, or a partner of 
congressional/party leadership? 
8. How important was the CHC to your work in Congress in general? 
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II. Working in the CHC 
1. What positions did you hold in the CHC during your tenure? 
a. How did you come to be in this position – did you have to actively 
campaign to get your CHC colleagues to vote for you? 
b. How would you say serving in this position affected your other efforts as a 
member of Congress? 
c. Would you say that your work in this position aided your efforts at 
representing your district? 
i. [If yes] Why do you think your work in the CHC facilitated 
representation of your district? 
2. How did the CHC decide on its legislative agenda? 
a. How much of the legislative agenda depended on who was chair at the 
time? 
b. How similar (or different) was the CHC’S agenda to that of the House as a 
whole? 
c. How much of the CHC’s agenda was a response to the House’s agenda 
(especially when Republicans controlled the House), or to the President’s 
agenda? 
d. How often did the CHC agenda include issues that were divisive among 
CHC members? 
i. What was the source of this division – was it because of different 
viewpoints among different Latino ethnicities, or something 
different? 
ii. How did the CHC decide where to stand on these internally 
divisive issues? 
iii. How did those tensions affect the interactions between CHC 
members? 
iv. Do you think that CHC membership was representative of the 
Latino population in the US as a whole? 
e. Did the CHC ever prioritize issues in its agenda that clashed with the 
Democratic Party’s agenda? 
3. How active were the CHC task forces in shaping the CHC’s legislative agenda in 
a given session of Congress? 
4. Given that most CHC members have been Democrats, to what extent during your 
tenure did the CHC try to work with the Republican Party? 
a. When the CHC did work with Republicans, what was the response from 
the Democratic Party? 
b. How did CHC members view the decision of Republican Latinos to leave 
the CHC, and later form the Hispanic Conference? 
5. When the CHC chose to back people in elections, for executive appointments, or 
for committee assignments, how were those decisions made within the Caucus? 
a. How strongly would the CHC push for these candidates? 
b. Did the CHC have sufficient access to attempt to persuade the president on 
executive appointments? 
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c. How successful was the CHC in pushing for its members to receive 
favorable committee assignments? 
6. How would you assess the role of the CHC in the House when you left Congress? 
a. Was the CHC still relatively independent, or was it closely tied to the 
Democratic leadership? 
7. What do you think were some of the biggest challenges the CHC has faced? 
a. Do you see it as a challenge trying to come up with an agenda that serves 
the interests of all Latinos equally? 
b. How would the CHC, or the individual members, do this? 
c. How would you deal with issues that affected some groups more than 
others, e.g. women’s issues, Cuba, Puerto Rico statehood? 
8. What are some of the major successes of the CHC? 
 
III. Daily Functions of the CHC 
1. After the ban on LSOs in the mid-1990s, where did the CHC receive funding 
from? 
a. Was the size of the budget ever a significant constraint on the CHC’s 
legislative efforts? 
b. Did the budget affect the ability of the CHC to hire dedicated staff? 
2. How important were the research and information services, such as regular 
legislative briefings, provided by the CHC to its members? 
a. Were these services unique to the CHC, or could members get this same 
information elsewhere? 
3. How often did the CHC whip need to convince CHC members to accept the CHC 
position on an issue? How effective was the whip? 
4. How were decisions made about which CHC members should testify before 
congressional committees on certain issues? 
5. How were decisions made about which CHC members should give floor speeches 
in favor of/against key pieces of legislation? 
6. When the CHC crafted its own proposed bills, how was it decided who should 
sponsor the bill and introduce it on the floor? 
7. What are the day-to-day interactions between the CHC and other organizations, 
either inside or outside Congress? 
a. How did CHC members perceive the role of the CHCI? 
b. What were interactions like between the CHC and other caucuses such as 
the CBC or the CAPAC? 
8. What were daily interactions like between the CHC and the Democratic Party? 
a. Did the CHC Chair have opportunities to engage with party leadership on 
issues of concern to the CHC? 
b. How did the CHC react if the Democratic Party took a stance opposite the 
CHC? 
c. How were relations with the Democratic Party affected by higher 
Republican support among Latinos in the 2000 and 2004 elections? 
 
IV. CHC Elections 
 270 
1. How did people decide whom to support in votes for CHC executive positions? 
a. Were the elections competitive, or was there a general consensus on who 
would serve in the leadership in a given session of Congress? 
b. Did members take into account factors such as seniority when casting their 
votes? 
 
V. Concluding Questions 
1.  [For MCs who served prior to 1994-95] How did Gingrich’s ban on LSOs affect 
the ability of the CHC to do its work? 
2. How would you judge the effectiveness of the CHC in representing Latino 
interests? 
3. Is there anything that you think the CHC could have done or approached 
differently during your time in Congress, or that you think it should be doing 
differently now? 
